



HUMAN SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCIL

# Safe and Inclusive Cities: Is social cohesion the missing link in overcoming violence, inequality and poverty?

## Preliminary research findings, Khayelitsha South Africa

---

April 2014

Edited by:  
Vanessa Barolsky

Contributions by:

Ncedo Mngqobisa (Field reports)  
Ben Roberts (Fear of crime)  
Lizette Lancaster (Crime statistics)  
Godwin Onouha (African cities)  
Diana Sanchez and Godwin Onouha (Formality and Informality)  
Yu Ke (Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry)

<a href="#"><u>Introduction</u></a> .....	2
<a href="#"><u>Khayelitsha the township</u></a> .....	7
<a href="#"><u>Crime in Khayelitsha</u></a> .....	9
<a href="#"><u>Violent crime trends in Khayelitsha</u></a> .....	12
<a href="#"><u>Fear of crime</u></a> .....	16
<a href="#"><u>Victimisation and fear of crime in Khayelitsha</u></a> .....	18
<a href="#"><u>Gang violence</u></a> .....	22
<a href="#"><u>Gangsters</u></a> .....	26
<a href="#"><u>Policing</u></a> .....	31
<a href="#"><u>Vigilante violence and non-state forms of social ordering in Khayelitsha</u></a> .....	37
<a href="#"><u>Taxi associations</u></a> .....	41
<a href="#"><u>The pollicisation of security</u></a> .....	43
<a href="#"><u>Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU)</u></a> .....	44
<a href="#"><u>Understanding the African city</u></a> .....	49
<a href="#"><u>Interpreting the African city</u></a> .....	51
<a href="#"><u>VPUU: formality and informality</u></a> .....	52
<a href="#"><u>The informal economy in South Africa</u></a> .....	52
<a href="#"><u>Trading kiosks</u></a> .....	58
<a href="#"><u>Voice and power</u></a> .....	59
<a href="#"><u>External models</u></a> .....	62
<a href="#"><u>Divisions</u></a> .....	64
<a href="#"><u>Training</u></a> .....	64
<a href="#"><u>Uneven development of infrastructure</u></a> .....	65
<a href="#"><u>Under-utilisation of public spaces and trading facilities</u></a> .....	66
<a href="#"><u>Resistance to formalisation</u></a> .....	71
<a href="#"><u>Conclusion</u></a> .....	73
<a href="#"><u>References</u></a> .....	83

## Introduction

Karl van Holdt has noted,

Post-apartheid South Africa is an extremely violent society, with high levels of violent crime, sexual violence, intimate partner violence and collective violence (Seedat et al., 2010), as well as high levels of police violence. Scholars have explained this variously in terms of socioeconomic inequality, cultures of violence inherited from apartheid and the struggle against it, and historical trauma deriving from the same history, but with a more psychological inflection (Seedat et al., 2010). (Van Holdt, 2013)

Thus democracy has not automatically led to a significant reduction of violence or the establishment of a 'rule of law' culture in South Africa as in many post-colonial states.

The Comaroffs (2006, p. 1) have argued in this vein,

political liberation in postcolonial, post-totalitarian worlds, and the economic liberalization on which it has floated, has implied, as its dark underside, an *ipso facto* deregulation of monopolies over the means of legitimate force, of moral orders, of the protection of persons and property. And an unravelling, more or less, of the fabric of law-and-order.

Therefore democracy may mask new forms of violence and inequality. Van Holdt (2013) argues that, 'there is a deep sense that South African democracy masks great inequalities, and that the promises of liberation have not been experienced by workers (von Holdt, 2013). Workers, in other words, are acutely aware of the structural violence which continues to oppress them' (von Holdt, 2013, p.118)

Critically also inherent to democracy are unequal structures of empowerment. As a consequence 'democracy...does not empower everyone equally, but itself constitutes a structure of differential power. For those who are marginalised and disempowered, violence provides an alternative strategy for reconfiguring the structures of power' (von Holdt, 2013, p.118)

Thus the marginalised respond to the 'structural violence' or what Žižek calls, 'objective violence-violence inherent to the "normal" order of things' (Žižek, 2008, p. 2) i.e. inequality, with 'subjective' violence, that is, overt violence.

Chatterjee (2001) has sought to articulate these struggles that occur outside the law and constitution among people who are formally citizens but in actual fact exist on the boundaries of the polity. These exclusions of citizenship, he argues, underpin the emergence in India of what he calls, 'political society', which occupies a zone between, 'the state on the one hand and civil society as bourgeois society on the other' (p 8). In this context, there has been a

widening of the arena of political mobilization...from formally organized structures, such as political parties with well-ordered internal constitutions and coherent doctrines and programmes, to loose and often transient mobilizations, building on communication structures that would not ordinarily be recognized as political(p 14).

This is, 'a domain of politics that is located neither within the constitutional limits of the state nor in the orderly transactions of bourgeois civil society, even though it is about both' (p 16). Critically, Chaterjee argues, 'political society' exists in a 'normatively nebulous zone', a zone of violence and 'disorder',

This is a zone where... the certainties of civil and social norms and constitutional proprieties are put under challenge. Rights and rules have to be, seemingly, negotiated afresh. Only those voices are heard that can make the loudest noise and can speak on behalf of the largest numbers. There is violence in the air. (p. 20)

It is in this 'normatively nebulous zone' where some of the most significant contestations in post-apartheid townships such as Khayelitsha are played out, not only in the realm of the overtly political, but also in sphere of the 'private' where gender and generational hierarchies are a source of deep contestation. Thus, 'there is an argument deep within communities over the authority of law and community enforcement of codes of behaviour, over the state and extra-state action' (von Holdt, 2013).

Therefore establishing democracy is a deeply and sometimes violently contested project, 'the formation of a democratic post-apartheid state is a drawn-out process of physical and symbolic contestation in which both popular agency and state agency are involved in a struggle to order and exert control over physical and symbolic territory (von Holdt et al., 2011, p. 122). In this context, 'the new democratic state has not been able to securely re-establish the authority of the law, with the result that it tends to receive a qualified and provisional acceptance in many quarters' (von Holdt, p. 123)

## Methodology

This report has sought to triangulate a range of data in order to ensure as complete a picture of the current context in Khayelitsha as possible emerges. On the one hand we have utilised quantitative data provided by our partner, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), based on the most recently released official crime statistics and the most recent Census data from 2011. This enables us to provide a detailed analysis of crime trends in Khayelitsha, particularly since 2010. This analysis will be extended further in future reports.

Secondly we have engaged in an extensive review of relevant secondary literature to assist us to analyse the emerging dynamics in Khayelitsha. Literature on the African city and formality and informality have been a significant focus in this report. We have also canvassed secondary sources to provide information on the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) project.

The ongoing Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry has been a significant source of data that still needs to be further utilised. The Commission commissioned a number of research reports on Khayelitsha and these have provided a valuable and up to date source of information on the township. In addition transcripts, statements and affidavits made to the Commission provide further useful data.

## Ethnography

In addition we have been engaged in ethnographic fieldwork in the township of Khayelitsha. The ethnographic fieldwork began in late November 2013 and will continue until at least until August 2014. The first phase of this work has involved an in-depth scoping exercise which involved identifying and meeting with a range of local stakeholders as well as conducting participant observation in Harare and Kuyasa, the main sites in Khayelitsha where there has been VPUU investment. The two sites are also useful to compare because although they have both benefited from VPUU investment, this investment has been higher in

Harare. Therefore it is possible to analyse comparative effects. The table below provides a list of the stakeholders we have interviewed.

Ethnography has multiple definitions, but in a very basic sense it refers to the understanding of the life world of others through the researcher, and this is done through intensive field work, which yields 'thick description' of what is observed and verbatim quotations from interviews. It is intended to give 'voice' to 'ordinary' people in a particular context. The story is told through the eyes of local people as they go about their daily activities. (Fetterman, 2010, p. 1). The ethnographer is thus 'both storyteller and scientist. The closer the reader in an ethnography comes to understanding the [local people's] perspective, the better the story and the better the science' (Fetterman, 2010, p. 1).

Thus the ethnographer tries to understand human experience on its own terms, rather than trying evaluate what it lacks in terms of conventional expectations. This is particularly important in African and post-colonial contexts in general where there is a tendency to subject African experience to normative judgements which render these life experiences 'irrational', 'backward' and 'lacking'. This approach does not mean a naive acceptance of this experience as an essentialist 'truth', or that this experience cannot be critiqued, nor contextualised and placed in historical and social context, but it does mean that a non-hierarchical and non-judgemental stance must be taken towards this experience. On the other hand, the analysis of these 'real-life' experiences needs to be linked to a theoretically informed, broader analysis of a particular society at a particular time, including an analysis of the power relations that structure and shape social relations and social experience.

Ethnography therefore refers both to the research process and to the product of this effort-a written ethnographic account. Ethnography means, literally, a picture of the 'way of life' of an identifiable group of people. These people could be any culture-bearing group in any time and place. While the meaning of the term culture is a source of ongoing debate among anthropologists, a useful description for our purposes here is that provided by the anthropologist Ward Goodenough (1976, p. 5):

The culture of any society is made up of the concepts, beliefs, and principles of action and organization that an ethnographer has found could be attributed successfully to the members of the society in the context of his dealings with them. i.e. the work of ethnography is essentially one of interpretation of the meanings located in particular social and cultural systems. As Weber argued social actors are suspended in webs of meaning that they, themselves create and they sustain meaningful and stable social relationships with each other because they share those common understandings of reality. Behaviours such as compliance to the law or non-compliance are understood and interpreted in terms of shared norms and values, which may either sanction or condone such conduct.

O'Reilly (2012) has argued that the critical elements of ethnography include: 1) the understanding and representation of experience 2) presenting and explaining the culture in which that experience is located, but also acknowledging that experience is 'entrained in the flow of history' i.e. shaped by historical experience, 3) Ethnography also involves direct and sustained contact with human beings in the course of their daily lives over a prolonged period, 4) It draws on a 'family' of methods including conversation and participant observations, 5) it respects the complexity of the social world, and therefore tells rich, credible and sensitive stories, 6) Ethnography should be informed by a theory of practice that understands social life as the outcome of the interaction between structure and agency through the practices of everyday life i.e. by examining individual lives, we are able to understand how structural factors such as class interact with

individual agency, for example decisions whether or not to participate in violence, 7) Examines social life as it unfolds over time, including looking at how people feel, located within an analysis of wider structures, 8) The ethnographer must continuously examine their own role, reflexively, in the construction of social life, 9) The ethnographer must determine the methods to apply and how to apply them as part of the reflexive practice of ethnography, i.e. methods are not absolutely determined up front, (although there is a general research plan), and may change depending on the unfolding research context. (O'Reilly, 2012, p. 3)

Critically in ethnography the researcher and/or research team is the research instrument and he/she must make decisions about how and what to sample and about issues which currently require attention. This is different to quantitative research where the researcher administers a research instrument and analyses the resulting data. This inductive approach to research attempts to generate ideas from the data which are then explored further (see Glaser, B and Strauss, A, 1967, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory*). The idea is that theories, hypotheses, insights, should emerge from the observations, so that they are grounded in observed experience. This may involve a process of progressive focusing where the observer begins to sort out the peripheral from the central factors involved and directs his/her attention to looking at key contexts for the vital evidence.

It is essential that the ethnographer goes to the field with an 'open' mind, which allows for the discovery of 'unexpected' data i.e. rich new data that was not necessarily included in the initial research design and what has been called 'serendipity' i.e. the emergence of data that provides, sometimes by chance in the course of fieldwork, significant new insights. For example, Ncedo's presence at sites of vigilante, criminal and gang violence was not planned but was the result of his day to day presence in the research site. However, an 'open mind' does not mean people go to the field with an 'empty' head. They begin with a research problem, for example, the link between social cohesion and violence, and a research design, for example a phased approach to research as well as particular, although flexible methodologies (participatory urban appraisal, social network analysis) that they intend to pursue (Fetterman, 2010, p. 2). On the other hand as the fieldwork progresses methodologies may shift or be refined based on deeper knowledge of the research site.

In addition it is important to acknowledge that the ethnographer, like all researchers, inevitably brings to their work their own preconceptions, assumptions and worldview. In ethnography this potential bias is dealt with through a process called 'reflexivity' where the researcher continually reflects on their own interpretation of the data and the ways in which this interpretation is impacted on by their own cultural positioning and worldviews. Events and discussions may also evoke a range of emotions for the ethnographer such as anger, fear, hope and connection. It is important therefore for the ethnographer to record and reflect on their own emotional responses to the material. This report has therefore included some of the reflections of the fieldworker, Ncedo in response to what he has observed and heard. This reveals both his emotional relation to the events that have unfolded as well as the ways in which his interpretations are based on his own life history, experiences and social identity.

Thus on a number of occasions Ncedo grapples with his own ambiguities around violence as someone who also grew up in an impoverished and violent township. He also reflects on his emotions around particular events, whether a robbery he witnesses that evokes fear to an incident of vigilante violence, which evoked a sense of confusion and dismay. Crucially also the ethnographer records the emotions of the people with whom he or she speaks. When people tell their story to the researcher, this is not a neutral endeavour as would more likely be case when asked to give a yes or no response to closed ended questions, but is inevitably shaped by the interviewees' own sense of themselves, their place in the world, their sense of

themselves as victim or active agents in the events they recount as well as the way in which they connect with the researcher. Often therefore stories are accompanied by strong emotions whether they are sadness, anger, frustration, resignation or anxiety. This does not mean that what the interviewees express is invalid because it is 'subjective' and shaped by their own biases. What it does mean is it is important for the researcher to locate themselves in a critical (but non-judgemental) stance from the interviewee's story so that they are able to analyse these 'biases' and emotional responses as research material themselves. One person's anger about an incident of violence and another person's indifference to same incident of violence reveals a lot about the interviewees, for example their subjectivities and values around violence and their life experience in relation to violence (those who are repeatedly exposed to violence may become desensitised).

Ethnography is therefore a highly interpretive process, unlike quantitative methodologies which focus on enumerating apparently objective phenomena, for example how many murders took place in a given period. An ethnographic approach would seek to understand the context in which the murder took place, the values and practices of the perpetrator and the impact of the violence on its victims. The interpretive nature of ethnography may mean that there can be different interpretations of the same data by different team members or interpretations may change over time as a result of new knowledge and deeper understanding of the field context develop.

The data collection methods in this study so far have involved interviews which produced direct quotations and observations which produced descriptions. During the multiple field visits, ethnographic interviews and participant observation were undertaken, and they make up the bulk of data for the ethnographic research. The basic reason for this is that the people or context that is being studied was the major focus of the research, although the researcher brought his own knowledge, life experience and interpretive skill, particularly in the context of observational research, which involved the witnessing of incidents of crime (robbery), gang violence and vigilante violence.

	<b>Contact</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
1	Senior member	Community Connections
2	Founder and member	18 Gangsters Museum
3	Three members	Singalakhe Cooperative, Mandela Peace Park
4	Three senior members (Chairperson, secretary and executive member)	Ntlazane Traders Association
5	Chairperson	Sanco Endlovini
6	S (community member)	Endlovini informal settlement
7	B	Former Reference member of VPUU in Kuyasa
8	Councillor Sobuza	Government/Harare
9	Councillor Nguzi	Government/Kuyasa
10	Chairperson	Khayelitsha Traders Association
11	Secretary	Khayelitsha Traders Association
12	Mr Ndithini (chairperson)	Khayelitsha Development Forum
<b>Other Interviewees</b>		
13	4 Traders	Khayelitsha Station
14	2 Traders	Harare Square
15	Two former skoolies ( robbers)	Khayelitsha
16	Two school girls	Kuyasa Station
17	Two Security guards	Mandela Peace Park
	<b>Total number of interviewees</b>	<b>29</b>

## Khayelitsha the township

Khayelitsha is located approximately 35 km from Cape Town's Central Business District. It is estimated that around 400,000 inhabitants live there (Seekings 2013). The population consists largely of black South Africans. Just over one half of Khayelitsha's dwellings in 2011 were shacks, mostly in shack settlements (46%), but some in the backyards of other dwellings (9%) (especially in the oldest, northern Site B area of Khayelitsha) (Seekings, 2013). Informal settlements are mainly concentrated in the Northern Areas of the township (Bauer 2010). The Census data suggest that the median household income in Khayelitsha in 2011 was about R20,000 p.a., whereas in Cape Town as a whole it was about R40,000 p.a., or double the Khayelitsha figure (Seekings, 2013), which is still very low. This means that one half of Khayelitsha's population are in the poorest per capita income quintile in Cape Town with a household incomes of less than R1,600 per month and R19,200 per annum. (Seekings, 2013)

High levels of poverty are clearly associated with high levels of unemployment. Seekings analyses the most recent census data and concludes that the overall employment rate for adults aged 20-59 in Khayelitsha in 2011 was 46%. The unemployment rate (inclusive of discouraged workseekers) was 40%. By comparison, the employment rate among African people in Cape Town excepting Khayelitsha was 49%, and the unemployment rate was 35%. Unemployment rates were highest among younger men and women, and declined with age. Among young men and women in their 20s in Khayelitsha, more than one half (52%) were unemployed in 2011 (2013). This lack of employment among young people is critically linked to lack of education, less than half (40%) of young adults in Khayelitsha have completed high school. This excludes these young people from available semi-skilled work and places them in the pool of labour only eligible for unskilled work, which is in short supply. (Seekings, 2013)

On the other hand there is clear differentiation within Khayelitsha, i.e. not all areas are equally poor and more specifically equally serviced. It is also important to note the variation in social conditions between the three police station precincts that exist in Khayelitsha-the Khayelitsha police station area, comprising the northern and oldest parts of the township, Lingeletu West, comprising the central area of Khayelitsha and Harare, comprising the eastern and southern parts of the township. Lingeletu West police precinct includes a much higher proportion of formal housing with much better access to municipal services (Seekings, 2013).

Access to basic sanitation and lighting is particularly poor in the informal settlements. In shack settlements less than one quarter have easy access to taps, less than one half have flush toilets connected to the sewerage system, and less than two-thirds use electricity for lighting. There have been ongoing social protests regarding lack of basic services. (Seekings, 2013)

Some of the most publicised included a series of protests organised by the ANC Youth League in 2010 to protest against a series of toilets that were built without enclosures in anticipation of a housing development in Silverton (north of Mandela Park) and in parts of Makhaza. The City council had ostensibly reached an agreement that they would enclose the toilets but most had not done so. This led to the extreme indignity of people using unenclosed toilets. The toilets have subsequently been enclosed by the City. Further protests by the people associated with the ANCYL were conducted against the roll out of communal chemical toilets. Research by the Social Justice Coalition found that many of the toilets were inadequately serviced by the Council and were unusable although the Council argued that the toilets were being



vandalised. ANC Youth League members dumped faeces in public places to protest against the toilets. (Seekings, 2013)

Although there has been an attempt to expand services this has not kept pace with the demand. According to Seekings between 1996 and 2011, the number of households using flush or chemical toilets doubled, the number of households using electricity for lighting (whether connected legally or illegally) more than doubled, and the number with water on site (increasingly inside the house) rose by more than 50%. (Seekings, 2013). However the population almost doubled during this period, leaving many without access to services.

On the other hand Seekings argues that the extent of migration into Khayelitsha has been exaggerated and in fact stabilised in the late 1980s. Census data revealed that between 2001 and 2011 an average of 55 000 people per year moved directly to Khayelitsha, while other people coming from the Eastern Cape in particular, moved to other townships in the Western Cape. Seekings also emphasises the extent which Khayelitsha, particularly newer areas such as Harare, has been significantly shaped by post-apartheid urban planning. (Seekings, 2013)

Nevertheless the composition of the Khayelitsha remains significantly impacted by migration related to its origins in apartheid planning. Khayelitsha was established by the South African government in 1983 as one of the last attempts at racially segregated urban development, becoming the youngest township of Cape Town. It was built to accommodate an increasing influx of migrants from the Eastern Cape and address overcrowding in existing townships (Bauer 2010).

Khayelitsha was initially envisaged as a 'small' township of approximately 120 000 that was intended to 'consolidate' the relatively small number of 'legally' residing African population in the Western Cape from the existing formal townships of Langa, Nyanga and Gugulethu. These residents were meant to be forcibly relocated to Khayelitsha while those who were in these townships 'illegally' under apartheid laws would be deported back to the Eastern Cape. However the apartheid government soon realised this plan was not feasible and eventually accepted that 'illegal' migrants would be accommodated in Khayelitsha, particularly in 'site' and 'service' schemes which provided plots of land with access to basic services but no housing. A small 'core' of 5000 two room formal housing was completed in 1985 (Seekings, 2013). However the migration of Khayelitsha soon outstripped formal housing opportunities. By 2011 approximately 50 000 formal houses had been built for the population of approximately 400 000. Nevertheless recent data shows that approximately half of those living in formal houses do own them. (Seekings, 2013)

As a result of its history and post-apartheid migration, Khayelitsha is what Seekings calls a 'largely immigrant community'. The 2011 Census found that only one in four adults (aged 20 or older) had been born in the Western Cape, with most adults (69%) born in the Eastern Cape. Only in the more prosperous neighbourhoods of central Khayelitsha were about one half of the adult residents born in the Western Cape. In newer shack settlements, almost everyone was an immigrant. Overall, Harare and Khayelitsha policing precincts in which this project is doing most of its fieldwork have much higher proportions of their adult populations born in the Eastern Cape (Seekings, 2013). Almost a third (30.9%) of the total population moved between 6 and 10 years ago with 13.2% having moved 21 years ago and 14.8% having moved less than 10 years ago (Thompson & Conradie, 2011). Significantly an important proportion of the population continues

to move between Khayelitsha and the Eastern Cape. Seekings notes that many elderly and unemployed young adult residents move to the Eastern Cape, for all or part of the year. (Seekings, 2013)

The picture changes however when one looks at children and adolescents. According to the most recent Census data, most (78% of) children and adolescents up to and including the age of 19 had been born in the Western Cape. Only 18% had been born in the Eastern Cape and 4% elsewhere (Seekings, 2013). Thus there is a 'new' generation of teenagers and young adults who have grown up in the Khayelitsha environment and it is these young people who are the most affected by crime both as victims and perpetrators.


It is also notable that over the last decade household size has significantly declined, from larger extended families which can provide mutual reciprocity and economic support, to increasing numbers of small households, a significant number of which (42%) are headed by women according to the 2011 Census. The median household size in Khayelitsha is now approximately 3 persons per household. (Seekings, 2013). Of these households many comprise young adults who are unable to find employment and are therefore unable to establish their own households. Young men find it difficult to marry because of social expectations that in order to marry you need to pay a traditional 'bride price' or *labola* to the family of the bride. Thus both young men and women remain as dependents in their parental home. (Seekings, 2013)

In terms of health in Khayelitsha, the township, like many other areas of the country, was severely affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Antenatal HIV prevalence rates reached 25% by 2002 and continued to rise to about 30% by 2006 before stabilising at this level. This was primarily the result of the increasing roll out of anti-retroviral medication nationally, although Khayelitsha benefited from the fact that it was the site of the pioneering rollout of a pilot anti-retroviral treatment (ART) programme in the early 2000s by Medecines sans Frontiers in defiance of national government policy which at the time denied the link between HIV and Aids. 2009 figures show that 13,500 people were receiving public-funded ARV treatment through ten sites in Khayelitsha. Women are significantly more vulnerable to and affected by HIV/AIDs with 31% of women in the township and 8% of men infected in 2009. (Seekings, 2013)

### Crime in Khayelitsha

Violent crime remains extremely high in South Africa as a whole, although homicide rates have steadily declined since 1994, partially as a result of the cessation of violent political conflict. Nevertheless according to the 2009 Global Peace Index, South Africa was the 123rd (out of 149) most violent country to live in. See graph one below for the trends in selected violent crime rates nationally, which reflect a decline, though to a very high level.

Graph 1



**Source: Institute for Security Studies**

Nevertheless murder rates have remained at high levels in comparative global terms. The latest release of statistics on homicide by United National Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODOC) found that South Africa ranked ninth in the world in terms of homicide. Violent crime has declined more slowly in the Western Cape than nationally. According to the Western Cape Department of Safety and Security murders committed in South Africa have reduced by 38.6% since 1994/1995 while they have only reduced by 15.4% in the Western Cape (Western Cape Department of Community Safety, 2012).

Even within this context of high levels of violent crime in the Western Cape as a whole, levels of crime and fear of crime are extraordinarily high in Khayelitsha. A report by the Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention (CJCP) quoted a report by the Medical Research Council, which used mortality and injury data to find that Khayelitsha had the highest murder and rape rates recorded nationally. (CJCP, 2014)

Violent crime in the Western Cape appears to be concentrated in a small number of police stations reflecting the significant social inequalities across the province. A report by the Western Cape Department of Community Safety in 2009 using 2010/2011 crime statistics found that although the Western Cape Province has 149 police precincts, there are ten police stations that account for more than 44.1% of murders. (Western Cape Department of Community Safety, 2012). Khayelitsha has consistently featured among the top five police stations alongside Nyanga, Gugulethu, Milnerton and Mfuleni. A Community Safety Barometer Project conducted by the Western Cape department of Community Safety in 2009/10 and 2011 and carried out by the Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention (CJCP) in 2011, also found high levels of victimisation in Khayelitsha and Harare, which emerged as the areas with the second and third highest victimization rates during the last three years. (Simelane, B.D & CJCP, 2011)

The Department of Community Safety found that at the ten police stations that having the highest level of murder in the country most murder cases (54.2%) were committed over weekends and, for the most part,

during the early hours of the morning, between 00h00 and 06h00. (Western Cape Department of Community Safety, 2012). This indicates significant level of interpersonal violence, probably fuelled by alcohol consumption. This seems to be supported by the CJCP report to the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry in 2014, which found that a common thread across all the groups that they interviewed in Khayelitsha was the fact that those most commonly responsible for the violence are known – both to the community and to the police, i.e. violence is not primarily committed by anonymous ‘strangers’.

Based on an analysis of the Forensic Pathology (mortuary and post mortem) data from 2011/12 and other data the Department of Community Safety found that that 87.1. % of murder victims were men and 13% female. Disturbingly the police stations where the highest numbers of women were murdered were recorded were in the two Khayelitsha police stations of Harare (16) and Khayelitsha (9). (Western Cape Department of Community Safety, 2012).

Although women may not be the most numerically significant victims of violence they are severely affected by it. The CJCP study found that Khayelitsha and Harare were two of four areas generally perceived as the most for unsafe for women, children, individuals with physical impairments and the elderly. (Simelane, B.D & CJCP, 2011)

As the Legal Resources Centre (LRC) stated in its submission to the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, ‘Girls and women are often beaten and raped whilst walking to and from communal toilets or fetching water from communal taps close to their homes; while domestic abuse poses a threat to women in their own homes’. The elderly also seem to be at risk. Khayelitsha has also been witness to some significant incidents of ‘hate crime’. This violence specifically targets a range of people considered ‘other’ such as ...‘refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people’. Khayelitsha was the scene of the sexual assault and murder in December 2003 of 22 year old Lorna Mlofana by a group of young men who learnt that she was HIV positive. Lorna was a leader of the Treatment Action Campaign in her area. At that stage the community and civil society organisations began calling upon the state to provide improved policing and service for rape victims. (LRC, 2014)

The Community Safety Barometer conducted by CJCP also found in its survey that Khayelitsha, Harare, Gugulethu and Kraaifontein were the communities in which women, children, the elderly and the physically-challenged were perceived to be the most vulnerable. In Khayelitsha 97.8% of respondents felt that children were not safe, 96.4% respondents felt that women were not safe, 93.9% felt that the physically challenged were not safe, 93.3% felt that the elderly were not safe. Respondents in general felt a high level of insecurity in their homes (74.0%), in their community (76.1%), while travelling (73.0%) and (71.6%) feared for their children’s safety, i.e. they felt a high level of insecurity in every realm of their lives and believed that certain groups were extremely vulnerable. (Simelane, B.D & CJCP, 2011)

In Harare the perception of the vulnerability of certain groups was only slightly lower, although still high with (89.2%) believing that women were not safe, (92.6%) believing that children were not safe, (91.9%) believing that the physically challenged were not safe, (92.4%) felt the elderly were not safe. Levels of insecurity in general, however were higher than in Khayelitsha with (90.0%) of respondents not feeling safe in their homes, (91.9%) not feeling safe in their community and (90.5%) not feeling safe while travelling and (91.6%) feared for their children’s safety. (Simelane, B.D & CJCP, 2011)

Thus the perception of the vulnerability of certain groups and of general insecurity is extraordinarily high.

In terms of the age group of people who are likely to be victims of violence, the Community Safety report of 2009 found that the majority (63.1%) of murder victims in the Western Cape were between the ages of 18 and 35, reflecting international trends that young men tend to be both the primary perpetrators and victims of violent crime. Further confirming the likelihood that many murders were committed during interpersonal violence between men was the finding from the mortuary data that most murders (49%) were committed by stabbings, followed by shooting (26%) and severe assaults (17%). (Western Cape Department of Community Safety, 2012)

Critically Mfuleni (44%), Khayelitsha (41%) and Harare (34%) were among police stations with highest number of gunshot murders. According to the Department of Community Safety, in those areas which are known for gang violence, the number of murders committed by shooting was significantly higher than the provincial norm. (Western Cape Department of Community Safety, 2012)

The mortuary data also found that the majority of victims (58.9%) were classified as African, followed by 'Coloured' (38.4%). According to the 2011 Census data, the African community in the Western Cape is slightly lower (38.63%) than the Coloured population (42.3%), meaning that proportionally more victims of murder were black South Africans. (Western Cape Department of Community Safety, 2012)

### **Violent crime trends in Khayelitsha**


According to Chris Giles, head of the VPUU social crime prevention programme in his testimony to the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry,

The first thing we measure is the murder rates and the slide I'll show isn't up to date but current at 2009/10 when I was responsible for these figures and essentially what it shows is the top graph which is the Khayelitsha or specifically Harare slide was rising more rapidly, the national, provincial and started to come down in 2006/07 when the intervention that we're responsible for started. We don't claim credit for this but it's indicated as a way of measuring whether what we're doing has an impact and these figures have been brought up to date but it's a complicated question of how you measure things. What this shows is a slow increase in the perception of safety.

The City of Cape Town has been reported as arguing that Khayelitsha has experienced a decline in crime of 24% since the introduction of VPUU areas. Harare, it says, has had a 33% reduction in crime. (Ground Up, 2013, <http://groundup.org.za/content/city-says-violence-prevention-efforts-working-activists-sceptical>)

Graph 2 below demonstrates some of the violent crime trends in Khayelitsha. According to the most recent data analysed by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) based on 2012/2013 SAPS crime data and the most recent population Census data from 2011, the murder rate for the Western Cape relative to the national murder rate has increased from a ratio of 40.7 compared to 31.3 murders nationally in 2010/2011 to 43.7 compared to 31.1 nationally in 2012/2013. This places the Western Cape nationally as the province with the ??? of violent crime. Within this context the three police station precincts in Khayelitsha, namely Khayelitsha police precinct, Harare police precinct and Lingeletu-West precinct have continued to suffer extremely significant violent crime rates. The murder ratio for all three police stations in Khayelitsha is well above both the national and provincial average. Khayelitsha police station recorded 108 murders per 100 000 people in 2012/2013. Harare police station has experienced a slight decline from 89.2 murders per 100 000 people in 2011/2012 to a ratio of 76.5 in 2012/2013. Lingeletu-West has experienced an alarming increase in murders from 67.7 to 76.5 in 2012/2013. See graph below.

Graph 2




**Source: Institute for Security Studies**

Another striking trend is the sharp increase in rates of robbery with aggravating circumstance, i.e. robbery associated with violence at all three police stations in Khayelitsha when calculated using the most recent Census data. All three police stations show rates that are above both provincial and national rates. See graph below.

Graph 3


## Khayelitsha Police Station Aggravated Robbery Rate



Source: Institute for Security Studies

In terms of aggravated assaults i.e. assaults with significant violence, the Western Cape has a significantly higher aggravated assault rate than the national average, which has been declining. In Khayelitsha there appears to have been a steady increase in aggravated assaults at Lingelethu-West police precinct, which is now at the provincial average. Aggravated assaults at Khayelitsha police precinct have significantly escalated and are now considerably above the already high provincial rate for this crime. Harare police station precinct appears to have consistently remained below the provincial average.

Graph 3




Source: Institute for Security Studies

Overall violent crime rates (an amalgamation of various violent crime categories), indicates that the violent crime rate in the Khayelitsha police precinct has rapidly escalated and is now well above the provincial average. The violent crime rate at Lingelethu-West has escalated since 2011/12 and is now at the provincial average. Harare violent crime rates have increased slightly but are still below the provincial average.



Graph 4



Source: Institute for Security Studies

### Fear of crime in South Africa

An analysis of South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) data from 1991 to 2013 reveals that historically there have been significant fluctuations in fear of crime in the South African context<sup>1</sup>. Following rising levels of fear of crime between 1991 and 1993, fear of crime showed a dramatic reduction in concern over personal safety coinciding with the lead-up to and immediate aftermath of the first democratic elections in April 1994. However, levels of fear began rising from 1995 until the late nineties. From 1999 onwards, the share of South Africans feeling personally unsafe has exhibited a distinct downward trend. Despite a marginal upswing in fear in 2013, fear of crime in the last five years has approximated the low previously recorded in 1994, with between a quarter and a third indicating that they feel fearful on a frequent basis.

On the other hand the trend for fear of walking in the neighbourhood at night has exhibited an upward trend. Between the South African national Victims of Crime Survey of 1998 and 2003<sup>2</sup>, there was a sharp increase in those that felt unsafe walking in their area at night rose in total from 44 to 77 per cent (Mistry, 2004). As of late 2013, more than two-thirds (69%) expressed fear of walking in their neighbourhood after dark, with around half (47%) feeling extremely unsafe. These figures are more than 22 percentage points higher than was observed in 1998.

<sup>1</sup> The present study draws primarily on data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), a repeated cross-sectional survey that has been conducted annually by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) since 2003. The survey series consists of nationally representative probability samples of South African adults aged 16 years and over living in private households.

<sup>2</sup> Conducted in the country on a periodic basis since the late 1990s by Statistics South Africa (1998, 2010, 2011) and the Institute for Security Studies (2003, 2007).

The fifth and sixth rounds of SASAS in 2007 and 2008 introduced new measures of fear of crime in response to critiques in international fear of crime literature that conventional measures such as 'how safe do you feel in this area after dark?', were asking vague questions that didn't refer to a specific crime, a specific geographical area, the frequency of fear in relation to specific crimes and the perceived impact of fear of crime on the quality of life. The 2007 round of SASAS therefore included two measures of crime frequency that have been included in the European Social Survey concerning how often people worry about burglary and violent crime, together with an experience of victimisation question. From the sixth SASAS round (2008 onwards), the remaining two ESS impact on quality of life questions were also added, i.e. Does this worry have a serious impact on your life? With the response categories 'All or most of the time', 'Some of the time', 'Just occasionally' and 'Never'.

These frequency of worry and the impact of worry on the quality of life measures which were included from the SASAS survey from 2007 showed that in 2013, approximately two-fifths of adult South Africans indicated that they never worried about their home being burgled or becoming a victim of violent crime, while a slightly higher share expressed worry either 'just occasionally' or 'some of the time' (42% for burglary; 46% for violent crime). For both types of crime, around a fifth of adults indicated that worry about these crimes was a constant presence in their lives. Approximately a fifth also believed that the worries harboured about becoming victims of burglary and violent crime was having a serious adverse impact on their quality of life. This trend has remained relatively stable between 2008 and 2013 (CHECK).

The four fear of crime items in the SASAS survey were combined into a single categorical fear of crime variable that was compared to data in the European Social Survey. This revealed that South African levels of fear of crime are significantly higher than a majority of their counterparts in Europe. When comparing the 2010 SASAS results against those from 20 other developing and industrialized countries in Europe included in the 2010/11 round of the European Social Survey, South Africa is ranked as having the highest level of fear. In South Africa the share of respondents falling in the most worried category is, at 27%, is more than six times higher than the ESS average.

Thus, while fear of crime has declined nationally, it remains at a high rate in international terms. This reflects the trend for actual victimisation rates, particularly murder.

In terms of who fears crime, the general hypothesis is that fear of crime is likely to be higher among people who don't feel able to adequately protect themselves. This may be due to physical limitations such as an inability to run fast or the lack of physical prowess to fend off attackers, or social factors such as having the financial means to protect one's property, or living alone. It has been suggested that three dimensions of vulnerability interact to promote fear of crime, namely: (a) exposure to risk (of victimisation), (b) the anticipation of serious consequences, and (c) the loss of control, which translates as the lack of effective defence, protective measures or prospect of escape (Killias, 1990; Hale, 1996). Gender, age, race and socio-economic factors are key variables in the research literature that have been identified as fulfilling the aforementioned conditions and extensively used to explain fear of crime.

Regression analysis was undertaken using an integrated 2008-2013 SASAS datafile to analyse fear of crime measures between 2008 and 2013 using three different models. Model 1 used the 'feeling personally safe on most days' measure, Model II uses the 'walking-alone after dark' measure, while Model III utilises the composite fear of crime measure. All three models confirm that women express greater levels of worry over crime than men. However the difference between levels of fear among men and women was only a few percentages. However, age consistently did not emerge as significant predictor of fear of crime. On the other

environmental factors appeared to have a significant impact. Urban residents were on average more fearful than rural residents. Those residing in informal urban settlements and formal urban areas were significantly more fearful than those in rural, traditional authority areas in all cases, and for the models for the two conventional fear measures the coefficients are greater for informal settlements than the other geographic locations, suggesting that fear is high for this contingent. This would confirm the data that is emerging about fear of crime in Khayelitsha.

Associations between race and fear of crime were more complex, showing relatively equivalent levels of fear among black and white South Africans. Thus while white adults exhibited a significantly lower level of fear than black adults based on the two standard fear measures in Models I and II (feeling personally safe on most days and walking alone after dark) this was not in the case of the multi-item fear measure in Model III. On the other hand there also appeared to be an inverse relationship between levels of education as well as living standards in Model 1 i.e. feeling personally safe on most days i.e. those with lower living standards and less education felt less personally safe. However, there did not appear to be a direct link between fear of crime and employment status.

However, the relationship between fear of crime and experience of victimisation and fear of crime and attitudes to the police were unambiguous across the models. Being a victim of (household or individual) crime and believing that neighbourhood crime has increased are both positively related to levels of fear, while confidence in the police and satisfaction with local crime reduction efforts by the government are negatively related to fear.

#### **Victimisation and fear of crime in Khayelitsha**

Both the ethnographic fieldwork and other sources of data indicate that victimisation and the associated fear of crime and violence remains high in Khayelitsha.

The CJCP report on young people's experience of victimisation in Khayelitsha for the Commission of Inquiry found that fear of crime among young people was strongly associated with direct experiences of victimisation, 'it is apparent that there were very few study participants who had not been affected by violence in Khayelitsha. At best, this was violence experienced by family and classmates known to the participants, rather than by the individual themselves' (CJCP, 2014).

The CJCP Safety Barometer report for the Western Cape Department of Community Safety in 2011 study found that of the 11 communities it surveyed in the Western Cape fear of crime was highest amongst residents in Harare, followed by residents in Gugulethu and Khayelitsha. The lowest levels of fear were observed amongst residents living in Cape Town. For residents in Harare, Gugulethu and Khayelitsha, fear of crime was ubiquitous in all spaces. Thus in Harare and Gugulethu more than 90% of residents in had feared crime one or more times in their homes, their neighbourhoods, while travelling on public transport and for their children's safety in the last year prior to the study. Fear of crime was also high in Khayelitsha with seven out of every ten residents having feared crime in their homes (74.0%), neighbourhood (76.1%), while travelling in their community (73.0%), and for their children's safety (71.6%) one or more times in the last year. (CJCP, 2011)

The Safety Barometer study conducted by CJCP in 2011 found that those living in Gugulethu (92.8%), Khayelitsha (86.2%), Harare (78.3%), Mfuleni (53.6%), Kuilsriver (48.7%), Manenberg (61.1%) and Phillippi (73.4%) reported increases in crime over the previous three years. A significant proportion of residents in Khayelitsha (64.5%) and Harare (71.7%) attributed the increase in crime to substance abuse becoming more

of a problem in their communities over the previous three years. Interestingly residents in Harare (72.2%) believed that gang violence had decreased in their area over the past three years. On the other hand in Khayelitsha (34.9%) of residents believed that gang activity had increased in their communities over the preceding three years. More research will have to be done as to whether the 'gang wars' that took place in areas of Khayelisha during 2012/2013 changed this perception. (Simelane, B.D & CJCP, 2011)

Different police precincts were also surveyed as to what they thought were the significant community problems. In Khayelitsha crime (16.0%) topped the list, followed by unemployment (14.6%), abuse of alcohol (10.5%), drug abuse (10.3), Homelessness (8.1%) and finally poverty (8%). Significantly therefore residents saw unemployment being more significant a problem than poverty. This may well be as a result of the extension of various forms of state grants that have been shown to have reduced absolute poverty in South Africa over the last ten years. A significant proportion of respondents (64.5%) also believed that drug abuse had increased, while only 17.2% believed that it had decreased. (Simelane, B.D & CJCP, 2011)

In Harare the perception of community problems was substantially different with unemployment (11.6%) being identified as the most significant problem, followed by shebeens (10.6%), poverty (7.0%), crime (6.5%), gangsterism (4.9%) and domestic violence (2.7%). The vast majority of respondents (71.7%) believed that drug abuse had increased. While residents ranked unemployment and a range of other social problems above crime, the majority (78.3%) appeared to feel that crime had increased in the last three years. On the other hand a majority (72.2%) felt that gang violence had decreased. (Simelane, B.D & CJCP, 2011)

In the 11 communities which they surveyed, including Khayelitsha and Harare, safety in public spaces was a key concern. According to the report, 'participants tended to identify open public spaces in their community, where people tend to congregate, as the areas where they themselves felt most unsafe. These were inclusive of public transportation places, public commercial or retail places as well as public recreational spaces in the communities'. Interestingly people felt most safe in their homes, which would appear to indicate that people are more afraid of crimes in public spaces rather than housebreaking or burglary. (NB FIND OUT FIGS FOR BURGLARY) As could be expected, feelings of safety diminished drastically after dark for residents living in all of these 11 communities. (Simelane, B.D & CJCP, 2011)

While literature on fear of crime indicates that fear of crime is not always directly correlated to actual victimisation or experiences of crime, it appears that the interviewees for this research base their fear of crime on direct experiences or directly witnessing incidents of crime as well as hearsay stories about crime. This is particularly the case among traders. A recent study conducted in Khayelitsha about barriers to self-employment found that crime was cited as the greatest obstacle to entrepreneurship. It appears that this fear of crime worsened over a five year period between 2000 and 2005. A survey in 2005 using 2000 data found that lack of start-up capital was cited as the greatest barrier to self-employment. However, a 2011 a study using data from a 2005 survey of Khayelitsha residents found that crime was the most cited obstacle to self-employment. The self-employment activities that people were primarily referring to included running a 'spaza' shop from home, selling small goods on the streets and making and selling clothes from home for women. The study found that, 'Crime stands as the lone hindrance deemed critical. Severe hindrances include risk of business failure, no access to start-up capital, transport costs, jealousy if successful, and pre-entry profit uncertainty' (Cichello, Almeleh, Mncube & Oosthuizen, 2011, p. 14).

This appears to be borne out by the experience of traders that has emerged through this project's field reports as well as the direct experience the fieldworker who was witness to a robbery:

I walked down to the peace park. As I was next to the Garden with big tanks... young boys probably 15-17 years old were taking plastics, and insulting a man and two ladies. The lady who was walking behind me said 'let's go back but I thought if I do that they may pull a gun and shoot so...or chase us thinking we have valuable items so instinctively I refused and told her I will go past them. She and some other people including two males ran back. I walked past. My heart was beating faster, I told myself that I should just be cool and will be cooperative should they demand me to do so. I went closer and I thought let me talk to my self and even...pretend to be in a conversation in my head. This is what I have done before and so far I have never been robbed in Khayelitsha even though people in front or who are coming after me get robbed. (Field report, February 2014)

Importantly Ncedo was assisted by a passing taxi driver, showing a level of solidarity as citizens bond together to cope with pervasive crime:

The day was hot but as I passed I could feel some cold... in my back. My knees became weaker and my body becoming sweatier yet I felt the cold. As I looked in front of me there was a taxi just let than 30m from where I was and it was hooting for me. I raised my thumb as a sign of agreeing that I am going to where it's heading. In reality I did not even care if it was going to heaven or hell but I just wanted to escape.

Eventually I came in the taxi... they started to ask me questions. Are you not scared, why did you not run away, why did they not hurt you, do they know you, do you know them? All these questions at once whilst some told me that my ancestors are with me whilst the woman I was sitting next to said I must thank God. I did not answer any question for a while then I started telling them what I saw. (Field report, February 2014)

The occupants of the taxi tried to assist Ncedo to process the incident and probably make sense of their own experiences by sharing crime stories and light heartedly mocking 'cowardly' men who run away in the face of potential attackers:

We laughed at those guys who run away and some people also had stories of men running away from such troubles and even leaving women behind and we laughed and discussed that till the Taxi reached a place I could recognise as Kuyasa Clinic. As the taxi passed Kuyasa station I asked them where is it going? And somebody said Makhaza...and I asked the driver to stop for me and he did without even asking me to pay. (Field report, February 2014)

Ncedo reflected on this incident and the way in which citizens faced with continual crime distance themselves from the emotion and fear associated with it:

I realised that I have numbed myself against these things but what about those who live in constant fear? Have they also been able to erect a kind of psyche which numbs and absorbs such incidences to a point where they can talk about this as a nice drama story and narrative and such that the taxi driver forgets about his dues. (Field report, February 2014)

This was not Ncedo's only experience of crime. One trader whom Ncedo had interviewed at Kuyasa station was stabbed during a robbery and admitted to hospital subsequent to the interview. He heard about the incident from another trader and a relative living in the area.

If I see young males coming I would either cross over the other side or go inside the yard where the offices of councillors nearby the stations are. It was even more scared when I was told that the one trader (A Rastafarian guy) whom I use to buy from was hospitalised because of an attack on him by thugs, in a robbery. I was told this by one of my cousins who came to chat with me whilst I was there since he lives in the vicinity. This was confirmed by an interview I had with one of the traders on the other side. (Fieldwork report on area around Kuyusa station)

A woman selling fruit at Kuyasa station described how she and her sons had been followed home by armed robbers who took all their goods. Her boys did not feel able to resist as the boys executing the robbery carried knives. As is frequently the case in crimes in townships, this woman and her sons knew the attackers but were afraid to report them to the police as they believed that they would be released and would come back to intimidate them. Here social ties between residents in fact undermine the ability to address crime, particularly in the perceived absence of effective policing. As this woman fruit seller explained, 'police take them [criminals] in today and the following day they are roaming the street and your life is in danger so I thought it's not worth it' (Trader, Kuyasa station, March 2014).

Other traders at Kuyasa station also described high levels of crime as well as efforts by fellow traders to assist each other to defend themselves against crime:

One of the women was almost raped last year but thanks to other traders it did not happen. The ladies had all experienced robbery while doing business. The one lady had a gun pointed at her and they took hats and asked for money. The other was saved by a neighbour who suspected that the boys she saw entering there were up to no good. The neighbour came in and that's how she escaped the chance of robbery. (Trader, Khayelitsha station, 11 Feb, 2014)

Another woman had changed her business which she believed to be particularly vulnerable to crime, 'The lady who is now in Salon business used to sell electrical appliances but because of the incident where she was almost robbed she decided to switch her business for her safety'. (Trader, Khayelitsha station, 11 Feb, 2014)

The police are seen to be unwilling to confront criminals and in this context traders rely on each other for protection, 'They said that police will come with sirens, which alerts the thieves because they don't want to confront them. They said that they rely on themselves as traders to protect themselves and their clients'. (Trader, Khayelitsha station, 11 Feb, 2014)

Two school girls that Ncedo interviewed at Kuyasa bridge expressed similar sentiments about the police being ineffective and unwilling to confront people who commit crime including gang members:

Police always arrive late or pretend not to see should they accidentally find themselves in the area of where crime is committed...the other [school girl] one said they [police] also are scared because they are told not to shoot but the gangs are not bound by the same rules. (Schoolgirls, Kuyasa, March 2014)

The bridge near Kuyasa station appears to be a space widely perceived to be dangerous.

Ncedo himself witnessed and felt compelled intervene in a potential incident of violence and believed he had assisted a young boy to resist peer pressure to become involved in a fight:

...there were young school kids who were sitting there coming from school round about the lunch time. I just watched them from distance and they could see I was watching them but they could not be bothered. It was when I realise that now the older boy is trying to hearten others up for a fight that I came in and told them to better go home. I could see the relief in one of the boys who were going to fight. He quickly went to his bag and straight to the station and disappeared in the mist of passengers coming from the train afar from where we were. (Fieldwork report, March 2014)

Two young school girls who have to use the bridge daily to get to school described the numbing impact that repeated exposure to violence creates as well as the impact of gang violence where young boys are compelled to 'prove' their 'manhood' through violence:

Every day they live in constant fear that their phones, calculators, school bags will be robbed or worse that they may be gang raped. They have both experienced being robbed of their phones, school bags and they become just numb when it finally happens. You don't dare scream because the guys are high and they are killers. Even if it's a young boy who is just an apprentice in the game he will either finish you to prove a point to the older group that he has a killer instinct or should you try fighting back the old and more experienced ones will come and finish the job. (Schoolgirls, Kuyasa, March 2014)

Again these young girls note the danger that inheres in social relationships in this crime saturated context with little police protection, 'The worse thing for you is if one of them knows you and sees that you have recognise them, they finish you because they know you will be a danger to them' (Schoolgirls, Kuyasa, March 2014)

On the other hand, close relationships with young men involved in crime can also offer protection but simultaneously potential danger is linked to being closely associated with their illegalities:

It does help to befriend the thugs though because that also provides some protection. But if you become very close they will teach you their wicked ways or else you may find yourself in jail because you were in company with them and the police think you also know something. (Schoolgirls, Kuyasa, March, 2014)

## Gang violence

Youth gang violence appears to have become a significant problem over the last few years in Khayelitsha and is profoundly shaping the meaning of public space including that new public spaces created to foster social cohesion and reduce crime. This contestation over space and the making of place by gangs is shaping the very nature of social interactions in many areas of the township. The ability of gangs to assert their hegemony in public spaces, including within public institutions constitutes these as spaces of fear rather than recreation or education.

Because police do not record the context in which murders and attempted murders occur, it is difficult to ascertain exactly how many lives have been lost or young people injured as a result of the violence between gangs, nevertheless from the perspective of residents of Khayelitsha a significant amount of the violence in the township is associated with these gangs.

Two major groups have emerged, called the amaVura and the amaVatos (Gillespie, 2014) however other groups have been mentioned during fieldwork. In general there seem to be a large number of young gangs operating at most of the schools in the township.

While the definition of 'gang' violence is contested the Prevention of Organised Crime Act passed in 1998, provides the following definition of a gang:

...includes any formal or informal ongoing organisation, association or group of three or more persons, which has one of its activities the commission of one or more criminal offences, which has an identifiable name or identifying sign or symbol and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.

Khayelitsha does not have the kind of underground criminal economy organised around the drug trade that characterises other 'coloured' townships in the Western Cape such as Mannenburg, Mitchells Plain etc. However, formalised violence between groups of young men, often school boys, has emerged as a significant problem that not only has taken lives but exacerbated the climate of fear in the township. These 'gangs' are to a important extent characterised by the hallmarks of gang organisation, in particular territoriality, however, they do not necessarily wear uniforms or other visible insignia of gang membership. On the other hand they engage in very conscious performances of violence to demonstrate superior prowess or ownership of space, which is characteristic of gang violence. It is also likely that these gangs are more fluid and transitory than the formalised gangs in areas such as Mannenburg. Nevertheless, gang violence remains a significant problem and appears to be directly affecting schooling in the township.

Moreover, our ethnographic fieldwork has also shown that some of the spaces created by VPUU for the community, in particular Mandela Peace Park in Harare have to a large extent become the territory of gangs who intimidate and rob residents who attempt to make use of the space. Critically the 'ownership' of certain territories by gang members has restricted the movement of young people in particular as well as older people and affected their ability to participate in activities, particularly after dark, for fear of being attacked (CJCP, 2014). This obviously undermines social cohesion in the community, including people's ability to organise against crime. Gang violence also structures identity. Young boys who live in particular areas report feeling compelled to join the gang operating in their area or are coerced to do so (CJCP, 2014). Young girls, some as young as 12, report that they do not attend school on Fridays because they fear that 'gangsters' will come to the school premises and sexually coerce them Young people also report being robbed on their way to and from school (CJCP, 2014).

These youth gangs appear to largely operate with impunity, overturning generational hierarchies through the threat of violence. Gangs appear to have free access to schools, while adults including teachers and school marshalls, seem reluctant or afraid to prevent gangs from preying on students. The police also seem to be unwilling to intervene and have resisted designating this youth violence as 'gang' violence, leaving young people doubly exposed. Our ethnographic fieldwork shows police passively watching preparations for a gang confrontation although their presence did seem to have averted overt violence.

During the ethnographic fieldwork a number of residents referred to an escalation of gang violence in 2013, which they refer to as a 'gang war'. A fruit seller at Kuyasa station described this time to Ncedo:

...during the gang wars days last year boys who are sixteen would walk past them carrying machete or just sharpen them in front of them and breathing would be so difficult because you don't know if they will come to you to test if it's working [use the weapons on you]. It was very dangerous and



scary. Even now they leave before time and come in late because they fear for themselves. (Trader, Kuyasa station, March 2014)

Ncedo himself witnessed a 'showdown' between two rival gangs, which did not result in an overt violence but which provides a graphic illustration of the way in which gang violence originates in the school and is then consciously performed outside the space of the school as a public spectacle. This organised and violent resolution of conflicts that originate at school is not a new phenomenon and it is likely that school boys draw on this history of violent conflict resolution. As Ncedo notes of his own experience of schooling in a township in the Western Cape, 'I myself grew up knowing that we boys settle our weekly quarrels on Friday after school and that such a tradition was still pertinent' (Field report, 22 February 2014)

However, the severity of the violence has escalated from fist fights to the use of knives and other weapons. These are used at school to threaten rivals and subsequently 'scores' are settled outside school. The pervasiveness of youth 'gangs' means that what could have remained individual grudges quickly escalate into clashes between rival gangs as youth draw in fellow gang members to support them. Young people, including young girls 'watch' these fights as a public spectacle, cheering on one or other 'side'.

Ncedo got off the taxi on a Friday afternoon at Esangweni High School.

I arrived at this spot as students were leaving the school premises. I could see that there was something on. Pupils and Taxis and were there was and also two police vans. At first I thought it was a student fight because it's Fridays... Soon I realised that it might be a bit bigger than a fist exchange between boys but it could be the much talked about gang wars that have swept the township of Khayelitsha in the past year particularly.

There in the open field were boys probably.. 16-14, there were four of them. When I asked the other students who were also looking whilst cheering at the same time, they told me that it was rival gangs. A fight had broken in the boys' bathrooms and knives were drawn but then they did not do anything at that time, so now the boys who drew knives for each other went to their gangs and now it's no longer one on one but gang versus gang.

So she [a girl student] says they are supporting the one who came to school because their gang does not terrorise the school whilst the other group makes it difficult to go home if their members had quarrel with someone including teachers. She said that those teachers who don't have cars are in big trouble because they can be attacked easily whereas even those with cars are not spared because they [gang members] throw stones at their cars. At least the taxi drivers can easily see what going on when you are in a car and should they come the naughty boys from gangs know that they must run away because taxi guys don't ask too many questions they act.

The four boys must have realised that there were police because they went back and started exchanging insults and pointing the middle finger to some school boys who responded and where actually quite keen to go to the battlefield seemingly. (Field report, 22 Feb, 2014)

According to security guards working in Peace Park in Harare, subsequent to the 'gang wars' in 2013, gang violence has not abated:

...the gangs are still persistent, the 'Mavatos', 'Vitos' and 'Italians' are still there and the worst thing is that they have forced young kids out of school because even those who are not involved are not

safe because these gangsters are territorial. Police also got involved later on, but you know that South Africa is a lawless country. The reaction of the police was late, and the consequences for the crime perpetrators are that they are treated nicely as though they did nothing. (Informal security guards, Mandela Peace Park, 6 Feb, 2014)

Although this overt 'gang war' has subsided certain sites are seen to be 'owned' by the gangs, for example the ironically named 'Peace Park' near Harare Square, where Ncedo himself observed young men that caused him to feel uncomfortable about staying at the park.

His interview with a group of women running a co-operative in the building built by VPUU at Peace Park indicates both a high level of fear of crime in the Park as well as citizen solidarity to address the problem as a group of men voluntarily provide a 'security' service for the women so they are able to move to and from the building. The women described the level of fear they feel to Ncedo:

The women feel very unsafe because the place is a crime zone. They say that if they must go out they go out in numbers just to go to shop because the youngsters in the community are ruthless. They also mentioned that they have not been robbed but have witnessed many men, women and schoolchildren being robbed in front of them. (Women from Singalakhe Cooperative, Peace Park, 6 Feb, 2014)

The women explain why they have been protected from a direct experience of robbery:

The reason why they have not been victims is the security provided by the volunteer security guards at the park. They even convinced me that for the sake of my safety I must inform those men about my presence and most importantly only come between 8-4pm otherwise the boys who are always hanging around the park would attack me... when they must leave the premises they call the security guards to escort them. Usually, about four security guards come to accompany them. (Women from Singalakhe Cooperative, Peace Park, 6 Feb, 2014)

According to the security guards they are motivated by a sense of common humanity to assist the women:

When these ladies who are working here in this building (VPUU building in Peace Park) work till later they call us and we come to accompany them. We are just helping them because they are fellow human beings because we don't get paid and we are taking a risk ourselves because these boys carry guns and we have nothing to protect ourselves. (Informal security guards, Peace Park, 6 Feb, 2014)

As much as personal connections with the women who occupy the building motivate these security guards, their knowledge of the residents in the community has allowed them to provide an effective security presence and some sort of social control over 'boys' in the neighbourhood who utilise the space to commit crimes:

According to the guards ever since they started working there and working with police there has been a drop in the number of robbery incidences and people say that at least during the day they no longer get mugged here whilst in the early hours and late afternoon these gangsters take charge. 'They know our times. The reason why they don't do these things in our presence is because they know that we know them because they are from this area and they are our kids.' (Informal security guards, Peace Park, 6 Feb, 2014)

## Gangsters

Ncedo conducted interviews with two young former gang members, which revealed a particular type of South African subject produced in a context of extreme tension between political liberalization and economic exclusion in an impoverished and radically unequal society (Godoy 2006). In many ways these young men constitute a radical critique of the nature of economic development and democratic 'freedom' as articulated in the repetitive expression by these young men of the desire for consumer goods as a motivation for their actions. As Hunter asks, 'what happens when consumption becomes the only way to increase social status in a climate saturated with both rights and inequalities?' (Hunter, 2010, p. 129)

However, it is clear that what is being 'purchased' through the illegal acquisition of material goods and their conspicuous display, is more than the goods themselves, but a particular status, the appearance at least of a particular lifestyle.

As Ncedo explains, 'the worth of a person is valued from the materialistic worldview and thus to die without having owned something expensive like a phone is not to have lived at all' (Field report April 2014).

While not entirely displacing political practice our aspirations, hopes and dreams for self-efficacy and our desires for justice and equality are increasingly directed into consumption as 'Commodities are sold and consumed as repositories of human principles and of ends that we desire' (Orlie, 2002, p. 406). Brand names become 'channels of desire, emblems of a world denied, embodiments of wishes unfulfilled' (Ewen and Ewen cited in Stavrakakis, p. 93).

Pillay and Moetsemme have both noted the 'philosophy' of *ukuphanda* in the South African context, essentially a strategy of survival used by both young men and women in urban townships to secure some of the basic conditions of life, often through illegal or 'unconventional' means.

For young men *ukuphanda* is integrally bound up with notions of masculinity, which valorises young men who 'make a plan', acquire cash and goods and are able to distribute them to family and girlfriends. It marks them as 'independent' in an environment where employment as a marker of the transition to adulthood is unlikely.

In a South African environment characterised by lack and unemployment, where failure to succeed materially is increasingly socially constructed and internalized as evidence of individual failure, conspicuous displays of the symbols of success mitigate against the 'shame' of poverty. For young men in particular, consumer goods gained either legally or illegally, are overt markers of success, providing access to 'status' and 'style'. This is not simply the 'style' of fashion but refers to the way in which, 'All aspects of social and political life, from the very public to the most private, are increasingly facilitated by products that are explicitly marketed as conducive to particular *styles of existence*' (Orlin, 2002, p. 400 own emphasis).

Posel has noted the significance of accumulation in post-apartheid South Africa as a 'marker of social advancement and improvement, as much as a goal and accomplishment in itself' (Posel 2002, p. 16). In this context consumption becomes, 'an affirmation of life and marker of progress' (p.17). If consumption becomes an affirmation of life, it has become increasingly sexualised, to consume is to be 'sexy'. Thus, 'consumption is sexualised – in ways which mark the engagement of popular culture in South Africa with more global cultural repertoires of sex' (p.17). Posel thus argues that 'Particularly for youth and young adults, therefore, the prospects of a 'better' life, both materially and symbolically, are closely aligned with

the imagery of material acquisition and fecund sexuality – as sites of virile, pulsating new life, a life of appetite, a life of consumption’ (p. 17).

When Ncedo asked these young men what their motivation for becoming ‘*skollies*’ (gangsters) was they articulated the desire for ‘success’ represented by the conspicuous consumption of designer goods that for them appear laden with the promise of sexual desirability as well as ‘respect’ and fear from community members who see these consumer items as evidence of violence and threat. While the South African state has been concerned to constitute the ‘good’ citizen who orders their behaviour in normative and ‘rational’ terms, these young men radically dispute this normativity by rejecting education as a means to achieve status in preference for the high of quick ‘success’ through illegal means:

Everyone in the township wants to live a life that they can’t afford. We want to live fulfilling life, nice life. There are two ways to go about living this life- education or robbing to get your hands on money. Education needs patience and takes longer. Not everybody can afford it or even those who can afford it, very few want to wait that long to succeed so we choose the short cut. This short cut is also very cool here in township. *Skollies* have a respect, they get the most beautiful girls, they wear the expensive labels, drink the expensive whiskeys and always have money and they are feared by some and respected by some because people have this misconception that all *skollies* are capable of killing. So what attracts people to be a *skollie* is the eagerness to be like other people, wear expensive jeans and meet girls. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

Competition for women is intense and is bound up with racialised conceptions of femininity. Lighter skinned women are considered more desirable ‘trophy’ girlfriends. On the other hand, these women are seen to ‘cause trouble’ as their desirability leads men to commit crime in order to maintain their ‘status’ and attractiveness to these women. In this world of competition it is also crucial to differentiate oneself from ‘ordinary’ citizens through the display and intimate knowledge of brand labels:

Here it is not enough to get a girlfriend but it must be the one that makes everyone stop and notice, what it’s called a ‘yellow bone’ (lighter skin girls). If you must drink you don’t want to get a Viceroy brandy but Hennes whiskey, Jameson.... if you must wear clothes it must be the best and most expensive labels. There is competition about everything so if government were to ban overseas brands so that we all wear Made in SA [South Africa] brand, make liquor available to all people, we would not drink it if we know that they [other people] can all afford it. What makes us drink is the fact that we know others want to be like us and it makes it cool. But also girls are the biggest problem. People go out of their way to impress girls that includes robbing to maintain their status. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

On the other hand gangs also offer peer support and the status of belonging to a community of peers considered ‘cool’, which protects gang members against the multiple forms of predation in the township as well as providing the status to attract young women, who similarly seek status and protection. Those who are not in a gang risk being ridiculed for their lack of sophistication, deprived of female company and are potentially vulnerable to attack:

It is also wanting to be part of a group of guys who are cool (*amajita*) because it gives you two things, status and protection. Those who take the other way are seen as *baru* (someone who is not street wise and who is not cool or even understand life outside their homes). No girl wants to be

with *baru*, they all want skollies because they also want access to money and protection. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

When asked about how crime could be stopped, these young men paint a picture of an environment of intense competition for resources and a context where crime is ubiquitous, unstoppable and shapes all social relations. This is also a context where the state does not provide protection as the police are purportedly in collusion with criminals:

Nothing [can stop crime]. Crime is everywhere- churches, schools, police are also friends with big *skollies*. Here in townships there is competition. The competition is about girls mostly but also generally everything. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

Police are friends with the big guns of the criminals. When you are a top -top guy in the township, the real *skollies* who rob banks, ATMs- police are in their pockets so that docket gets lost. Most people get guns from them besides the ones who rob them [guns] off them [the police]. Most people get the bullet proofs from them; the bullets that go around here are sold by them so they are also criminals. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

When asked about the role of NGOs, the church etc. these interviewees sarcastically reject the role of the Church arguing that it simply provides an opportunity to rob citizens going to and from church:

Most importantly churches give *skollies* a chance because people go to church in the evening or in the morning and that's the time for the skollies and they rob them all the time so that's the churches' contribution. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

A variety of 'others' are responsible for exacerbating the crime problem. Somalians create opportunities for theft because they keep cash in their homes. However, robbery of these foreigners is condoned, 'and if as a *skollie* you rob them, people... don't take that seriously or in fact they just say "these people must just go"'. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

People from other African states facilitate crime through technological expertise, 'they are the ones who open these phones when they are locked, because they know how to cheat the system of technology. That helps the *skollies*'. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

'The community' also places pressure on *skollies* in jail to settle scores when they are released, 'when they come back they are under pressure now to avenge their friends' death, if not the other group...will or may take the initiative and proactively finish him before he finishes them'. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

Lastly 'the community' creates temptations for the *skollie* by placing 'orders' for stolen goods, 'If you know that so and so wants a certain phone and you see it the urge is so much because you start imagining the nice time you will have because you are certain of a buyer'. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

For these young men in this context becoming a *skollie* is normative practice, few young men in their neighbourhoods and peer group are perceived to have *not* become *skollies*. While gang members believe that being a member of a gang offers protection, it is clear that it also makes you vulnerable to other forms of retributive violence from the community:

For instance three of us were born in Site C and all guys who were born in our area became *skollies* except for two guys. One is still born again [Christian] till this day, the other one became a *skollie* because he was wrongfully accused of robbing and the CPFs hit him to hell and they nearly killed him and from that day he just robbed everyone. I felt he was mentally disturbed but he did not live long than even six months, he was killed by community members in Kuyasa after being caught robbing. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

Thus while on the one hand these young men argue that they are respected and admired in the community, particularly by young women, they also acknowledge the anger that their activities invoke. They fear the retribution of this 'admiring' community far more intensely than the formal criminal justice system. 'The community' is feared for the violence it will utilise against gang members as well as its capacity to banish them from local community networks and strip them of their social status.

...our utmost fear is not going to jail or dying but it's the torture by the community should they find you. That makes one run faster than a car or be more vigilant and venomous than a snake because should the community members catch you and take the law into their own hands that's bad news. You will also carry that stigma for your whole life. It feels like you have gone back to being a *baru* because you were caught. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

The interviewees argue that part of the reason that the majority of young men in their neighbourhoods become *skollies* is also because of a lack of role models as those who are legitimately successful soon leave the township. As a result young people do not have the experience of people who they can look up to who achieved this success through education. Ironically these interviewees conception of 'respectability' is intimately tied to their own understanding of fashion and display as critical to social success. They argue that even when those who have qualified as professionals return to the township, their dress does not inspire admiration and young people will not be convinced that these are people who can be role models. Professionals are seen to have lost their sense of 'style' 'like white people', who are accustomed to their bourgeois identity and don't display their fashion and style.

If these guys who are educated like lawyers stayed in the townships after their degrees some youngsters would be inspired by them but you don't see these guys after their degrees, all we see are *skollies* driving around flash cars and spending money. Also these educated guys don't have style, I still don't understand why a lawyer can't just wear nice jeans township style during the weekend because his degree won't be stripped away because of that and most youngsters will be inspired but these guys start having a weird sense of fashion, it's like they become white (whites are known for lack of fashion taste in townships). When they come here as visitors they know us but the young boys don't know that these people are not gangsters, they just see people in their cars opening windows and having short conversations they then think it's one of the *skollies* because they have conversations with us. To people even if you change they judge you in the unchanging past tense. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

While most *skollies* seek status and protection through gang membership there are those who are 'forced' to be *skollies* because they become drug addicts:

...when you begin you always have money for them [drugs] because at home they trust you... when you ask them for R5, R2 they give it to you because you are a normal child, they don't know that you are a drug user. But that soon diminishes because you start losing interest at going to school and

access to money then start to dry up... Then you go to the streets, usually the first targets are young kids who go to shop and you rob them of their money and within days you will be robbing their parents to feed on the need for the next fix. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

There are also *skollies* who seek more than protection and status, they actively seek to be feared, usually achieved through conspicuous displays of violence. Interestingly these young men see this use of gratuitous violence as a sign of cowardice, a way of hiding an inability to protect oneself:

...there are ones who just want to be famous and feared. These ones are trigger free and usually kill in front of people so that they can be seen and be feared. They will go to rob in places like shebeen (drinking establishment), church or any place where there are eyes. People who grew up as cowards who could not defend themselves usually turn out to be like that, they stab and kill whenever someone makes them angry. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

Importantly these young men distinguish themselves from the 'boys' involved in groups like the amaVura and the amaVatos, arguing that, 'as to how they end up having names and from where they get these names we would not know'. Clearly for them gang membership does not require a group to have a formal name but the ties of the gang are no less strong. While differentiating themselves from 'boys' who are involved in gang rivalry, they do note how this 'boyish' violence escalates as boys get older and use more lethal weapons:

We don't know, this is the thing for the young boys and for *amakhwenkwe* (uncircumcised boys)...to us, it usually was territorial wars between boys. It will usually start in the playing field when you are playing with guys from another area and there is a disagreements then one from one side kicks or klaps[hit] one of us, then we all fight, or when one boy fights or get beaten by other boys and we take it as boys from his area as a symbol of disrespect. Then there is always going to be a grudge even as you grow older and are now using knives and guns. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

Territoriality and rivalry between different neighbourhoods is deeply entrenched. Young men contest ownership of space through the control of women. These rivalries are exacerbated by alcohol consumption:

Most fights are about girls. Most fights are always started when there are girls to impress and usually starts in the shebeen. Even now if we can go to a shebeen, buy most expensive whiskeys, drink expensive beers and wear labels- girls want to be in our table and should we make a move guys from that area or locality will want to show us that they are the man of the house. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

On the other hand, while men seek proprietorship over women, according to these interviewees youth gangs also involve girls in violence, fighting the same territorial battles with other girls, 'The other thing with these gangs is that they also have girls fighting with other girls'. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

Rivalry persists from childhood into adulthood:

Once there is a rivalry between areas even if from childhood it does not end, it just cools down when police get involved but never ends because every time two guys from a rival area where there is a history of animosity, the likelihood is that it will end up being a fight between two areas and that's how they end up being a gangster. (Former gangster, Khayelitsha, March 2014)

## Policing

The police in this context appear deeply ineffective and their engagement with citizens deeply ambiguous. This is not only about the police themselves but about the complex process of state formation in South Africa, where the authority of the state, particularly the right of the police to exert social control and social order remains significantly contested. Van Holdt refers to this as a contestation around the symbolic order of the state. Tilly (2003) argues that a low-capability state, whether democratic or authoritarian, leaves considerable space for contentious politics to give rise to collective violence because the state is unable to enforce the law and exert full control over public space;<sup>127</sup> Speaking about violent protests against the failure of the state to deliver services, van Holdt points out the ambiguity of citizens' relationship with the state which is demonstrated in these protests that both 'disrupt the authority of the state *and* reaffirm its authority by calling for those at the apex of its structure to ensure that grievances are responded to' (von Holdt, p. 120, 2014)

Steinberg has noted, as a result of the history of policing in the South African context, or rather the absence of policing for black South Africans and the plethora of informal forms of self-regulation which arose as a result, many citizens continue to give halting and uneven consent to being policed. Steinberg argues therefore that the key challenge which the democratic dispensation faced in terms of policing was not in fact to establish the legitimacy of the new police service but to establish its authority over various other pre-existing forms of social regulation, which were often characterised by violence and division. (Steinberg, 2012)

These historical conditions of 'non-policing' created a particular subjectivity, 'To be black and to live in Johannesburg (or any other major South African city, for that matter) was to seek protection.' (Steinberg, 2012, p. 488) This protection was acquired on a profoundly particularist basis that led to division and exclusion, 'while everybody in black urban South Africa sought protection, no single agency protected everyone. Wherever protection is exchanged for friendship, loyalty, money or from ethnic solidarity, some people are excluded. A host of informal agencies bump shoulders and clash.' (Steinberg, 2012, p. 488)

In the post-apartheid context, instead of the police becoming an agency, which would 'control the predatory violations of the conditions of coexistence among strangers' as influential police theorist Egon Bittner envisaged the purpose of policing, by focusing on effectively responding to calls for assistance and investigating cases, the police engaged in a distorted form of crime prevention, which sought to target 'risk' populations through heavy handed and often brutal assertions of their authority against vulnerable communities. Thus, Steinberg concludes, 'And so, for black urban South Africans, too little changed. The vital functions of keeping peace among strangers were still radically underprovided. People thus had little reason to abandon private sources of security for the police.' (Steinberg, 2012)

Policing in Khayelitsha has become a deep source of contention and has recently led to the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry into policing by the Western Cape government after this was resisted in the Constitutional Court by the Minister of Policing on the basis that policing is a national, not a provincial function.

Dissatisfaction with the police however is part of a wider dissatisfaction about the capability of the state to deliver services in general. According to Seekings, 'More residents of Khayelitsha express dissatisfaction with other public services...One half were dissatisfied with electricity, water and roads (with much higher



proportions in shacks than in formal houses). More than half were dissatisfied with health care and housing'. (2014, p. 26)

### **Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry**

The Commission was initially established by the Premier of the Western Cape, Helen Zille, in August 2012. After delay caused by the legal action taken by Nathi Mthethwa (the Minister of Police), the Commission was finally launched in January 2014. The Minister's legal team argued that the establishment of the Commission was not legal because the Premier of the Western Cape did not have the legal authority to create a provincial investigation into policing. The case was heard in the Western Cape High Court, and then the Constitutional Court, where the Minister lost both cases, as well as their application for the right to appeal.

The inquiry is chaired by former Constitutional Court judge, Kate O'Regan, and former Head of the National Prosecuting Authority, Vusi Pikoli. The main objective of the Commission is to investigate allegations about the inefficiencies of policing in Khayelitsha, as well as the alleged breakdown in relations between the community and the police in Khayelitsha. The Commission is also looking at the social and economic context of Khayelitsha in order to more better understand policing activities within the township. The scope of investigation includes all policing activities in the area, including the three SAPS stations (Lingeletu West, Harare and Khayelitsha) as well as mobile units that may have been involved in policing the area.

The Commission was formed in response to complaints from individuals and NGOs active in the area. Since 2003, these organisations (including Social Justice Coalition, Equal Education, Free Gender, Ndifuna Ukwazi, the Treatment Action Campaign and the Triangle Project) have submitted numerous petitions and memoranda to various levels of government, claiming that Khayelitsha police as well as the greater criminal justice system has continued to fail Khayelitsha residents.

They stated that ineffective policing in the township (including neglected cases, missing dockets, absent staff, shortage of visible police, low morale and misconduct, overburdened detectives and inferior training, as well as incomplete investigations) had given rise to vigilante groups taking matters into their own hands and killing suspected criminals. Police crime figures indicate that there were 78 vigilante killings between April 2011 and April 2012.

Civil society organisations argued that a general and systemic failure of the criminal justice system had occurred. According to the NGO Legal Resources Centre (LRC):

The failures of the Khayelitsha police to prevent, combat and investigate crime, take down statements, open cases, apprehend criminals are systemic in nature and they constitute a violation of the provisions of section 195 of the Constitution which requires that all public administration be conducted professionally, ethically, impartially and with the effective, economic and efficient use of human, material and financial resources. (LRC, opening statement, 2014)

The police on the other hand argued to the Commission that the organisation, 'deeply regrets these unfortunate acts by a few undisciplined members of the police' (SAPS, opening statement, 2014)

The LRC argued to the Commission that a large number of suspects are detained, not charged and then later released, the general reason being that suspects often cannot be linked with the crimes committed and that SAPS members appear to be arresting and detaining suspects without the requisite reasonable suspicion. The arresting members do not make statements indicating the reasons for arrests made. (LRC, opening statement, 2014)

Other allegations included the fact that dockets were often lost, resulting in cases being struck off the court rolls while investigating officers and prosecutors did not cooperate effectively on what investigations were necessary for successful prosecutions. Investigating officers often did not communicate with victims of crime regarding the progress of investigations or prosecutions, including information about court dates. Investigations and securing of crime scenes such as rape, gathering of evidence, interviewing of witnesses and other basic procedures were often ignored or performed incompletely. An internal investigation by the SAPS Inspectorate found with regards the quality of investigations that the investigation of case dockets by detectives in Khayelitsha 'does not result in any extraordinary achievements or successes', and that very little impact is made on serious crimes such as armed robberies and house break-ins. (LRC, opening statement, 2014)

The SAPS themselves admitted before the Commission that in 2011, 291 disciplinary charges were instituted, while the total number of police of Khayelitsha is approximately 150. The public commission of inquiry was preceded by the police's own internal investigation which led to a report by the late Lt General Tshabalala, Divisional Commissioner of the SAPS Inspectorate. The Inspectorate found after looking into the state of police-community relations that the constitutional structures established to enhance police-community relations are not functioning effectively and optimised in Khayelitsha, this includes Community Police Forums (CPF) and sector policing. Sector policing in a UK based model of neighbourhood policing that divides up a policing precinct into smaller territorial areas. The objective is ostensibly to build community relations on the ground, by facilitating a relationship between police who are allocated to a particular sector and the community in that sector. In addition sector policing is intended to enhance police visibility and accountability through a localised approach to policing. However, the Tshabala report found that partly as a result of staff shortages police officers from different sectors would often work together policing all the areas of a precinct and hence undermining the purpose of sector policing. The Inspectorate concluded that 'the South African Police Service cannot claim that the services that are rendered to the community in the Khayelitsha area are of such a standard that the community does not have any reason for complaining.'

Various bodies responsible for oversight and cooperation with the police were also alleged to be poorly managed, and not supported nor respected by the police. The three organisations (Community Policing Forums, the Policing Complaints Centre, and Independent Police Investigative Directorate) are argued to be either inactive or ineffectively operating. Mr Hanif Loonat, formerly the Community Policing Forum (CPF) Provincial Chair and Mr Chumile Sali, formerly CPF Secretary in Harare, Mr Thabo Leholo, Western Cape head of the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID), previously the Independent Complaints Division (ICD), Mr Patrick Njozela, the head of the Policing Complaints Centre (PCC), each gave evidence on their respective organisations and their relationship with the SAPS.

The CPFs are a constitutionally mandated body designed to foster a cooperative relationship between SAPS and the people the police serve as well as monitoring their effectiveness and efficiency. However, according to the witnesses, most CPFs in Khayelitsha are not active. Those that are active are not functioning effectively or meeting regularly. An investigation by the police's own Inspectorate in 2012 found that 'generally' the contribution that the CPFs are making to improve police-community relationships in the Khayelitsha area is 'questionable' primarily because of the lack of participation by representatives of all the relevant community structures and inadequate involvement in community projects and community awareness programmes launched by the SAPS. Save for the Lingeletu-West Police Station, the task team found that the CPFs at Khayelitsha Police Station and the Harare Police Station were not 'functioning well' (LRC, opening statement, Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, 2014).

In terms of formal oversight, there appears to be little independence and considerable fragmentation. The Policing Complaints Centre is housed by the Provincial Government in the Department of Community Safety and has a mandate limited to 'poor service', but not more serious matters. Criminal allegations against SAPS officers are referred to the national Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID), under the authority of Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa. This means that there are few completely independent bodies that are able to investigate police misconduct. Currently, if a case is opened against an officer at a police station, the station commander assigns another police officer from that same station to investigate his colleague, almost inevitably leading to a partial investigation. In addition the IPID allegedly refers cases related to criminal conduct by the police back to station commanders, further undermining the possibility that effective investigations of police misconduct will ensue.

During the first phase of the public hearing, over 63 people gave oral evidence. In the course of these hearings, the commission repeatedly heard about the breakdown of confidence in the police, and the need for stronger links between the community, the Community Police Forums (CPFs) and the police. Indifferent and disrespectful attitudes exhibited by the SAPS were recounted frequently. Internationally 'procedural justice' i.e. a perception that people are being treated fairly and impartially has been found to be critically related to trust in the police and consequently to their legitimacy (Tyler & Huo 2002; Hinds & Murphy 2007; Hough *et al.* 2010; Huq *et al.* 2011; Jackson *et al.* 2012).

According to Seekings, a series of surveys in Khayelitsha have asked about trust in the police. In five different surveys, comprising a total of more than 1,500 interviews in Khayelitsha, only about one quarter of the respondents said that 'most' police can be trusted. This was about the same proportion as the proportion who said that 'none', 'almost none' or 'very few' police could be trusted. In every survey, the median response was that 'some' of the police can be trusted. (Seekings, 2014)

However, these patterns of mistrust characterise many South African townships and are not necessarily unique to Khayelitsha. Seekings argues that, 'The pattern of distrust in Khayelitsha was not... significantly out-of-line with the pattern in other African townships in Cape Town...and may have been slightly less distrusting than in coloured and white neighbourhoods' (Seekings, 2014)

In his testimony Chris Giles of the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) project singled out the SAPS as the least cooperative link in the chain needed for a holistic approach to crime. Another theme that the commission repeatedly heard was the relationship between Khayelitsha's degraded socio-economic conditions and its high levels of violent crime (e.g. the poor delivery of housing, lights, water, road infrastructure, sanitation, schools, jobs and other opportunities). The SAPS argued that in effect Khayelitsha is un-policeable and that informal settlements are largely inaccessible due to poor lighting and 'dangerous' conditions. The police argued that in this context of deprivation, 'None of the strategies proposed by the NGOs or by some witnesses will make any difference. The only solution is to eradicate these informal settlements. Proper housing and proper supporting infrastructure must be built in order to meet the demands of increased urbanisation'. (SAPS, opening statement, 2014)

The situation is exacerbated by the lack of resources for policing in Khayelitsha, in particular, a high police-to-civilian ratio. While the national average of police officers to civilians in a policing precinct is 1: 303, in Harare, it is 1:903. Police detectives normally deal with no more than 50 cases, but detectives in Khayelitsha are assigned 138 dockets on average (36 investigators deal with roughly 5,000 dockets). Michael Osborne, representing Department of Community Safety (DOCS), described this as 'just too much to cope with... As

long as two or three hundred dockets are being given to detectives, this will never work' (Hearing transcript, Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, 2014).

Major General Glenn Schooling told the commission that the number of deployed officers at the Khayelitsha Site B Police station had dropped by 25% in two years, from 200 members in 2010 to 150 members in 2012. The crime rate for the area remained high while the number of police officers available on the streets had decreased significantly. In the meantime, absenteeism within SAPS is high, at around 30%. Advocate Bawa, an evidence leader for the Commission, cited one report in which 20 officers were scheduled to arrive for a shift, however only seven arrived.

The police themselves represent themselves as 'helpless' against the structural forces of unemployment and deprivation, and 'hopelessness generally'. For them inequality of service provision is inevitable in this deeply imperfect context,

we cannot use the standards of policing found in Constantia or Camps Bay or Rondebosch to be the same as those Khayelitsha. We will therefor submit that there is no systemic failure of policing in Khayelitsha if one takes into account the social and economic conditions of the people of Khayelitsha. (SAPS, opening statement, 2014)

The imaginary of the police about 'the community' of Khayelitsha is of a deeply oppositional and potentially dangerous body of people with whom they have no relations and over whom they have no control. Thus 'Police officers working in Khayelitsha confront the faces of angry people' and consequently 'policing in Khayelitsha particularly at night, and more particularly in the informal settlement areas, is highly dangerous':

There can be no doubt that conventional or 'normal' policing methods or strategies cannot be deployed or used in many parts of Khayelitsha, particularly in areas exhibiting high density informal settlements. The severe lack of proper or any infrastructure such as roads; electricity; street lighting, sanitation; and any sort of town planning, are the main contributory factors that make the informal settlements an ideal breeding ground for crime. Those who bear the brunt of the extraordinary high levels of crime in these informal settlements are women and children, older people, and the handicapped. (SAPS, opening statement, 2014)

The police in this context can become the scapegoat for general community anger about lack of services:

The patrols conducted on foot are not only difficult but also dangerous for the police. Lights and roads are in a state of disrepair or neglect and in some cases just absent. Potentially the police are policing a community that is angry about poor service delivery including poor sanitation, and the absence of decent living conditions. (SAPS, opening statement, 2014)

'Normal' policing activities cannot take place in this 'abnormal' context, which could not even be addressed by more police personnel:

The cordoning off of crime scenes and the pursuit of criminals cannot take place as it normally would in a suburban area. Indeed, it is highly doubtful that the employment of additional or more police officers, of more police vehicles, and other provisioning, would be able to effectively address the problems. (SAPS, opening statement, 2014)

The police perceive themselves as having little agency or authority, even in contexts which are less 'dangerous'. Thus with regard to the non-functioning CPFs, that could potentially build relations with this malevolent community, 'There is little the police can do where CPFs are boycotted or shunned by certain groupings within the community' (SAPS, opening statement, 2014).

The police therefore seem to engage in a 'hands off' type of policing, where their primary role is assert their presence through high levels of police visibility. This 'spectacle' of policing, however, appears to be largely without substance. While police visibility is commonly cited as a key demand of citizens which reduces fear of crime, the study by CJCP for the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry found that for the interviewees, 'police visibility was not considered an issue' (CJCP, 2014) as this visibility did not lead to effective police intervention in or response to crime. Instead, the police are widely perceived to be deeply implicated in crime and corruption, including bribery and misconduct which inevitably undermined citizen trust in the institution and its legitimacy. Instead police appear to use their coercive power for the predatory extraction of resources in the form of bribes, whether this is raiding shebeens<sup>3</sup>, which then offer alcohol to prevent being closed down, establishing roadblocks to secure bribes, or stealing from illegally resident Somalian shop owners because they have no recourse. Police are perceived to carry out these activities with impunity and suffer no repercussions for misconduct.

The CJCP study found that rather than the police offering a professional, impartial service in the model of a Weberian bureaucracy, in order for citizens to get service from the police it was necessary to form personalised relationships with them. As one learner argued it is 'important for community members to befriend police as that is the only way how their problem will be heard'. (SAPS opening statement, 2014) This type of personalised relationship with the police is not unique to Khayelitsha, Hornberger in her study of policing in inner city Johannesburg found similarly that in order for citizens to acquire effective service this required personalised relationship with the police, represented in the commonly used phrase, 'my police, your police' (Hornberger, 2011). Subsequent research conducted by the HSRC in the township Alexandra in Gauteng, the informal settlement of Zamdela in the Free State and an informal settlement falling under traditional jurisdiction, Violet Bank in the province of Limpopo, all reveal these personalised relationships. (Barolsky, 2014, forthcoming)

Eric Wolf has shown that even in contexts where there is a highly developed formal state, the formal state structure is intimately connected with a variety of social networks, 'the formal framework of economic and political power exists alongside or intermingled with various other kinds of informal structure, which are interstitial, supplementary, parallel to it.' (1966, p. 2). Critically, in South Africa, it appears that in South Africa in the context of still nascent state formation, social networks do not simply exist in and around formal institutional structures, these networks are in fact constitutive of the state and are fundamental to how the state does or does not work.

The CJCP study found that a common consensus among interviewees was that police officers from outside the community would be less likely to be open to corruption, as they would not know the local criminals, or have existing relationships within the community that might prevent them doing their job effectively and transparently. Here therefore networks are a liability and conduit for the exercise of power and extraction of resources. (CJCP, 2014)

---

<sup>3</sup> Drinking establishment

With regard to conventional police work there appears to be an almost stylized indifference and passivity. Police do not intervene in gang violence or protect children at school. Instead they claim that they are 'afraid' of the school boy gangsters. When requested to protect girl learners so they can participate in activities, they argue that there are not enough patrol vans. Interviewees also recounted stories where the police had refused to intervene in an ongoing crime or to respond when information is brought to them. The police 'refuse' to police certain areas that they consider 'dangerous'. When crimes are reported at police stations, the service citizens receive is rarely satisfactory, ranging from indifference, rudeness to actively mocking certain complainants who come to report such crimes as a report of the rape of a boy or other sexual violence. (CJCP, 2014)

All of these factors, including lack of faith in police investigation, obviously undermines the extent to which citizens are willing to report crime to the police. Critically also police are seen to be unable to provide protection to citizens who report crime, who fear retribution from the alleged perpetrators as they often know the complainant. (CJCP, 2014)

Importantly those the CJCP 2014 study found that people would be willing to report crime if they felt that they would get the assistance they need. This supports other HSRC research on trust in the criminal justice system, which found that citizens were willing to change their attitudes to the police if they had merely one or more direct positive experiences with them. (Barolsky, 2014, forthcoming)

### **Vigilante violence and non-state forms of social ordering in Khayelitsha**

The relationship of citizens with the police in Khayelitsha has to be seen in the context of the complex informal sources of regulation and governance in the township that both precede and in some ways supersede the advent of democracy. Various forms of community policing and social regulation have a far more powerful resonance than the apparently weak and ineffective formal criminal justice system. There is also a strong discourse of self-reliance, a sense that 'the community' can look after itself as it did under apartheid and continues to do so now.

Neve and Du Toit argue in their study of Khayelitsha that, 'the township can be conceptualized as consisting of a number of overlapping, concentric rings of authority and governance. These are situations of informal economic governance in which enforcement through violence or the threat of violence is central, and where the state is far from assured of a monopoly on such violence'. (2012)

The CJCP therefore found in its study on Khayelitsha in 2014 that all focus group participants,

were clear that the retribution taken by non-formalized community members was violent in nature, and may or may not result in the death of the suspect. The extent of the punishment is viewed as being unrelated to the severity of the crime – it is merely a function of the exasperation and frustration that the community feels with the inadequacy of the police response.

Use was made of,

whatever weapons were to hand, ranging from pangas, knives and stones, to sticks and shovels; to the burning of suspects, forcing them to drink battery acid, or leaving them bound on railway lines. These possible methods were not confined to any one group, but were all mentioned by multiple groups, the consensus being that despite one's personal feelings, no-one would try to intervene in such cases, and would stand by and watch, or cheer on those dispensing the 'justice'. (CJCP, 2014)

Here Sampson's notion of people acting together for 'the common good' takes an ambiguous turn, referring to the violent enforcement of a 'common good', conceptualised as a defensive social cohesion that seeks to rigidly define the boundaries of the 'community' against the criminal or other 'outsider'.

Ncedo personally witnessed an incident of violent retribution at Khayelitsha train station against two alleged young thieves whom neighbours reportedly witnessed stealing:

there were boys who were brought in by what would be called a mob. The story goes- these boys stole a computer, cell phone and a wall watch in Z area. This happened during the day. They probably saw the owner was busy on the washing line behind. They sneaked in but were seen by one of the neighbours who recognised one of them. Then in the evening the neighbours gathered and looked for them. Guns and any object that anyone had were brought in for the search and they [young boys] were found and were tortured, they were swollen beyond recognition, they had blood and observers were calling for their death. (Field report, April, 2014)

Ncedo recounts his own ambiguity about this incident:

Here I was personally torn apart, my natural instinct was that they should be left alone because surely they have learnt their lesson but experience has also taught me that robbers bleed today and the following day they are back in the street doing the same thing [however] this kind of torture makes them more vicious rather than makes them stop what they are doing. (Field report, April, 2014)

Once the young robbers had been violently dealt with, attention turned to the person who had bought the stolen goods, a Congolese national, who had allegedly then sold the goods to another Congolese national. Xenophobic sentiment rose quickly towards this individual, whom the crowd initially thought was a Nigerian national, (perceived to frequently buy stolen goods). This man 'confessed' to being Congolese and immediately returned the stolen goods that he still had in his possession. Ironically the fact that retribution against this individual would be perceived as xenophobic restrained the crowd, 'now the heat was also turning on him...the temptation to torture him was boiling with the mob. They resisted the temptation because it's going to be seen as xenophobia, they kept saying'. (Field report, April 2014)

The police arrived after the incident had already played itself out and the crowd had decided not to attack the Congolese national. Abuse was hurled at them as they left with the young boys for their perceived failure to arrest criminals:

As that was happening police came in, then everybody disappeared except for the robbers who were taken in and the internationals (Congolese) who were explaining to the police what had transpired. As the police van left people started swearing at them and saying that they know that they will drop the robbers before they reach the police station. (Field report, April 2014)

These types of responses to crime and violence have a significant historical trajectory. As Fourchard notes, 'South Africa has a long tradition of anti-crime organizations –civic or civilian guards, parents' courts, people's courts, Neighbourhood Watches, street committees, vigilante organizations...which fight against both gang activities and what is perceived as the social degeneration of township life'. He argues that, the prevalence of these organizations reveals a 'fundamental' insecurity in South African townships (p. 608, 2011).

In addition to these anti-crime structures, during the period of resistance to apartheid, particularly during the 1980s, a complex network of alternative governance and self-regulation was developed, consciously in opposition to the state as a form of 'people's power' that saw communities organised systematically in street committees, area committee etc. These organisations did not only organise resistance against the state but mediated a variety of forms of social tension and conflict, including the establishment of 'people's courts' which would 'try' those accused of various forms of crime as well as those alleged to have worked in collusion with the state, so-called '*impimpis*' (traitors). In many instances it appears that the state has not reclaimed these spaces or established meaningful sovereignty over them. While residents will allow various municipal service providers into the township to provide goods such as water and sanitation, this does not mean that the state's right to assert its sovereignty and authority through the police is uncontested. As the CJCP study found, 'less formalized community structures seemed preferable alternatives for both ensuring safety, and achieving a perceived sense of justice' (2014). The police themselves argue that vigilante violence is the result of 'deeply-entrenched notions or systems of so-called "people's justice"; a thirst for so-called "instant justice"; a culture rooted in our historical past of a distrust or even disdain for those in authority, including the police' (SAPS, opening statement, 2014)

Thus, according to Gillespie who conducted an ethnographic study on vigilante violence for the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, the 'police are only a small part of the problem that causes 'mob' justice' (2014). She argues instead that vigilante violence is 'about the failure of the state to deliver and address the legacies of apartheid', in particular inequality. (Gillespie, 2014)

Therefore, vigilantism is, 'deeply rooted in the history of the township, as part of a complex system of alternative justice practice in Khayelitsha and as expressive of a national and international popular justice technique that occurs in conditions of sustained inequality and lack of access to adequate livelihood'(Gillespie, 2014)

Critically vigilante violence is oriented toward the assertion of local forms of sovereignty and the creation of a moral community against a putative 'other' through violent and public spectacle. In the South African context this 'other' may be the 'criminal', the foreigner, the homosexual. As Burr and others have noted the 'criminal' and crime as a discursive category gives voice to polyvalent concerns about social disorder that extend beyond violations of formal law. Crime becomes a 'diagnostic of the fragility of civil society', (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2004, p. 822) a metaphor for imminent social dissolution, a 'conjuring of a world saturated with violence and moral ambiguity (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2004, p. 824).

Thus Gillespie argues that vigilante violence is an 'ongoing alternative practice of punishment that complements, contests and supersedes the formal state criminal justice system' (2014)

Therefore, while public attention has focused on recent and horrific incidents of vigilante violence, including 'necklacing', these types of violence and the conceptions of popular justice which underpin them, are neither simply a sudden manifestation of post-apartheid rage with the failures of the state or merely the continuation of historical forms of social ordering. Instead they are a hybrid form that draws on historical repertoires and practices of popular justice. On the other hand, post-apartheid, these forms of popular justice take on a new relation to the state and current constitutional dispensation. Thus Burr argues that popular justice is also about 'alternative' conceptions of moral order that contest the constitutional order, particularly in terms of the control of women and youth (Burr, 2007). Burr argues that these forms of disciplinary violence are not only a critique of the *application* of the law but is also a critique of the moral foundation of the law, including a belief that it is through disciplinary violence that 'people are made into



human beings, and that it is through the constant performance and embodiment of violence that the moral community is performed, despite the official adherence to constitutional democracy' (2007). On the other hand, it is clear that the continued power and resonance of these 'alternative' forms of social ordering and the failure to displace them, does speak, as we have seen, to the weakness and inadequacy of the state and the corruption and brutality of particular institutions like the police, as well as the state's inability to assert its own symbolic order, in particular the constitutional order, against competing practices and beliefs.

On the other hand Gillespie notes that she found 'no consensus' on vigilante violence i.e. whether people condoned or rejected it.

Ncedo witnessed an incident in Khayelitsha which, where collective violence was threatened but not carried out, which speaks to the paradoxical nature of social ties in the township, where 'strangers' are prepared to intervene, if necessary with violence, on behalf of a fellow resident they feel has been wronged. But the collective ties are formed against the boundary of the 'other', in this case a Chinese national. The incident also speaks to the violent enforcement of moral community through the informal social regulation offered by taxi associations as well as the ambiguity of the role of the police as arbiters of social order in this fraught context.

Ncedo arrived at the scene when a group of armed citizens were threatening to attack a Chinese shop owner after he had allegedly hit a shop assistant when a duvet cover was stolen from the shop by a young man. The shop assistant had sought the assistance of taxi drivers to chase down the suspect and retrieve the duvet cover, which she then gave to the shop owner. Community members were angered by the apparently unwarranted attack on the shop assistant who had in fact ensured that the duvet cover was returned. Community members immediately interpreted the incident in the light of anti-Chinese sentiment. In a show of solidarity with the shop assistant the angry crowd threatened this Chinese shop owner as well as other Chinese owned shops in the area, which subsequently closed out of fear. Police arrived to intervene and attempted to negotiate rising xenophobic sentiments in a context in which it was assumed that the only reason they had arrived at all was because the Chinese shop owners could afford to bribe them. The crowd threatened the police when they felt that proper respect hadn't been shown to the woman who had been assaulted by putting her at the back of the police van, with the Chinese shop owner sitting at the front. After a show of armed force, the police subsequently 'agreed' that the woman who had been assaulted should sit at the front of the police van and the Chinese shop owner at the back. They then retreated and quietly returned later when the crowd had dispersed with the Chinese shop owner and shop assistant each sitting at the front of two separate vans.

It was roughly around lunch time when I saw people amalgamated in front of the Chinese 5 Rand's store<sup>4</sup>, carrying stones, umbrella's and brooms from the toilets in the mall...I was told that there was a young guy who came in and said he wants to buy a particular duvet cover. The lady working at the store gave him [the duvet cover] and instead of going to the till to pay he ran away but the taxi drivers nearby chased him and he run into Makhaya but he threw away the duvet cover in order to raise his speed to save his life as taxi drivers are known to punish robbers in the community. Robbers in some instances run to the police and hand themselves over to them rather than get caught by taxi drivers.

---

<sup>4</sup> Everything in the store costs 5 Rand or less hence the name.

After getting the duvet cover the Chinese shop owner came back and hit...the lady who works there who gave the robber the duvet cover who ran away with it. It was this incident that made customers and other passers-by to want to attack the Chinese shop and also other two nearby Chinese shop owners who had nothing to do with the incident. The manager in the mall was called by securities who were at pains trying to prevent the attack. All Chinese shops were closed and within a few minutes police came in and after some time came out with both the Chinese man and the worker who was abused...the worker went to the back of the van and as the Chinese man was about to enter the front -people wanted to attack the police vans (two vans had come in). Then police came out with their guns but people said the Chinese must be the one at the back and the lady in front and the police agreed.

People claimed that Chinese treat their workers like that and they...were singing that they must go back to China.

People were incensed by the fact that a foreigner can treat a South African woman in that manner yet he was helped by South Africans to at least get his materials back.

People were also angry at police, claiming that they are never so early when criminals are being chased or when called for duty but are very efficient to protect a Chinese shop owner.

People were even accusing the police of expecting bribes from the Chinese and even said that they knew that he would not even spend an hour in jail.

Then after some while + - two hours the police came back again in two police vans and the two (Chinese man and the lady worker) were each seated in the front in each van. They went into the shop and there seemed to be a discussion for a while, about 15 minutes, then they came out. From the outside it seemed to me that they were trying to reconcile the two sides but that's speculative because no-one wanted to divulge as to what has happened. At that time people were no longer interested in the story. (Field report, 3 April, 2014)

### **Taxi associations**

As can be seen from this story, taxi owners and drivers play a critical role in enforcing social order in the community and are generally a far more powerful presence than the police, particularly in combatting gang violence and 'disciplining' youth. As Ncedo writes,

Taxis are known bullies and bring with their excessive force whenever they go. As such community members have used this force whenever they feel that they need it. There are so many stories of people ...in townships...are not taken to police but to the taxi ranks where they are met with brutality. Even during this time of gangsterism in the absence if not failure of police...the taxi association was called upon to act. The young boys or men who are gangs are aware that the energy they have will be met by equal or more opposite energy by the taxis and when they collide something has to give, hence taxi drivers have been given the credit for lowering down the gang wars in Khayelitsha. (Field report, 3 April, 2014)

Taxi associations have a known association with violence particularly in relation to violent rivalry over taxi routes. A Western Cape provincial inquiry into the taxi industry sees taxi associations in unambiguously negative terms:

the taxi associations operate 'like a modern day mafia with the power to extort monies from operators, the ability to kill people who disagree with them and threaten their interests' (Western Cape Provincial Government 2005: 111). The inquiry report is replete with accounts of the use of covert *iimbovane* ('ants', or assassination squads) to murder rivals and the amassing of vast unaccounted-for 'war chests', secretly used to 'hire hit men, buy illegal firearms, employ the services of traditional healers, pay for legal fees, bail for those arrested, pay families of *iimbovane* and maintain the services of those involved in violence. (cited in Neve and du Toit, 2012)

On the other hand it is clear that taxi association are also seen as playing an important social regulatory function that is appears to have more resonance than the formal institution of the police. Thus as Gillespie notes of Khayelitsha, 'it is common knowledge in the township that if you need help with a criminal matter the best place to go is to Site C taxi rank where the taxi bosses run a formidable alternative justice system' (2014).

The taxi associations not only deal with criminal matters but are called in to adjudicate a range of other disputes and issues of social control including young people who are brought by parents struggling to deal with their 'ill-discipline'. They address school violence by raiding schools for weapons and deal with theft by getting people's stolen goods back, through 'talking' and sometimes intimidating the family of the perpetrator. (Gillespie, CJCP)

Taxi associations also play a critical role in regulating informal economic relations and ensuring the enforcement of 'contracts' between traders and customers.

those working in close proximity to the taxi rank indicated that they were able to appeal to the offices of the local (minibus) taxi association if they had a dispute with a debtor or employee, suggesting that the governing powers of such associations extend beyond the immediate remit of their own business interests...It was clear that the local taxi association was widely regarded as a source of governance and a buttress against unsanctioned claims in the form of criminal victimization. In a context marked by high levels of informality the local taxi association thus represents an important vector of local governance. (Neves and du Toit, 202, p.137)

The CJCP report described the power of taxi associations relative to formal policing practices,

Taxi drivers patrol the community at night in private cars, both together with, and separate from, neighbourhood watches and street committees. According to the [focus] group, taxi drivers feel no compunction attacking any individual they encounter they suspect of engaging in crime, or wandering the street with no '*legitimate*' business. The same group reported that the taxi drivers are seen as being the '*most powerful*', and are the ones seen as taking primary responsibility for policing the community. (2014)

On the other hand CJCP respondents also saw taxi drivers as 'being in collusion with the police, and complicit in the provision of bribes to the local SAPS'. (2014)

In the HSRC's recent fieldwork taxi associations are seen as having played a crucial role in halting the escalation of gang violence last year. It is clear that their 'discipline' involves violence against alleged perpetrators. Informal security guards at Peace Park explain:

The unity of the community with the fierceness of taxi drivers, who would hit them[gangsters] until they spoke and give out the names of other culprits helped somewhat to reduce crime. (Informal security guards, Peace Park, 6 Feb 2014)

Two young school girls in Kuyasa confirmed the role of taxi drivers in combatting gang violence with violence. Here taxi drivers act in '*loco parentis*' for young people whose parents they believed had failed to act against or control their children,

This year it's better because the gang wars have somewhat subsided because of the involvement of the Taxi drivers. This crime in fact would stop if parents did not protect their kids who are involved in wrong doing. They [parents] complained to the police about the Taxi drivers yet the tax drivers help reduce the incidences of gang war by fighting fire with fire and the gangs are scared of them. (Schoolgirls, Kuyasa, March 2014)

### The pollicisation of security

In this highly volatile and violent context, it is evident that security has become significantly politicised in the Western Cape. While this is probably true of other areas in the county, the situation is exacerbated by the fact that the Western Cape is the only province in the country not run by the ruling African National Congress (ANC). In this context, the question of security has become a significant 'political football' between the national government, dominated by the ANC and the provincial, Democratic Alliance (DA) governed, Western Cape. In the 2000 municipal elections the DA in alliance with the New National Party (a spin off from the National Party that ruled the country under apartheid), won the Cape Town City Metro. However, the NNP withdrew from the alliance in 2001 and the DA lost the Cape Town municipality. No party achieved an absolute majority in the Western Cape in the 2004 general elections. However the ANC formed an alliance with the NNP, which allowed the ANC-NNP coalition to form a provincial government. However, in the 2006 local government elections, the DA won back the City of Cape Town and DA leader Helen Zille was elected Mayor of the City. She formed a coalition with six smaller parties as the DA failed to win an outright majority in the 221-member City Council, which governs the Cape Town metropolitan area. This became the only large metropolitan area that was not controlled by the ANC. However, as the DA itself says, 'the coalition government in Cape Town initially had a tenuous grip on power' although its role in governing the City has been progressively entrenched over time. In the country's last elections in 2009, the DA won the province of the Western Cape as a whole with a narrow majority of 51%. In the 2011 local government elections it won an outright majority in the City Council of Cape Town and a new mayor, Patricia de Lille, formerly of the Independent Democrats party, was elected.

In this context of ongoing contestation, as Fourchard notes, 'provision of security in poor neighbourhoods is an important resource for political parties, local leaders, and more ordinary members'. Those parties which can be seen to be providing security in a particular area are likely to have access to significant political gains. In the highly contested Western Cape Province, security became a battleground between the ANC and DA. While the ANC was still ruling the province the then opposition DA sought to win voters in 'coloured' townships. Fourchard writing during the period that the DA was still in opposition found that,

mobilization for security is perceived and used by political leaders and police officials as a resource to reinforce partisan presence in contested constituencies. Vigilantism might be perceived by local ANC leaders and police officials as a popular reaction against an unresolved social question inherited from the apartheid era, but they are more likely to see it as a political problem that may be exploited

by their political opponents. DA perceives police initiatives as nothing more than an ANC threat to its influence in the coloured areas of Cape Town.

This contestation regarding security has continued to the present with the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry becoming a source of contestation between national and provincial government. The national government disputed the provincial governments' authority to set up a Commission of Inquiry into policing in Khayelitsha because policing is a national competence, but this was finally overturned by the Constitutional Court. The provincial government has focused on the inadequacy of national government responses to crime, including the infrequent and late release of crime statistics. In this regard the Western Cape government has embarked on a process of establishing an integrated safety information system that seeks to collate all sources of information on crime in order to supplement and verify police statistics. Another source of contention between the provincial and national government has been the national government's reluctance to deploy the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in communities affected by gang violence, despite the provincial leader's repeated call for such intervention. The provincial government has also emphasised the oversight role of the Department of Community Safety in the Western Cape over the function and priorities of policing in the Western Cape and most recently (March 2014) passed the Community Safety Bill which defines and legislates this role. However, as Gillespie points out both parties [ANC and DA] are to 'blame' for the 'failed project of providing for the poorest citizens of South African cities. Unless this is at the core of discussions about how to solve the problem of crime and its violent retaliations, it is unlikely we will get very far in our efforts to make Khayelitsha, and South Africa less violent' (2014, p. 15).

Gillespie argues that the anti-crime initiatives that are currently taking place in Khayelitsha actually add to the politicisation of security and the complexity of addressing crime in the area:

There are a number of NGOs that are working to reduce crime in Khayelitsha, with varying degrees of success. Each has its own working method and its own set of objects, from toilets to large urban upgrades from patrols to youth groups. Yet they also bring with them their own institutional dynamics and ways of working that are variably useful to residents, sometimes serving particular interests, sometimes creating factions and tensions, sometimes creating their own set of actors and protocols. They add to the complexity of crime control in the township.

### **Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU)**

The Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading project (VPUU) was publically launched in 2005 as a collaboration between the City of Cape Town in cooperation with the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the German Development Bank (KfW). The project stated that it was aimed at social, situational, and institutional crime prevention while linking urban upgrading with a broad spectrum of social interventions. Community partners initially included the Khayelitsha Development Forum, operating since 1995 and *Simelela* a network of 28 NGOs from Khayelitsha and Cape Town working on gender-based violence.

The project sought to increase safety by improving the socio-economic conditions of 200 000 to 300 000 in defined 'Safe Node Areas' in Khayelitsha. 120 million rand over a five year programme was allocated to the project.

The intervention has three key approaches, i.e. situational crime prevention, social crime prevention and institutional crime prevention. The situational crime prevention component of the intervention relates

primarily to construction of public facilities such as libraries and the creation of well-lit spaces alongside the main pedestrian routes. One key aspect has been the introduction of what are called 'Active Boxes' at the intersection of main pedestrian routes. These are small three-storey buildings which contain at a minimum a meeting room or public facility for the neighbourhood, a caretaker's flat and a room for facility guardians. They are managed and run by resident groups. The aim is to positively occupy previously perceived dangerous spaces. The Active Boxes are placed approximately every 500 metres along major pedestrian routes. According to VPUU volunteer civic patrols guard these buildings. A ground floor activity may vary from youth centre, sport centre, informal trader's bays, a crèche, depending on the local context. The caretaker flat ensures 24-hour occupancy. Each Active Box aims to make a specific area safer, while in its replication a network is established that spreads across a whole Safe Node Area of about 50,000 – 80,000 residents. (Bauer, B, 2010).

The other major component of the intervention is social crime prevention. Besides financing small projects by community based organisations (CBOs) and resident groups, the programme supports crime prevention activities, for example linked to the Active Boxes is a Neighbourhood Watch Project, where according to VPUU, 420 volunteers were trained in conflict prevention techniques and between 250 and 300 take part in unarmed patrols. Another focus of social crime prevention is Early Childhood Development and preventing school violence. In terms of the Early Childhood Development the VPUU stated in 2009 that it was involved in the development of an Early Childhood Development policy and area based development plans to be adopted by the City of Cape Town. They also reported that they were supporting 20 crèches as part of the focus on Early Childhood Development. (Graham et al, 2011)

According to VPUU it is involved in three schools in Harare and Kuyasa which were identified as crime hotspots by the community in 2006. These are Kwam Fundo Senior Secondary High School, Luleka Primary School, Esangweni Senior Secondary High School. (Graham et al, 2011)

The final component of the intervention focuses on institutional crime prevention which is primarily interpreted as promoting local economic development, skills training as well as the management and maintenance of spaces and places. One of the key objectives of institutional crime prevention is to empower local communities to take over facilities through the development of business skills, integrated planning and community participation. According to VPUU it has trained three groups to manage facilities that it has built in Khayelitsha. These include Harare Peace Park Facility Management Committee, Ntalzane Traders Facility Management Committee, and Kwam Fundo Sport Facility Management Committee. There was a public handover of facilities to these groups in 2009. (Graham et al, 2011)

According to the testimony of Chris Giles, VPUU's Social Crime prevention head, the VPUU 'model' has three key focuses. The first draws on the World Health Organisation's focus on lifecycles and therefore the programme focus on prevention through Early Childhood Development and the support of school going children and young adults so that they have 'the skills and the knowledge and the attitudes' to enable them to enter the marketplace or create employment for themselves. The second stream is 'taken from South American models' and it's focused on the building of community cohesion and social capital. The project here focuses on community participation, the collection of joint information, shared planning and the promotion of local initiatives that will support safer communities. The third focus of the 'model' is on community-based policing where VPUU supports and works with Community Police Forums, the of Neighbourhood Watch and the police, 'with the intention of... developing active citizen...involved in peace-

keeping and good relationships with the police' (Hearing transcript, Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, 2014).

Critically the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) has spanned both ANC and DA City of Cape Town administrations. However, the most substantive work undertaken by VPUU since 2006 has been under the auspices of the DA led government. In 2011 the DA's mayoral candidate Patricia de Lille released a media statement on VPUU,

The Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) programme has become an example of the success of a community approach to fighting crime, led by the City. It incorporates all stakeholders, including the metro police and the SAPS. To date, it has made the people of Khayelitsha safer. Last year, there was a 24% reduction in the murder rate in Khayelitsha.

This programme is designed to reduce crime by improving the overall environment in a community. This is done with better infrastructure, including safe walkways and area lighting, introducing area patrols and creating partnerships with community and other organisations to improve access to services. These organisations include the SAPS, neighbourhood watches, metro police and community leaders.

With international funding, the city has already invested R50 million in this project in Harare, Khayelitsha, in its most recent introductions in Kuyasa and Site C in Khayelitsha, and in Manenberg.

In Khayelitsha, due in part to the success of this programme, the murder rate declined by 24% in the past year.

De Lille said the DA-led City of Cape Town stood accused of neglecting poor areas like Khayelitsha, but the VPUU's success showed that that perception was wrong.

'This programme is designed to reduce crime by improving the overall environment in a community. This is done with better infrastructure, including safe walkways and area lighting, introducing area patrols and creating partnerships with community and other organisations to improve access to services.

'The city keeps being accused that nothing is being done in Cape Town, but we have this world class centre,' De Lille said referring to one of the 'active boxes' which has an astro-turf field and a playground. (Ndenze, B, May 4 2011, IOL news, <http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/da-lauds-vpuu-success-1.1064098#.U1-CQvmSw0I>)

### *History of VPUU*

The initial preparations for the VPUU project took place when the ANC was still in power in the City. A pre-feasibility study was conducted in 2002 in Cape Town. An agreement between the German Government and the South African government was reached in 2003 around the financing of the project and a separate agreement between the City of Cape Town and German Development Bank setting up the VPUU structure was also concluded in 2004. (Graham et al, 2011)

The City of Cape Town is the project implementing agent. Staff are provided through the Project Management Unit of the City, which was established in 2006. According to VPUU funding is sourced from local, provincial and national government in addition to the contribution of the German Development Bank.

VPUU states that the Khayelisha Development Forum has been involved in planning and implementation since 2002. (Graham et al, 2011)

Baseline studies were conducted in 2006 in Harare and Kuyasa. In 2007 the VPUU Social Development Fund was launched. Plans for 'Active Boxes' were approved 2007 and regular household surveys were begun. In 2008 the Harare Peace Park Active Box was completed and the VPUU reported that it had established strategic partnerships with a variety of local and national organisations including with Mosaic, an NPO focusing on domestic violence-as Gender Based Service Provider, Love Life, Khayelitsha Community Trust as well as the Development Bank of SA and the national Neighbourhood Development Partnership Grant housed in the national Treasury. (Graham et al, 2011)

In 2009 the Harare Square Development complex was completed along with the construction of and opening of facilities in Harare and Kuyasa. The VPUU project was also initiated in Site C and TR section of Khayelitsha. Other initiatives were patrolling, development of a local economic strategy and an Urban Design Concept Plan. An upgrade of the Monwabisi Park informal settlement also began and a baseline survey was conducted in Mannenburg. Patrolling was initiated after feedback from the community in 2006 that patrolling in hotspot areas would help prevent murder, rape and robbery. In 2009 VPUU reported that over a thousand people had engaged in patrols over the previous 30 months and that 70 had received a certificate for completing 50 or more patrols. They argued that sustainability is ensured by the full involvement of local structures. (Graham et al, 2011)

However, testimony at the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry indicated that the deployment of Neighbourhood Watches (NW) has proved more challenging than initially envisaged. Chris Giles, head of the VPUU's Social Crime Prevention programme testified at the Commission about the 'problematic' actions of Neighbourhood Watch (NW) members, recounting an incident report where NW members reported how they retaliated with stones when they themselves had been stoned.

Incident report: 'We met X, Y and Z, they were carrying big stones. We asked them why. The people started swearing and shouting at us and throwing the stones at us. We started throwing the stones back at them. X was hit and fell down. We called a van to check on him.'

Giles: This, in our opinion, is an example of inappropriate action by the Neighbourhood Watch and it appears from the account that the police will have known what had happened. There's no indication that the of Neighbourhood Watch felt they need to keep this information from the police or that the police were expected to take action to prevent occurrence.

Giles: So both in our opinion in this instance are implicated and inappropriate behaviour in relation to the community.

(Hearing transcript, Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, 2014)

Giles' discourse throughout his testimony appears deeply normative, emphasising a rationalist and managerial approach to the problem of violence in Khayelitsha that deliberately avoids political entanglement. Of the political contestation regarding policing he argues, 'at the moment we run the risk of hurling insults at each other without having the data to come to rational responses'. VPUU tries to avoid political contestation through the rational collection of data. Household surveys are carried out as a, 'way of ensuring that we get an opinion which is independent of any other kind of gate keeping structures or political affiliations which are in place, so that the voice of the community can emerge'. Which communities



these are that can emerge in this putatively 'apolitical' space is unclear. Policing must be based on the 'rational', neutral collection of information that avoids personal and political interests, 'We need to plan deployments based not only on SAPS crime data but on systematic community data, we can't make deployment a public resource on the basis of anecdotes or on the basis of particular individual's interests or concerns because that again undermines the perception of the community of the rationality of the use of protective resources'. However, it is difficult to get the police to participate in this rationality, 'it's very difficult to get any kind of informed commitment to a plan however rational and often explained it is'.

While the deployment of policing resources according to detailed crime mapping and the 'scientific' collection of data, may indeed be the most rational and potentially effective way to deploy resources, the mere assertion of the importance of this rationality is unlikely to find easy resonance in such a contested space, without direct engagement with, rather than dismissal of, rhetoric and practices that don't adhere to this normative, and ultimately highly ideological, vision.

Giles perspective at times appears to be in deep disjuncture with the deeply fraught social reality of Khayelitsha- it's vigilantism, its political contestation, its failures of policing and governance in general, the 'muck' of informal settlements where life is lived on the edge of survival. Instead the project seeks to find 'apolitical', technical solutions to the problems of violence based on the 'neutral' collection of data that draws on models of crime prevention deeply influenced by Northern discourses about 'managed spaces', proper planning, order and control. While these may be the ideal in Western cities, the reality of African cities in general is deeply fluid, unstable, emerging and above all not easily subject to managerialist practices which seek to create order out of the apparent 'chaos' of the African city.

Illustrative of this divorce between Northern norm and local practice is another of Giles' responses to a Neighbourhood Watch report in which patrollers waited without success for a response from the police to an incident they had reported and subsequently decided to take the matter to a 'community meeting'. Giles argues instead that the problem should have should been 'dealt with within a structured and trustworthy team' and that taking the problem to a community meeting could not have a 'constructive' outcome (Hearing transcript, Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, 2014).

In relation to CPFs, Giles acknowledges they are not functioning at Lingeletu-West and Khayelitsha police station, however VPUU has proposed a 'service level agreement' with the Harare CPF, 'What's important is it sets out the service provider, key responsibilities, duties and deliverables of how that will be measured'. To encourage adherence to this 'contract' VPUU has offered CPFs in Khayelitsha an 'income' of R3 000 a month of which 70% CPFs are obliged to spend on equipment or training and 30% to meet costs like transport and airtime. Thus there is little autonomy regarding how funds are spent. The terms of the contract are rigorous. Each CPF must have, 'accurate data about their membership *and* who is active *and* where they are active' (own emphasis). Secondly each active member of a Neighbourhood Watch must submit an incident report at the end of their duties. In addition, each CPF must enter into a 'development contract with each individual volunteer so that the volunteer gets a sense that out of their contribution [is a contribution]to the community'. According to Giles, 'we agree standards on each of those tasks and if the CPF performs to standard they get the money into their account...They'd need to present to us bank statements to keep a record and monitoring of the expenditure'. However, when questioned about the success of these contracts with CPFs, Giles acknowledges, 'up until now only the Harare CPF has actually received payments so it's not something that has been that successful up until now'. (Hearing transcript, Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, 2014)

When asked how the 'attitudes' of the police can be changed so that they engage effectively in partnerships with community organisations, including VPUU, Giles argues, ignoring the problem of power, that the issue is simply a matter of a lack of communication, 'all it takes is for a good clear conversation at provincial cluster and station level, a decision whether to participate or not, identification of the role they wish to follow and how we can all know whether they're doing it or not and regular attendance at a meeting, there's nothing difficult in any of that'. (Hearing transcript, Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry, 2014)

## Understanding the African city

Attempts have been made to develop critical insights in the understanding of cities in Africa, one that does not simply replicate the Global North, American or European urban and regional theory on the region. Rather, one that actually views African cities on their own terms and based on their own experiences in a bid to contribute to a more grounded understanding of African cities (Nuttall and Mbembe 2008; Pieterse 2008; Edjabe and Pieterse 2010; 2011; Myers 2011; Pieterse and Simone 2013). Therefore while African cities are often viewed as places 'bursting at the seams, overtaken by their own fate of poverty, disease, violence, and toxicity.' (Roy, 2009:820) and as opposites of the 'global city', that is 'urban nodes that are seen to be command and control points of the world economy.' (Roy, 2011:224). However, Roy argues, they are also places where those living in abject poverty and deprivation apply their resourcefulness and innovation to survive and thrive. The social dynamics of Southern Cities therefore lend them to be 'epicentres of creativity and innovation and as well as political unrest and crime' (Isandla Institute, 2011:5).

The peculiarities of Southern Cities are the result of the history of colonialism and post colonialism as well as rapid urbanization and globalization. According to Simone (2007: 237) during colonialism African cities left little opportunity for the African - 'the potential interconnections among emerging networks of social practice, economic specialization and cultural reformation were constrained'. Additionally, institutions were underdeveloped due to a lack of public spaces that were repressed by the existing powers (Simone, 2007:238). What was attained in the city did not remain within it but invested in transitional populations who existed between the rural and urban rule (Simone, 2007:238). Furthermore, 'economies capable of extending and deepening African uses of urban space were, for the most part, readapted toward deflecting the impositions and segregation of colonial rule' (Simone, 2007:238). They were also applied to unregulated activities at the peripheries of the cities 'without the urban topological and social complexion necessary to really incubate and develop these nascent urban orientations and practices' (Simone, 2007:238). Post colonization the situation did not change much because the focus shifted to the nation state as a source of progress and modernity at the expense of the city (Rao, 2006: 225).

The weakness and gaps left by colonization and subsequent neglect have currently been exacerbated by the growth in the urban population of cities in the South, especially in Africa. The United Nations (2007) states that urban population is estimated to reach 5.9 billion by 2030 and most of these people will be living in developing country's urban areas. This rapid urbanization has highlighted the weaknesses of many cities in the South and as a result most people who move to urban areas will be left poor and destitute. This is evidenced by Beall, Guha-Khasnobis, & Kanbur (2010: 8) who report that between 1993 and 2002, the population living on less than US\$1 a day decreased by 150 million in rural areas, however, it increased by fifty million in urban areas.

African cities are therefore not by any means peculiar in their rapid rate of growth, but African cities confront the peculiar challenge of informal and formal dimensions of city growth which poses a variety of governance challenges to the continent. A process of accelerated urbanization and intensive population

migration into urban spaces is currently occurring on the continent. Africa is recorded to have the fastest rate of urbanization compared to other continents (Pieterse 2011: 5). The United Nations HABITAT (UNFPA 2007: 7), projects that over the next two decades, Africa will more than double its urban population from 294 million in 2000 to an astounding 742 million in 2030, and a further 1.2 billion by 2050. This suggests that Africa may only be at the beginning of its urban transition, an urban space that is already marked by profound crisis visibly expressed in the endless vistas of unemployment, gangs, armed militias, and the spread of intolerance and xenophobia.

These ills experienced in developing country cities are also the result of the globalization of neoliberal policy, which favor capitalist interest over and above the citizens. The global South, according to Costa Da Nóbrega Cesarino (2012: 107), is part of a Western hegemony that impacts on it negatively. For example, in cities of countries like Brazil and South Africa 'new found universal citizenship rights are starkly contradicted by the material inroads on citizens lives made by neoliberal capitalism' (Miriraf 2009:40). The populations have been able to achieve formal political rights but they have 'gained rights they cannot eat!' (Miraftab, 2009:41). For this Watson (2009) blames governments, who have enacted inappropriate laws and regulations, which are producing social and spatial exclusion (2009:2262).

This increase in population coupled with inadequate policy and planning, has left urban centers unable to cope and this has led to not just poverty but other social ills associated with it. These ills include inadequate housing, water and sanitation, growth in inequality, and inability of the poor to find secure employment. Consequently, 'insecurity has become a fact of life' and has led to the growth of Slums and informal settlements (Beall, Guha-Khasnobis, & Kanbur, 2010: 8).

Slums on the one hand are a 'distortion of urban substance into a dysfunctional stage for violence, conflict and the iniquitous distribution of resources' (Rao, 2011:231). They form part of urban economic and social informality, which Yiftachel (2009) terms 'gray spaces', they partially 'incorporate people, localities and activities between the 'whiteness' of legality/approval/safety, and the 'blackness' of eviction/destruction/death' (Yiftachel, 2009:89).

However, Slums are not only places of illegality, death and destruction but spaces for vibrant and entrepreneurial urbanism (Roy, 2011:224). Poor urban residents make use of what is available in the city, though limited, to forge a living. In Southern cities formality, including formal employment have played a minor role and as a result a great proportion of Southern Cities are developed through the unplanned and spontaneous activities of the informal sector. This is because the bulk of the excluded population take ownership and devise their own solutions to the challenges of housing, neighborhood and urban development and ekes out a livelihood outside formal decision structures (Miraftab, 2009: 42). Additionally, the economies that take place within them are 'active frontiers of contemporary capitalism, the greenfield sites where new forms of accumulation are forged and expanded' (Roy, 2011:229). Therefore, 'deep informality of third world cities is not their failure' but 'a triumphant sign of their success in resisting the Western models of planning and urban development' (Miraftab, 2009: 44).

Furthermore, the informality of these urban areas forms part of cultural and historical traditions of resistance (Rao, 2011). That is, the marginalized stake their right to the city, 'a legally enshrined mechanism that ensures the on-going presence of all who reside in cities to 'make' an urban life that 'counts' (Simone, 2008: 2). As such, 'illegality and informality tug at the normative roots of the state leading to an arena charged with the violence of and toward the governed, staged around the paternalistic welfare policies of

the state designed to placate and manage populations whose civic, political and social rights are patently out of sync' (Rao, 2011:229).

Thus, despite early predictions of its demise, informality has continued to receive global recognition, particularly, in the global South (Neves and du Toit 2012: 131). Consequently, 'Economic informality therefore appears to be less a residue of underdevelopment than a means by which a growing number of markets, economic activities and working lives are organized' (Neves and du Toit). Myers (2011) suggests that the informal is more complex than was previously characterised by economists and political scientists, and that research must embrace these complexities and see the informal as a structural form in and of itself. Presently, the idea of informality, in political, social and economic terms, forms the organising principle around which multiple activities are organized globally (Chen 2007), and earlier negative perceptions and hostilities which characterized the 'informal' are gradually withering away as new approaches for improved managing of the informal are being invented (David et al 2012).

### Interpreting the African city

While a well-documented and growing literature on the subject of African cities exists, the emergent factors associated with the current processes of change in cities across the continent seem to be challenging long-held assumptions and structures that make up the city. Formal and informal processes in the cities raise critical questions centering on citizenship, social policies and practices, and a complex blend of relations of dependence, inter-dependence, domination and resistance that must be explored and understood in their different contexts and for their implications for governance.

The interrogation of the urban aims to bring into focus divergent and diverse perspectives capable of opening new lines of thought and imagination, and compelling and persuasive accounts of the complexity of everyday urbanism (Pieterse 2011: 2). The urban becomes not just a fixed space where things happen. It becomes an emergent outcome of complex interactions between overlapping social, political, cultural, economic and institutional networks which are in a constant state of flux, and are simultaneously routinized, crisis-ridden and transformative (Swilling 2011: 79).

The urban space is an important determinant in the constitution of everyday life. People and spaces are intertwined in a manner that cannot be studied independently of each other (Aitken 2001; Holloway and Hubbard 2001). As McDowall (1999: 4) notes, 'it is socio-spatial practices that defines places'. Issues like structural poverty, inequality, the impacts of climate change, uneven and exclusionary economic patterns, weak and corrupt governance all become concrete urban development challenges (Pieterse 2011: 1).

The plurality of claims to the urban throws up deep issues which breeds different conflicts and contestations, and makes it inevitable to engage with social processes in understanding everyday life in an urban context. Given their unruly, unpredictable, surprising, confounding and pretentious nature, these dynamics have been aptly described as 'rogue' (Pieterse 2011: 1).

Consequently, it is important to grasp the urban in terms that encapsulate what it is, both on its own terms and in terms that are meaningful to the people who inhabit it. This involves re-conceptualizing the role of the urban and transcending notions of the urban based on Western paradigms. The theorizing of the urban in Africa in a manner that is global empties it of local conditions and experiences on the ground, and creates challenges in understanding identities and actors whose lives are 'shaped' and 'organized' in these spaces.

## VPUU: formality and informality

The VPUU directly confronts some of these complexities around the nature of the African cities, including their informality, their ambiguous relation to legality, their self-regulation, insecurity and violence. The VPUU project is intended to ameliorate key elements of the depredations experienced in African cities, including, in South Africa, an apartheid legacy, which saw townships constituted as mere catchment areas for cheap labour. Aesthetic and functional infrastructure including libraries, parks, mosaicked public spaces, community centres are all intended to create a sense of 'place' and ownership and to address the challenges of endemic violence that poverty, state absence and urbanisation have thrown up. The primary modality through which VPUU, working through the City of Cape Town government, seeks to achieve its objectives is the formalisation of both space and social relations. However, the ethnographic fieldwork evidences some of the struggles to mediate the formal-informal divide, to 'super-impose' a model of order on a deeply contested, informal space where the state is accepted if it provides services, but not if it tries to assert its authority, where the most resonant forms of social regulation are violent and outside the state, where the lines between what is legal, illegal, criminal or not are blurred and where informal businesses operate according to rationales that don't adhere to normative business practices. In this environment 'scientific' models developed by global organisations struggle to embed themselves in forms of sociality and governance that are far more deeply rooted and which dispute the normative underpinnings of these interventions.

## The informal economy in South Africa

Contemporary South African society is strongly patterned and shaped by the legacies of apartheid and racialized forms of underdevelopment. This, in Philip's (2009) view has resulted in the centralized and vertically integrated monopoly structure of the core economy, and its asymmetric distribution of assets and capital; a racialized spatial legacy of township and homelands located far from economic opportunity; and the enduring legacy of inequality in the acquisition of skills and education. All of these effectively contribute to a post-apartheid distributional social system and pattern marked by lasting poverty and the highest level of income inequality in the world (Seekings and Nattrass 2005). Though these tendencies manifest differently based on specific local contexts, it is safe to argue that various survivalist and informal activities exist at the margins of the South African economy, and are underpinned by complex social dynamics and imperatives.

Despite widespread poverty and unemployment in South Africa, the informal sector is small and there is a low proportion of informal employment comparable to most developing countries of the world (Cichello et al 2005; Foxcroft et al 2002). These developments hinge on the legacy of the apartheid system which prohibited trade by Africans, and now accounts for a combination of a strong and formal economy which systematically crowds out informal economic opportunities in a developing country (Lund and Skinner 2003; Philip 2009). Those in the informal sector are marked by disadvantage (Neves and du Toit 2012: 131), and 90 per cent of them are African (Devey et al 2006), and are mostly female and with very low average incomes (Rogerson 2007).

In Cape Town the informal sector is nevertheless recognised as a significant source of employment and it is said to produce around 12% of the city's economic output and employ around 18% of people ([www.capetown.gov.za/en/ehd/Pages/informaltrading.aspx](http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/ehd/Pages/informaltrading.aspx)). Most of this trading takes place in public spaces within townships and other urban settings, illustrating the link between informality and public space. Public spaces are crucial both in geographical and social terms in Khayelitsha. These spaces reflect the agency and resilience of individuals and broader struggles over scarce resources. These spaces are

particularly important as they provide sites for recreation, socialising and networking. Preliminary field work in the sites in Khayelitsha is providing valuable information on the dynamics and tensions between urban upgrading, informality and public spaces.


As Neve and du Toit point out the interaction between the formal and informal is uneasy as the complexity, sociality and sometimes violence of informality interconnects with the state in varying degrees of intensity, depending on the degree of intervention in different contexts. The relationship between the two is often governed by informal rules that both the state and community tacitly understand, in order to facilitate this uncomfortable accommodation. Thus some forms of regulation are enforced, while others are strategically ignored. Therefore, 'state-led regulation coexists uneasily with non-state forms of governance. It also has different manifestations and intensities of enforcement in different locales. Regimes of governance are therefore contextual, variegated and spatialized in terms that are typically widely understood by both enforcers and enforced against...[this] recalls Guyer's (2004) notion of patchwork 'formalisms'.

Myers (2011) therefore disputes the idea that the informal constitutes a site of 'decay' and 'disorder', a premise upon which most government initiatives are based. Increasingly both national and local governments have realized that the informal economy has become a crucial factor in economic development, particularly in developing and emerging countries, and that it offers significant job and income generation opportunities (David et al 2012: 4). However, the failure to understand the structural underpinnings of the informal, has in many instances exacerbated inequality and poor access to services for those in the informal sector, arising from government policies and actions that do not recognise informality. One of the major risks of formalisation is disempowering already vulnerable individuals and communities. Upgrading efforts risk taking away, through formalisation, the strong sense of empowerment and self-worth that individuals gain through informal trading. Thus, evidence suggests that the integration of social networks and patterns of sociality into structured formal forms of urban development remains a poor substitute for previous forms of economic reciprocity and sociality (Myers 2011). In this context, formality can constitute a threat to social networks and patterns of sociality, and render the supposed benefit derivable from it doubtful or uncertain (Neves and du Toit 2012: 142).

The main challenge is to develop innovative, inclusive and supportive policies that recognize the value of the informal economy and the people in the informal sector. Policy frameworks and strategies aimed at the informal economy must be developed, without hampering the potential of the sector for economic growth (David et al 2012: 4). The enduring question that remains is how precisely should the link between informality and urban spaces be conceptualized?

The diagram below graphically summarises the core elements of the VPUU strategy in terms of infrastructure development in the safe node areas. While the Kuyasa interchange is not represented in this diagram, this has been a site of observations (it is located about 1km North West of the Mandela Peace Park site).





The urban upgrading project illustrates the tensions between Western (and locally internalised) perspectives around the shape of cities and urban environments which advocate for a 'properly' planned and modern city, in contrast with informal character of many African cities. It appears that the VPUU initiative is rooted in aspirations to create a 'world class' city where the perceived 'backwardness' of the African city needs to be 'corrected' via modernisation (Steck, Didier, Morange & Rubin, 2013). In this approach, urban planners favour formality, order and modernisation in order to promote an international urbanism that is associated with the 'neo-hygienist' vision of a modern city. More often than not, the informal is viewed as homogenous and undifferentiated. It is misunderstood and misrecognised because of normative notions of economic rationality (Neves and du Toit 2012: 131).

As Chris Giles, explained at the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry,

What the programme would like to show over time is the increase in what we would call managed urban areas and the map on the left with the orange dots shows the very few areas that were effectively managed and they're associated mainly with schools or with urban parks and on the right it shows the area that's now being managed and it shows the continuity between facilities, the alignment of...pedestrian and crime routes and the use of baseline information to then develop plans.

The assumption is that with managed space economic development will follow:

...the intention is to come up with a lasting safety arrangement which has an active component of citizenship that's based on economic development and the bringing of economic activity into the area and to spend wisely... on the security that we do need.

Recent studies on informality, particularly street trading, in cities such as Johannesburg and Cape Town, it has been argued, are evidence of a 'reordering of space' where social agents like traders have been invited to participate in the reordering of the city, but in 'disciplined ways'. Within this context, the informal is found wanting when measured against the benchmark of entrepreneurship that is predicated on rational, self-interested, utility-maximising individuals (Neves and du Toit 2012: 131-132). The spatial reordering seems to be anchored in new forms of governance where the management is not only done by public sector but by new PPP structures and private agencies (see Steck, Didier, Morange & Rubin, 2013).

While there is a perception that informality is related to disorder, informal regulation does occur through popular institutions and networks that may be beyond state control (Meagher 2009). In Khayelitsha, Neves and du Toit found that one of the most significant regulators of the informal sector were taxi associations, to whom traders would pay a regular fee. Taxi associations would 'police' contractual obligations between traders and their clients, with violence and intimidation if clients failed to comply. Street committees were also found to play a critical role in 'allocating' trading spaces.

While informal traders are exhorted to run their businesses using conventional business practices for the maximisation of profit, and are often given training in these business practices during the processes of formalisation, these attempts to 'teach' informal traders how to do business 'properly' in terms of Western norms of business practice, ignores other rationales, practices and norms around informal business. As Neves and du Toit point out informal businesses do not adhere to norms around 'proper' managerial business practices including record keeping and separating business from home expenditure, 'Informal sector workers are prone to not keeping written business records, eliding enterprise and domestic accounts, and extracting seemingly unsustainably high levels of resources from their enterprises'.

Critically informal businesses are deeply linked to particular forms of sociality in which the business is not a site for the 'rational' extraction of profit but a site for the redistribution of income between family members. Thus, 'They are motivated not by business plans but by various social and redistributive logics' (Neves and du Toit, 2012, p. 131-2) Thus instead of a focus on maximising profit economic activity is, 'directed to a wide range of objectives: generating income, bolstering food security, facilitating social connectedness, slowing the draw-down of a finite portfolio of assets'. Thus the informal sector has been criticised for being constrained by virtue of the fact that it has to act within its social networks and rely extensively on interpersonal guarantees. However, in attempting to understand the informal sector, 'The neo-classical economic logic of maximizing profit and minimizing costs inadequately captures the potentially multiple objectives of economic informality' (Neves and du Toit, 2012);

Thus economic activity is a profoundly cultural and socially embedded phenomenon and cannot be approached simply as a site for technical intervention, 'practices of accumulation are shaped by people's experiences and interpretations of social behaviour, rather than impersonal market logic'. (Neves and du Toit, 2012). Key to survival in informal contexts are, 'networks of trust and morality constituted within the socio-cultural environment' and practices of 'mutual sociality' (Neves and du Toit, 2012).

Area 1: Ntlazane road. Formality and informality





Within this context, the formalisation of spaces and informal trading in the safety node areas on the one hand and the utilisation of the new public spaces, while being welcomed by Khayelitsha residents, has also raised various issues of contention.

Interviews with ordinary traders, traders associations and organisations working with traders has indicated that many traders welcome the provision of better physical conditions for trading. These include no longer having to 'stand in the sand' but being able to use kiosks, having an improved pavement space, having access

to toilets, electricity and water and a safe space to pack things safely at night (Ntlazane traders association, March 2014).

The current caretaker of a building in Harare Square employed by VPUU and SANCO chairperson in the informal settlement Endlovini was able to give a detailed account of various VPUU activities and had this to say:

VPUU has done a good job in terms of developing this place Harare, here is a library, there are kids' parks and there are also buildings. They are also giving people skills like in mediation, management and people get certificates which are recognised and that is poverty alleviation...VPUU has brought about development of a high calibre.(April 2014)

A trader at Harare Square expressed similarly positive sentiments:

She said that the development by VPUU is a positive thing to have happened in Harare. She said that there are libraries, parks and some computer stores that are there thanks to VPUU infrastructural development in the area. She said that the pavement from there down to the station has made the trip down the station feels much safer. (Trader 1, Harare Square, 18 Feb 2014)

A senior member of the Ntlazane traders association argued that, 'VPUU has done well' (March 2014).

However, for those on the 'outside' of VPUU development initiatives its role appears deeply contested, with contention centring around the formalisation of informal business, including the 'imposition' of 'outside' models of development and competing conceptions around how business should be conducted. In addition, running as a thread through many of the narratives of traders are the critical issues of voice and agency, which traders, both utilising VPUU facilities and those outside them, repeatedly reiterated.

Ncedo summarises the key issues he encountered during his fieldwork with traders. Central to these issues is the question of formalisation, which as he notes, involves a shift in subjectivity that informal traders struggle with:

The struggles between the informal and formal are glaring when one engages the tenants at the VPUU buildings particularly amongst those businesses who were informal before VPUU came into being. It must be born in mind that these businesses are mostly survival strategies. These are people who decided to do something before they die out of hunger and as such the transition between the survival strategy (having something so that I eat at the end of the day) to formalised business (making profit and have short and long term plans and ideals) is not as simple straight forward. (Field report, April, 2014)

VPUU appears to struggle to understand these 'non-formal' rationales and, from the perspective of traders, seems dismissive and overbearing, failing to recognise the agency and competence of traders and imposing what are assumed to be 'superior' business practices:

The attitude of the VPUU project managers when engaging with the locals is not helpful. This however could be as a result of lack of understanding of why people went to business in the first place by the project managers. It could also be as a result of frustration by the local business people who had thought that they at least could manage their own businesses and affairs and now... someone who comes in to teach them how to manage (formalise their business) takes away, violates

their own understanding of themselves and their capabilities...There has been a lot of assertions by participants claiming that VPUU people treat them as children, they tell them what to do, and they do not listen to them. All of these could indicate that people are frustrated because they can no longer make decisions as they used to, that their knowledge or understanding of business is seen by the outsiders, who just came in, as not sufficient or lacking. (Field report, April 2014)

### *Trading kiosks*

As part of its developments, VPUU has created formal kiosks in a number of areas, which are, as noted by traders, meant to provide better conditions in which to trade. However, as part of the process of formalisation, VPUU expects, and indeed enforces, a contractual relationship with traders, in which they are expected to pay for the right to use the kiosks. This is very different to the survivalist forms of business based on relations of mutual reciprocity, in which most traders formerly engaged. This formal, impersonal 'business' relationship is resisted and contested. Traders understand the 'notice' that VPUU gives them should they not pay rent as a form of coercion, not the result of the 'violation' of a formal contractual relationship, but a failure of reciprocity.

A deep source of contention is the question of rent that traders are expected to pay to make use of the kiosks. It appears that most traders were either unaware or did not understand that this would be the consequence of VPUU development.

However, this is not merely a matter of misunderstanding and lack of communication but is profoundly about the ability of these small businesses to continue to operate. Traders quoted rental figure of between R900 and R1000. It was alleged that after some years of struggle and residents' 'investigation' of rental prices in the neighbouring township of Mitchell's plain, VPUU had made an offer to reduce rents to R600, exclusive of water and electricity. This was unlikely to reduce rental costs when services were included. In a township where the average monthly income is R2000 as outlined by Seekings, paying almost half one's income on rent is no doubt a significant financial burden.

VPUU's response has allegedly been to ignore traders complaints and repeatedly insist that 'ten thousand feet are passing here' as a result of their development. Traders vehemently dispute this and our own ethnographic fieldwork appears to confirm a significant underutilisation of the areas around formalised trading spaces. As one trader explained,

They [VPUU] tell us that there are about 10 000 feet passing here every day so they know we are making money. I welcome you to come and have a look in my book as to how many people pass and buy from us. We also invited VPUU to observe how many people actually buy from us. (Trader 2 in VPUU building at Khayelitsha station, 11 Feb 2014)

A senior member of the Ntlazane traders association explained, 'We asked them [VPUU] to come and do observations but they will not listen' (Ntlazane trader's association, March 2014).

Ncedo confirmed the lack of passing trade on several visits to the area. On this occasion,

They [traders] negotiated with me to stay and observe at least for three hours, which I did. There were three kiosks I was observing. One sells pillows and clothes, one has clothes and tablecloths and the last one was a Salon [hairstylist]. The Salon did not have a single person doing their hair on the day. One pillow was brought from the second kiosk, while some tablecloths were bought. (Field report on observation, 11 Feb 2014)

The trader renting a kiosk at Khayelisha station, reportedly close to tears, explained her anxieties about the rental rates,

VPUU has caused so much pain in our lives. Ever since VPUU came into being our lives have been negatively affected. They never told us that they were going to charge us such lump sum amounts per month when they came in and now we are trapped (Trader 2 in VPUU building at Khayelisha station).

She argued,

They told us they just wanted to build a shelter and nice places for us to work in. Now they demand huge rentals and if you can't afford them they promise to kick you out because they are not a charity (Trader 2 in VPUU building at Khayelitsha station, 11 Feb 2014).

Members of a co-operative operating in the VPUU building in Peace Park told Ncedo they are,

...unhappy with rental of R1000.00, which they have been paying since June 2013 when there is another location at the training centre where there is no rental payment. They are also not happy about VPUU's 29 day notice should VPUU wish to get rid of them (Members of a co-operative at Peace Park VPUU building, 6 Feb 2014).

Senior members of the Ntlazane traders association also stated that,

They do not like the attitude of VPUU of always threatening them when they don't afford rent. They say that VPUU should have at least given them three months for free to recover the money they might have lost when they were moved from one place to another during construction because that tampered with their routine (Ntlazane traders association, March 2014).

It appears that some traders have got into debt as a result of an inability to pay rent, 'The traders pay R924 per month. One lady owes R3000; the other says she owes more. They told me that owing VPUUs rentals is the one thing they can't get out of their minds' (Trader 2 in VPUU building at Khayelitsha station).

Another trader argued that people who are trading in the kiosks have to run another stand to make a profit,

People who have businesses there now have more than one stand because the stand in the VPUU buildings is for making money for Germans. Your children or relatives must work for you in another stand in this area for us to actually make some profit (Informal trader 1 at Khayelisha station, 11 Feb 2014)

### *Voice and power*

The issues of voice and language are deeply intertwined with the question of power as Richie in 1977 wrote, 'Where language and naming are power, silence is oppression, is violence'. It was Foucault who perhaps most famously investigated the link between knowledge and power. He argued that the nexus between power and knowledge has led, since the 18th century, to the creation of 'new 'technologies' for the governance of people', as 'Man' becomes simultaneously a 'subject and object of knowledge' (Gordon, 1980, p. 234) through various 'discourses' that literally define what can and cannot not be said and create the conceptual terrain in which knowledge is formed and produced. (Young, 1981, p. 48)

Habermas on the other hand focused on the power of discourse in modern democracies. Discourse is not merely talking, but is also a matter of creating understandings. According to Habermas we resort to discourse only when there is a disruption of everyday understandings that orient actions in common directions (Warren, 1993).

However, in the South African context, the question is less one of disruption of shared understandings, but of the initial creation of those understandings. In an environment where social deprivations and needs remain so pressing and where a recent history of conflict remains so present, it is often the language of violence that is the medium that is used most frequently by those seeking meaningful membership of the polity as citizens.

Thus for Habermas, the key institutional embodiment of discourse is what he calls a public sphere, that is, 'an arena in which individuals participate in discussions about matters of common concern, in an atmosphere free of coercion or dependencies that would incline individuals toward acquiescence or silence' (Warren, 1993, p. 212). In South Africa this public sphere remains a site of deep contestation, its boundaries are unclear, who and who may not 'speak' is deeply invested with power and the battles for inclusion within the realm of the 'speaking' subjects are often violent and discordant.

The struggle to constitute a public sphere, a context for discourse critically concerns the issue of equality. As Warren notes, '[t]he participants' equal stance in the debate is a cornerstone of deliberative democracy. Everyone's viewpoints and concerns are in principle equally relevant, because everyone is provided with the same rights and intellectual ability' (Warren, 1993, p. 207).

Habermas however, acknowledges that, '[d]iscursive responses to ruptured understandings are generally impossible...when resources of power are so uneven that those with power can resolve issues by fiat, and those without have to ingratiate themselves to superiors at the expense of speaking their minds to retain or advance their livelihood' (Warren, 1993, p. 212).

As Woolman argues in the South African context,

I tend to believe that our significant disagreements flow from ongoing, radical inequalities of power and an inability to form the substratum of trust necessary to have the open, honest conversations that would enable us to act, successfully, and regularly, in a manner that reflects rather obvious truths about the world we inhabit. (Woolman, 2013, p. 214)

Pellizoni therefore talks about the problem, particularly acute in deeply divided societies, of 'radical uncertainty...where not only the means, but also the goals and structure of a problem are ill-defined. Critically what 'radical uncertainty' brings into play is the problem of 'incommensurability among different cognitive and axiological positions' (Pellizoni, 2003, p. 208), particularly in fragmented societies. 'Incommensurability' refers rather to something more profound than disagreement or contradiction-both these assume a common language, a common frame of reference (Pellizoni, 2003, p. 209). Incommensurability refers to a condition where there is no shared language or conceptual framework. It is not possible to compare among different options, because this would entail a cardinal or ordinal measure, a common property or a comparative term (O'Neill 1993), which is lacking' (Pellizoni, 2003, p. 209). Therefore, 'what is lacking is a single description and connection of the facts, a shared vision of the meanings of concepts and principles. Facts become soft, and values hard. It is increasingly difficult to distinguish between them' (Pellizoni, 2003, p. 206). In these contexts, common ground may be hard to find.

The tensions between traders and VPUU seem fraught with the lack of common understandings, a shared language or common frame of reference. It is also evident that the inability to create a discursive public sphere in which discourse leads to common understandings is deeply limited by extremely unequal relations of power.

While VPUU engages in the rhetoric of consultation and community participation, this appears to be contradicted by the experience of traders on the ground. Thus Chris Giles argued at the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry that the VPUU project,

Take[s] seriously the concerns and ideas of ordinary people and lets them know what's happening and then encourages them to participate, [this] enables us to know how the situation is and without knowing that we can't know whether what we're doing makes a difference.

However, interviewees appear to struggle to make their opinion count in terms of the VPUU programme.

As a senior member of the Ntlazane traders association explained they made suggestions regarding what they thought were profitable business activities but VPUU appear to have ignored these suggestions. It seems that they felt that health and safety considerations would not allow for the sale of food from kiosks.

VPUU does not listen to our complaints. We engaged him (VPUU manager) on rent issue and other businesses that we feel could be profitable around here but they don't budge. For instance we know our customers better than anyone like when there are taxi drivers there must be food because they like their food. Blacks like meat but we cannot provide these because they are protecting their building (Ntlazane traders association, March 2014).

A trader at Khayelitsha station told Ncedo that 'VPUU does not listen to them or take them seriously. When they come to meetings with them (VPUU) they hardly ever yield any fruitful results for them'. (Trader 2 in VPUU building 11 Feb 2014)

Senior members of the Ntlazane traders association told Ncedo that they had proposed that there must be ATMs near the kiosks at Khayelitsha station. This is because people get dropped off by taxis and come and look at their goods and but then tell them they will buy when they come back. But, they never do because they will get the same goods in the [Khayelitsha] Mall where they are able to draw money. According to the association, they had also taken the initiative to go to the banks and the banks had already agreed to install ATMs but VPUU 'stopped them'. Some business people wanted to venture into selling fast food but VPUU did not want that because, 'they are thinking of their building and risks that come with such businesses...We spoke about the need for ATMs but that fell on deaf ears' (Ntlazane traders association, March 2014).

It appears that VPUU has now agreed to the sale of food at its facilities and were scheduled to install 'grease traps' in February. However, according to the Ntlazane traders association double standards apply in terms of the contractual relationship with VPUU 'there were no time lines [for installing grease taps] although there are time lines when they traders must do something like paying rent' (Ntlazane traders association, March 2014).

According to the Ntlazane traders association, they work with organisations such as Sanco and Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF). However, 'They say that has this working relations don't assist much because nothing moves till VPUU decides and no one tells them anything unless they decide for themselves'. (Ntlazane traders association, March 2014)



There also appears to be a perception among some interviewees that VPUU does not treat traders with respect,

The worst thing about them (VPUU) is their attitude. They just speak to us as though we were kids. We are men and women in our own right so no German and American citizen can just come here with their business models and instruct us to follow them. When they call you to meetings it is just to rubber stamp otherwise they don't listen (...) (Senior member Khayelisha traders association, 11 Feb 2014).

There is also a perception that VPUU does not allow people the autonomy to run their businesses, 'They came here with big promises that people would be built places to work from and they would be in charge of them. But, what's happening now is the exact opposite' (Senior member Khayelitsha traders association, April 2014).

The Ntlazane traders association emphasised their continued 'ownership' of space in Khayelitsha,

VPUU has forgotten that where they are is a public space, in which they found them already, and they can't just discard them like that. They claim that VPUU took them in because they were embarrassed by the fact that Khayelitsha people are not using their buildings. (March 2014)



Area 1: VPUU building by Khayelitsha train station. Start of corridor

### *External models*

The perception that VPUU has 'imposed' external models of development on Khayelisha is a strong thread running through interviews.

Steinberg has noted specifically in relation to community policing, the complexities of policy transfer to developing contexts. Similar principles are applicable to the models of crime prevention and economic development that VPUU appears to be seeking to implement in the context of Khayelitsha. Steinberg argues therefore that, 'the results of policy transfer, especially to societies in the process of a major transition, are often unknowable' (2012, p. 350). Pfigu uses the concept of 'travelling models' to understand how global ideas such as community policing and crime prevention, are re-contextualised and re-appropriated by a variety of actors at local and national levels, including by the communities in which these ideas are propagated, as well as by various other local actors, mediators and knowledge brokers. Communities

interpret these 'new' ideas in terms of their own normative and cognitive frameworks, drawing on their own experience and local stories of, for example, 'community policing', to interpret and redefine imported Western conceptions. Travelling models are therefore subject to processes of local and national 'translation', which may fundamentally transform the meaning and practice of these models in the local context' (Pfigu, 2012, p. 52). These processes of translation are on-going and contested, continually shifting meaning and practice around core concepts and 'models'.

In this context, the VPUU approach, particularly related to business practices appears to be deeply contested. As one trader at Kuyasa station explained, 'VPUU came with their ideas from Germany which will never work here'.

A senior member of the Khayelitsha traders association argued of VPUU, 'it's made of people full of ideas to impose and is not helpful to the cause of traders in Khayelitsha. The chairperson asked Ncedo resentfully, 'why the Germans who came with the VPUU idea chose to come here and test their ideas in their [Khayelitsha's] own backyard' (Khayelitsha traders association, April 2014).

This senior member of the Khayelitsha traders association argued that VPUU has an imperialist agenda,

The very people, Germans and Americans who created poverty and displacement to the African people come here now wearing a cap of investor to steal from us, control us and take away the very survival strategies that we have developed overtime (Khayelitsha traders association, 11 Feb 2014)

He argued therefore that Khayelitsha residents should focus on their 'own solutions',

the sooner we don't seek outside help but find solutions to our own problems the better. Otherwise we will forever be taken for granted and treated like pieces of rubbish because we too dependent on other people (Khayelisha traders association, 11 Feb 2014)

Traders in a VPUU building at Khayelitsha station asserted their competence to run businesses without 'outside' help.

They say that they have kids who are at university who started from sub A with the money made from selling fruits and there are successful business people like the chairperson of Khayelitsha traders association who have built themselves nice houses, and educated their kids though fruit selling (Trader 2 Khayelisha station, 11 Feb 2014).

Senior members of the Ntlazane traders association argued, 'We are not running out of ideas as to how to solve them [problems]. We can use politics and vote for different party or when these big guns come for electioneering we tell them all. (Ntalazane traders association, March 2014)

Whatever the 'truth' of these allegations, it is clear that a number of traders both associated with the Ntlazane traders association, which works with VPUU and with the Khayelitsha traders' association, which has explicitly broken away and does not work with VPUU, have experienced the VPUU project as an imposition that does not take their needs or voices into account and that infantilises them and fails to



acknowledge their existing skills. Clearly such a perception needs to be addressed if VPUU is to work cooperatively with communities.

### *Divisions*

Another perception is that VPUU has exacerbated divisions in the community, particularly between traders associations. The main traders association in Khayelitsha when VPUU began operating appears to have been the Ntlazane traders association. However, according to the current senior leadership of the Khayelitsha traders association, it was formed in 2007, 'upon the recommendation or suggestion of the Cape Town City Council' (Khayelitsha traders association, April 2014). While the origins of the new association need to be investigated further, it appears that the source of division between the two associations largely centres on collaboration or non-collaboration with VPUU. While the two associations argue that they do work together, there are also clearly tensions. The Ntlazane association, is perceived to be 'collaborating' with VPUU and therefore to be the subject of animosity from other traders not working with VPUU,

They told me that their organisation works closely with SANCO but not with Khayelitsha traders association. The reason for no cooperation between the two organisations is VPUU. They created animosity because now we are seen as sell-outs. We are seen as close to VPUU but we just wanted to get by as before. We wanted to do business so that our children can have food and also stand a chance in life (Ntlazane traders association, March 2014).

There also appears to be suspicions of the Khayelitsha Development Forum (KDF) who are seen as 'too close' to VPUU. A senior member of the Khayelitsha traders association argued that KDF 'is always on the side of the powers that be and big business like VPUU but we have no choice but to work with them because they work with SANCO who is genuinely with us in our struggles in terms of support' (Khayelitsha traders association, 11 Feb 2014). The Ntlazane traders association argued that, 'KDF they are too close to VPUU and there is suspicion of bribery' (Ntlazane traders association, March 2014).

The perception that VPUU focuses on more formalised businesses at the expense of smaller, more informal businesses, was reiterated by several interviewees. Members of the Ntlazane traders association told Ncedo that,

They said that I must go speak to the women in Harare square who are selling in front of the Spar because they cannot afford rent. This is despite the VPUU premises being built in their name but after they have been built, established businesses like Siluluto (internet café) are preferred because they will pay and do not need any kind of support from VPUU. (March 2014)

There is also a perception that VPUU is making a profit by charging for facilities. According to traders at a VPUU building at Khayelitsha association, VPUU are, 'in the business to make the already rich Germans even richer' (Trader 2 Khayelitsha station, 11 Feb 2014). Another trader argued, 'The VPUU is not about us but it's a business for them. They want us to work for them' (Informal trader 1 at Khayelitsha station). A senior member of the Khayelitsha traders association stated that, 'VPUU is in Khayelitsha to do business. It is making money out of the poor traders' (Khayelitsha traders association, April 2014). A former member of the VPUU reference group in Kuyasa reiterated, 'the very people who said they were here to develop people, they were here for business and developing their pockets' (22 February 2014).

### *Training*

The role, purpose and effectiveness of training seem to be a source of contention. A former member of the VPUU reference group argued that, 'VPUU has assisted people through its training on the following content: Conflict resolution skills, leadership skills and how to handle crime (22 Feb 2014). However, the fact that

training was not linked to capital investment appears to undermine its effectiveness in the eyes of some of those who have received training. A trader at Harare Square explained,

VPUU did send them for a training which they appreciate but they need capital so that they could expand and venture into other commodities which could be viable in the area. VPUU had advised them not to sell fruits all of them but sell different things but that's difficult because they can only sell what's available and what sells (Trader 1, Harare Square, 18 Feb 2014).

Women traders who are senior members of the Ntlazane traders association felt that although they were given training in leadership but were subsequently not allowed to lead,

The businesses you see around here were started by capital that was saved when we were still selling in the sand....There was training that was provided to us, leadership training and we were promised then that it will help us manage our building, but later to learn that they VPUU will not allow us to manage ourselves, rather they will micromanage us, let alone managing the business as ...promised (Ntlazane traders association, March 2014).

The traders resisted attempts to introduce formal business practices,

...we have been doing business for years without such training and we never had problems... VPUU introduced the idea of an auditor who came to do their books but they did not cooperate, eventually they [VPUU] saw it was not working (Ntlazane traders association, March 2014).

Finally they argued that the costs of training were too high. According to representative of the Ntlazane association, VPUU had contracted the organisation Business Place to train them. However, they felt that the fee of R100 for the training was 'a lot considering that's more often the money we make a day'. (Ntlazane traders association, March 2014)

### *Uneven development of infrastructure*

The upgrading has taken a similar shape across the different Safe Node areas but the size and impact of the interventions seems to be quite different. This is particularly visible between the Kuyasa area (around a new train station) and the Harare Square and Ntlazane street trading areas. The initial emphasis on development in Harare appears to have caused some contention and rivalries between the different areas.

According to a trader in Harare Square,

VPUU has done a tremendous job in uplifting the lives of communities in Khayelitsha particularly in Harare. This has happened to a point where some other communities feel envy of them. (Trader 1 Harare Square, 18 Feb 2014)

Councillor Sobuza in Harare confirmed this perception. He told Ncedo that,

VPUU has done a tremendous job in uplifting the lives of communities in Khayelitsha particularly in Harare. This has happened to a point where some other communities envy them and say that VPUU came for them. He said that in terms of the objectives of VPUU, which include reducing crime and erecting facilities for children to play, they have done tremendous job. (20 Jan 2014)

A councillor in Kuyasa, however, expressed anger at the focus of development in Harare and alleged broken promises about development in Kuyasa,

The ideas that VPUU came with are noble and people were excited but it never took off, at least not as far as Kuyasa people are concerned. Unlike the nodal area that VPUU identified for development along with other settlements like Harare and site B, the area of Kuyasa did not receive, not even one cent. Leaders who were part of the reference group of the VPUU and the ones who are still part of, are so disillusioned by VPUU that they are not interested to attend, or to have anything to do with them. As far as they are concerned VPUU is dead or does not exist (28 Jan 2014).

The building of a library in the Kuyasa area appears to have also led to contention. A former member of the VPUU reference group who lives in Kuyasa argued,

VPUU sounded like a good project at first but they as Kuyasa people they felt that the project was not yielding the expected results. He feels though for Harare in might be a different story. He says that all the things that were promised to be done in Kuyasa none of them has been done. Instead even the Library that was supposed to be in Kuyasa has now been built in Makhaza yet it's called Kuyasa (it's behind Kuyasa Station)...The bad thing about this library is that even though people were still complaining and even fighting on the ground VPUU went ahead and erected the structure irrespective, which indicates that they don't care about people's views. (22 Feb 2014)

### *Under-utilisation of public spaces and trading facilities*

#### Area 4: Harare Square, Informal traders



Area 4: Harare Square, kiosks

In line with the contrast between different sites, the provision of neat public spaces has not yielded optimal outcomes overall, and the utilisation of some of these facilities is therefore the source of growing frustration. Issues of management and access seem to be at the core of the problem.

The most functional and better utilised facility seems to be the Harare library, located at the square (see picture 1). A similar 'success' story seems to be the soccer turf managed by the NGO Grassroots soccer which holds matches and activities with young people in the area. However, another VPUU sports facility within

school premises (Area 5) is allegedly very underutilised. According to a local NGO activist this is due to bad management as residents have limited access, knowledge about the procedures to use the field and are asked to pay high fees and fill in paper work to use it. This needs to be confirmed.

**Picture 1: Harare library**



In terms of trading facilities, observations in all areas show under-utilisation of the new kiosks as the majority stand empty and closed. Although in Harare square a few businesses are operating in the kiosks, the public space of Harare square is still dominated by a few informal traders selling fruit and veggies (see picture 2). Research on the utilisation of office space, and particularly the 'work and live' units is still at an early stage. However, the newly established (late 2013) shared office space and incubator scheme 'The Hub' (see picture 3) seems to be a promising initiative driven by young social entrepreneurs. However, their relationship with VPUU appears to be that of landlord and tenant, rather than their work being more directly facilitated by VPUU through funding, training etc.


**Picture 2: Informal traders at Harare Square**



**Picture 3: The Hub, Harare Square**



**Picture 4: The Hub Harare Square**



The most striking underutilisation of kiosk facilities is in the Kuyasa train station area where not a single trading space is operating (see pictures). Similarly, the major infrastructure for a taxi rank seems to stand unutilised as no taxis were using it at the times of observations. The only trading activity here are informal traders on the one side of the tracks (a few women trading on the pavement, see picture). While more research and interviews are needed in these areas, according to a security guard from the area 'hawkers



used to sit next to the [Khayelitsha] clinic and sell but immediately when the officials built the kiosks they left.’ (March 2014). The reasons for this are unclear as is the exact nature of VPUU involvement at Kuyasa station. Several interviewees argued that the Kuyasa infrastructure development was implemented by the City of Cape Town. However, it is clear that the development has been built along very similar lines to the development in Harare. In addition VPUU is in fact working through the City of Cape Town as implementing agent. It is therefore not clear why the development in Kuyasa is frequently not seen as a VPUU development. The reasons for the extreme levels of under-utilisation, including the failure to utilise major infrastructure or taxis, still needs to be investigated. Ncedo argues that ordinary citizens are not used to ‘owning’ public space and that it is in fact criminal actors who are used to being in control of such spaces,

One of the things we need to realise is that these communities are not used to owning public spaces in these areas. The gangs on the other hand have long taken over public spaces such as street corners and thus a park is something that if not occupied could easily be welcomed [by gangs] to own and do their things in it.

These subjectivities around public space needs to be investigated further and could be linked to an apartheid history in which the nature of townships as dormitory cities for cheap labour meant that residents did not, in many instances, invest in this space, which was seen as a place of repression and control. Townships still exist on the margins of South African economy. Ambiguities around the state in post-apartheid South Africa has meant the public infrastructure intended to develop townships into social, political and economic spaces in their own right, have in some instances been the target of violent destruction as communities express their anger about problems of local governance through the destruction of these facilities. It is evident therefore that citizens in many contexts do not feel that they ‘own’ the new public infrastructure. Instead it is seen as a site of contestation and a symbolic field in which the state’s authority can be challenged and negotiated. In addition the underutilisation of public spaces in Khayelitsha speaks to some of the risks of formalisation in a complex social and economic context, where the formalisation of space and social relations are deeply contested, which in this instance appears to have resulted in desolated public spaces.

**Picture 5: Kuyasa trading kiosks**



**Picture 6: Kuyasa trading corridor**



**Picture 7: Informal traders Kuyasa station**



**Picture 8: taxi rank at Kuyasa station**



### *Resistance to formalisation in public spaces*

There has been an organic eruption of informality as a form of tacit resistance to formalisation, primarily through the utilisation of public areas around the formal kiosks and corridors.

Informal traders have requested authorization to utilise shipping containers (often used by informal traders, see picture 9 below) to expand their businesses into the public space, in order to avoid high rentals. This has emerged in particular in Ntlazane road where VPUU has also been involved in establishing formal kiosks. According to the Ntlazane trader's association, the containers were apparently standing empty and they therefore wanted to utilise these containers for informal trading activities. However, according to the association, VPUU was given 'ownership' of these containers by the City of Cape Town and wanted to charge rentals for the use of the containers. However, the traders association allegedly resisted attempts to charge for the use of the containers (Ntlazane traders association, March 2014). In addition, traders are asserting their right to define how public space is utilised by using the space in front of their kiosks to display their goods or as selling areas (see picture 10).



**Picture 9: Informal trading in a container, Ntlazane road**



**Picture 10: Trader in kiosk using public space outside the kiosk, Ntlazane road**



**Picture 11: Informal trading in the formal corridor on Ntlazane road**



**Picture 12: Informal trading in the formal corridor on Ntlazane road**



## Conclusion

The research problem that this study began with the objective to test the hypothesis that social cohesion is critical to understanding the link between poverty, inequality and violence. It was proposed that social cohesion or the lack of it can be an important factor in explaining why some poor neighbourhoods are prone to violence and others are not as had been demonstrated in some international literature.

The concepts of social cohesion and related concepts such as social capital have become ubiquitous in international and local policy discourse. These concepts are also the subject of a large body of empirical research, primarily in the United States and Western Europe. This literature has been concerned to understand high levels of crime and violence in socio-economically deprived neighbourhoods through an understanding of the impact of neighbourhood networks and forms of association on social control. This has led Sampson to develop the concept of collective efficacy, as critical to understanding why violence happens in some communities and not in others. He defines collective efficacy as ‘social cohesion among neighbours combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the “common good”’ (1997).

While there are multiple and contested definitions of social cohesion the concept finds its origins in the work of Emile Durkheim, who considered it as an ordering feature of any given society, and defined it as the

mutual dependence between members of a society including the connections and relations between individuals, groups, associations and territorial units within a given society (McCracken 1998). Shared values, loyalties, solidarity, communities of interpretation, perceptions of mutual identity and belonging, societal trust and the degree of inequality or disparity are all included in definitions describing social cohesion (Jenson 1998; Wolley 1998). Jenson (1998) argues that questions of social cohesion become critical in periods of rapid social change in history and society. Durkheim's concerns and current preoccupations with the concept are borne out of an anxiety that the 'glue' that held society together 'previously' has weakened, initially with the rise of industrialisation and subsequently in the context of rapid globalisation, information and technology (Green, Preston and Janmaat 2006). This, it is argued, has led to individualism, alienation and eroded bonds of spatial proximity and kinship.

However, research conducted so far appears to contest way in which social cohesion itself is conceptualised and the manner in which it mediates the link between poverty and violence. Emerging empirical material from ethnographic fieldwork and other research shows that Khayelitsha, like many South African townships, is characterised by dense social networks and multiple forms of social ordering and social organisation. Under apartheid many townships such as Khayelitsha were characterised by a remarkable depth of organisation and social cohesion as people co-operated to oppose apartheid. This cohesion, however, as it is now, tended to be defined against an 'other' against whom violence was sanctioned. Before the end apartheid, this 'other' was the *impimpi* or 'traitor' to the cause of opposition to apartheid. In post-apartheid South Africa, the other is the 'criminal', the 'foreigner' or the homosexual. While the community coheres around the momentary expulsion of the 'other', in fact there is ongoing and deep contestation about the nature of the contemporary social order, particularly along gendered and generational lines as the rights regime introduced by democratisation, is seen to overturn fundamental hierarchies that are believed to have previously maintained the social order.

Western literature, however, starts from a series of assumptions about the nature of modern society as fundamentally 'individualised' and founded on the 'sovereign subject' who is autonomous and master over his or her ends and means. However, these assumptions, although universalised, are deeply rooted in the specific context of Western history. Instead African subjects begin from a position of communitarianism and mutual solidarity in which the very meaning of being human is located in one's relation to others. Thus these are not individual actors who 'choose' to intervene for the 'common good'; this relation is already inherent in the subject's identity and is woven into the fabric of sociality.

Thus in this context multiple networks exist as a condition of existence. In contexts of poverty, this is even more the case. '*Stokvels*' or informal saving societies have been ubiquitous in South African society for many decades. On the other hand these networks may be as dangerous as they are enabling. They are conduits for both love and friendship and simultaneously sites for exclusion, suspicion, violence and authoritarianism. Vigilante violence is utilised to police the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. One of the traditional 'indicators' of social cohesion is whether people recognise 'strangers' in their areas, in Khayelitsha it is clear that people do generally recognise 'strangers'. However, this knowledge of community members may in fact exacerbate violence. Therefore those who commit crimes are generally 'known' to community members and risk violent collective retribution as Ncedo recounted in the incident of two young boys, 'tortured' and beaten for having stolen a neighbour's goods. Here neighbours are extraordinarily willing to intervene on their neighbour's behalf; however the 'common good' they seek to achieve is often the violent exclusion of the criminal and the momentary restoration of 'order'. While community members know who the 'criminals' are, the 'criminals' equally know who they are, as they form part of the same community. If residents report

crime, they risk violent retribution from community members they lay charges against. This makes the criminal justice system, premised on individual justice, potentially redundant. The literature's reference to 'good' and 'bad' or 'negative' and 'positive' social cohesion is completely inadequate to understand the nature, complexity and fluidity of these networks and their relationship to violence in an African context.

A critical part of understanding the complexity of social cohesion in the South African and indeed African contexts is the legacy of colonialism. As the Comaroff's argue, post-colonial societies are in general founded on difference, significantly rooted in the experience of colonialism, where conceptions of 'nationhood' referenced the European metropole. The colonies were a mere extension of this nation, its local population produced as subjects rather than citizens. Therefore unlike European nation-states, which were characterized by 'the emergence of a sense of nationhood based, imaginatively and affectively, on horizontal connection (Anderson, 1983)' (Comaroff, 1998: 344), the relationship of extreme exploitation and exclusion established between the colonial state and the colonized, meant that a similar horizontal 'imagining' of national identity did not occur in the colonial environment and what were produced were 'states *sans* nations...states without hyphe-nation' (Comaroff, 1998: 343).

Pre-existing diversities and ethnicities were either ignored or strategically deployed to facilitate authoritarian forms of social control. This led to complex and fractured forms of citizenship and 'publics' with different claims, rights, duties and moral imperatives, bifurcated – as Comaroff (1998), Mamdani (1996) and Ekeh (1975) have pointed out – between the individual, the 'modern', the rights bearing citizen and the 'traditional', the 'communitarian', the 'cultural' and the 'ethnic' citizen.

Peter Ekeh's seminal study (1975) on 'Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa' analysed the way in which the colonial experience created two public realms, a 'primordial public' (the 'traditional') in which colonial subjects operated in terms of collective claims and moral imperatives and a 'civic public' i.e. the bureaucratic, individualised and regulatory environment created by the colonial administration, which was seen by colonial subjects as an 'amoral' environment that imposed no moral obligations on them. According to Comaroff these two public realms were the product of the colonial state's contradictory effort, 'to convert "natives", simultaneously and contradictorily, into *both* right-bearing citizens and culture-bearing ethnic subjects' (Comaroff, 1998: 344). This produced two competing versions of modernity and contestations of European dominance, one based on the precepts of the liberal ethos of universal human and individual rights, individual entitlement and autonomous citizenship. The other version of modernity was based on the assertion of group rights and ethnic solidarity. According to Comaroff, 'It is this last phenomenon, the production of alternative modernities, that is likely to be the final legacy of the colonial state in Africa' (1998: 346).

These fractures have continued in the postcolonial context. As Elizabeth Povinelli (2006) has pointed out, postcolonial liberalism relies on a binary opposition between the autological subject (autonomous, self-determining) and the genealogical society of the past (where the subject is bound by various types of inheritances). The autological *subject* of the present is constructed in opposition to the genealogical *society* of the past, which is posited as a realm of social constraint and 'tradition'.

However, the lived socialities of communities such as those in South Africa demonstrate a far more complex form that is at once lived through a collective sociality of obligation and kinship but which at the same time contests the genealogical society that this collective sociality implies through the strategic appropriation of

the discourse of individual rights, often in strategic deployments. Thus young people declare their 'right to consume', for example and women declare their 'right' to multiple partners. (Hunter, 2010)

These tensions emerge in the Khayelitsha context in terms of perceived failures around parenting which were seen by several interviewees, both young and old, as at least part of the cause of crime. The current rights dispensation is seen to have overturned current generational and gendered hierarchies in dangerous ways. Women are often blamed for parenting failures, implicitly as a result of their changing role in society. As Hunter has argued, intense gendered conflict, what he calls 'structural distrust' between genders, has been precipitated by rapid changes in the political economy, which have led to a, 'generational shift' from, 'mostly men earning a living and supporting a wife to many men and women making a living in multifarious ways' (Hunter, 2010, p. 5). Unemployment's destabilisation of gendered expectations has driven, 'what can be only described as extreme levels of hostility between men and women' (Hunter, 2010, p.131).

An elderly man explained his perception of the overturning of generational hierarchies,

One of the reasons why children are on drugs and gangs is that people do not discipline their children. They are even lazy to raise their children. [More] often than not they send their children to their grandparents to be raised by them. These are people who really don't have the energy anymore. There is a tendency that when a boy is naughty here instead of his parents disciplining him they send him to old people in rural areas who do not have any man power left to discipline children, they stay there and come back even worse.

This government did away with death sentence and now people are raped left right centre. The government caused all of this by giving young people rights. Today teachers and parents can't discipline them because they have rights and they will go to the police... Without discipline, young people respecting all older persons, not just their biological parents, we will always complain about violence and crime. (Kuyasa station, 2 April 2014)

Ncedo outlined the unresolved tensions between communitarian conceptions of society, which continue to have significant resonance and conceptions of society based on autonomous individuals, which the rights based Constitution appears to endorse. These tensions play themselves out in the realm of parenting, which in the past was a profoundly communitarian activity, not only because children were located in extended families but because the community as a whole was seen as responsible for each child. All adults were therefore seen as acting in loco parentis regarding children, including the right to 'discipline' or punish children who were seen to violate social rules. In contemporary society, particularly in the urban contexts, these bonds have significantly weakened, at least partially as a result of the changing nature of the family itself. Seekings notes that there has been a decline in extended families in Khayelitsha, an increase in households headed by women and an increase in single person or small households. One interviewee expressed these tensions, referring throughout to a hypothetical 'she' as the locus of the tension and confusion between individualism, which 'lives in the head' and communitarianism, 'which lives in the blood' i.e. is part of a deep essentialist heritage.

...there is a tendency for young parents to exclude any other societal member from their affairs when it comes to raising children but at some point when the child is not behaving as she/he should they now come seeking for outside help whilst it's too late.

This in my understanding signals untimely convergence between the today's parent growing up in environment learning towards individualism but in a way still looking over their shoulders for communalism. Here a parent may know that the community did shape them a bit but they may not be sure whether they invited themselves or they were invited.

On the other hand she would be thinking that her children are her business and her business does not involve others. Parents may actually be out of their depth here but the pride imbued by individualistic culture that has consumed the person is persuading her to solve her own problem.

Here although individualism is in the head it is not in the blood. By that I mean the person may wish to live in accordance to the individualistic cultures but may not have the individualistic society resources like psychologist to assist them in times of needs as it's the norm in that [individualistic] culture.

However, whatever the circumstances, she still lives up to the individualistic standard or codes, up until she cracks and turns back straight to the communal culture she was busy leaving behind. Because this culture it's also owned by yesterday's society, they also feel undermined that they are only asked to intervene at the last moment, as such they want to ask the person the question, why now? Hence I say it's an untimely meeting between the two. (April 2014)

It is with an understanding of this complex sociality that an understanding of the role of social cohesion in mitigating violence has to be located. As already noted, post-apartheid South Africa is an extremely violent society. The statistics from Khayelitsha reveal an extraordinarily high level of violence comparable to some of the most conflicted societies in the world. Anthropologists working in the South African context have talked of the precariousness, instability and contingency, the improvisational quality of life in poor communities where the majority of South Africans live. This is an environment where insecurity 'shapes all else' (Ashforth 2005, p. xiv) and 'everyday injustices have to be suffered without reference to a meaningful idea of Law standing above all' (2005, p. xii).

Our own research and that of other researchers working in Khayelitsha has shown the enormous impact that the experience and fear of crime and violence has had on the social fabric in this township. As the CJCP report to the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry found, 'Overall, the findings revealed that fear of crime have impacted on residents' lives in various ways. On an individual level, it restricts personal movement within the community (particularly at night time) and contributes to a poor quality of life in general. On a community level, fear of crime has negatively impacted on community cohesion and community ties (i.e. the ability to trust other community members)' (2014). Two school girls who were interviewed as part of this study reported being constantly afraid of attack during their daily trips to school. Ncedo himself talked about the way in which he numbed himself in response to the frequent occurrences of crime and violence. In general there appears to be a significant desensitisation to violence. Young Khayelitsha residents are exposed to a significant amount of violence in their daily lives, including gang violence, vigilante violence and criminal violence, as well as violence in the home. Residents in general appear to be willing to participate in or watch violence against alleged criminals. Violence appears inherited in the geographical landscape, for example, the name of the informal settlement Endlovini, when translated from isiXhosa means 'elephant' and comes from an isiXhosa saying, '*Indlovu iyangena* which means force wins' (SANCO chairperson, April, 2014). Violence appears integral to the masculinity of young men who participate in gangs and who commit violence to 'win' women and expensive property.

While violence appears ubiquitous, it is important not to simply ascribe a homogenous 'culture of violence' to the Khayelitsha community or any other South African community. As Van Holdt argues, 'our research finds substantial constituencies in marginal communities who long for peace and stability, who wish to abide by the law and wish the law to end crime' (2013, p. 128). Instead the idea of a 'culture of violence' ascribes an unchanging identity to a group of people. It makes it difficult to see the historically located and contextually specific practices and histories of practice as well as values, norms and identities that occur in particular contexts and historical periods, when subsumed below a homogenetic conception of 'culture'. The concept of a 'culture of violence' also makes it difficult to unpack different forms of violence, their impact and conditions of emergence as well as their historical genealogy. In addition it obscures the 'expressive logic' of violence rather than its instrumental value. Vigilante violence and gang violence are committed both as public spectacle, as a show of power and momentary sovereignty, as well as being an instrumental means to control a particular territory or punish a particular criminal. Thus Margold argues that the concept of a 'culture of violence' is both 'reductive' and 'inflationary', i.e. it reduces the complexity of violence to a single undifferentiated culture at the same time as ascribing this culture enormous power to dictate the way in which social practices play out. Instead, 'violative practices utilize culture in ways that need to be ethnographically specified' p. 84. i.e. violative practices are not an inevitable outcome of particular 'cultures' but are the consequence of a particular set of social, structural and historical circumstances that may draw on meanings and values around violence but which are not dictated by them. Thus, these are not 'totalising conditions that orchestrate all the rhythms of daily life'. This allows no space for agency and makes the group ascribed a 'culture of violence' responsible for their conditions, implicated in sustaining violence as a way of life. This approach obscures the nature of people's actual collusion and resistance as well as the conditions of structural violence that create the context in which overt violence takes place. Thus the notion of a culture of violence appears to close down avenues of resistance and the resources people draw on to resist violence. It ignores potential repertoires of 'peace' as well as sources of courage and refusal.

The ethnographic fieldwork points to different responses to violence. In many cases avoidance is used, for example during the robbery Ncedo witnessed, in other instances community members actively assist each other to prevent violent predation, for example the traders who intervene to stop attacks on their colleagues, in other instances there is active participation in and collusion with violence, for example school children cheering on 'sides' in gang fights or community members participating in violence against people alleged to have participated in crime. For example, the young boys whom Ncedo witnessed being beaten by a group of neighbours. Women appear to play an ambiguous role in violence. While generally reified as inherently and genetically predisposed to non-violence, it is clear that some women are complicit in violence. Young girls cheer on male gang members; women actively participate in vigilante violence by dispensing further punishment once a suspect has been 'subdued' (CJCP, 2014) or pointing out suspects whom they know will be violently attacked. Other research shows that violence is a key part of the 'discipline' that mothers dispense to their children who interpret this as a form of 'nurturing' in terms of norms of care in which violence plays an integral role (Barolsky, Pillay and Sanger, 2008).

It is not necessarily helpful to understand these complex practices around violence in conventional normative terms that refuse to acknowledge the meaning of violence in social and political life. Van Holdt argues therefore that in the South African context, 'subaltern collective violence is embedded in its own moral orders, which challenge the symbolic authority of the law' (2013). Thus Taylor argues for a move away from a 'proposed schedule of norms which ought to govern our mutual relations and/ or political life' and instead argues for a notion of a 'moral order' i.e. 'an identification of features of the world, or divine action,

or human life which make certain norms both right and (up to [a] point) realizable. In other words the image of order not only carries a definition of what is right, but of the context in which it makes sense to strive for, and hope to realize 'the right' (at least partially). Thus 'features of world, human life and even divine action' create norms that are seen as being both 'right' and realisable. Therefore it is the social world which defines what is 'right' in particular contexts and historical circumstances. Consequently what is 'right' is not a set of universal, transcendent norms as the Western enlightenment envisaged and the current global order still prescribes.

It is therefore perhaps more fruitful to think about the complex context in Khayelitsha in terms of Bourdieu's notion of *habitus* rather than in terms of a set of prescribed norms about what is 'right'. Bourdieu deploys the concept of habitus to articulate the interaction between structure and agency, individual action on the one hand, and a constraining social structure, on the other hand. According to Wacquant, 'the notion of habitus proposes that human agents are historical animals who carry within their bodies acquired sensibilities and categories that are the sedimented products of their past social experiences' (2011, p. 82). Critically, habitus is more powerful than prescribed norms in determining how people actually act. Thus Wacquant quotes Bourdieu, who argues that 'habitus produces individual and collective practices, and thus history...[it] ensures the active presence of past experiences which, deposited in each organism in the form of schemata of thought and action, tend, more surely than all formal rules and all explicit norms, to guarantee the conformity of practices and their constancy across time. (Bourdieu [1980] cited in Wacquant 2011, p. 85)

Understanding social agents in this fashion helps to contextualise the subjectivity and practices of a variety of actors in the context of Khayelitsha, whether these actors are informal traders, VPUU managers, gang members, school children or others. Rather than seeking to understand the ways in which these actors deviate from an 'ideal' set of normative practices, understanding the way in which their practices are embedded in historical social experience and are deeply embodied, i.e. not always conscious, helps to make 'sense' of the actions of various actors, whether gang members committing apparently arbitrary violence, people who are involved in brutal vigilante violence, or VPUU managers who seek to impose normative models of order on an 'unruly' population.

Habitus therefore refers to lifestyle, the values, the dispositions and expectation of particular social groups that are acquired through the activities and experiences of everyday life. *Habitus* is the subjective system of expectations and predispositions acquired through past social experiences. As Wacquant points out, habitus is 'acquired' it is not a natural property of particular social agents, for example certain social agents are not inherently more violent than others, violence as part of habitus is acquired in particular contexts. Importantly therefore habitus is contextual and varied, '*dispositions vary by social location and trajectory: individuals with different life experiences will have gained varied ways of thinking, feeling, and acting*' (Wacquant, 2011, p. 86 original emphasis). Thus human beings are socially constituted.

The particular contents of the habitus are a complex result of embodying social structures—such as the gender, race, and class that are then reproduced through tastes, preferences, and actions. The habitus exists below the surface of explicit consciousness, it is not about conscious aims or explicit discourse but about subjectivities developed in particular contexts which make certain practices 'commonsense' or unquestioned parts of social life. Thus formal discourses may be disputed by social practices. Critically people's subjectivity is not simply an abstract element of their consciousness but is physically embodied. Mauss therefore defined habitus as those aspects of culture that are anchored in the body or daily practices of individuals, groups,



societies, and nations. It includes the totality of learned habits, bodily skills, styles, tastes, and other non-discursive knowledges that might be said to 'go without saying' for a specific group (Bourdieu 1990:66-67) — in that way it can be said to operate beneath the level of rational ideology.

The habitus or subjectivity of the individual agent exists in dialectical relationship to the notion 'field' which refers to the contextual environment. According to Bourdieu a field is a setting in which agents and their social positions are located. The position of each particular agent in the field is a result of interaction between the specific rules of the field, agent's habitus and agent's capital (social, economic and cultural). Critically, a field is a system of social positions (for example, a profession such as the law) structured internally in terms of power relationships. Fields interact with each other, and are hierarchical (most are subordinate to the larger field of power and class relations). Therefore a field is a social arena of struggle over the appropriation of certain species of capital — capital being whatever is taken as significant for social agents (the most obvious example being monetary capital).

Agents subscribe to a particular field not by way of explicit contract, but by their practical acknowledgement of the stakes, implicit in their very 'playing of the game'. This acknowledgement of the stakes of the field and the acquiring of interests and investments prescribed by the field is termed social illusion, or *illusio*.

It is helpful to think of the contestations around the social and moral order, the boundaries of community, the right to ownership and authority, the right to economy and society in Khayelitsha, in terms of the notion of field, as an arena of contestation around a range of forms of capital, including the cultural and symbolic, i.e. what conception of social order will prevail and who has authority to impose this, as well as contestation over economic capital, i.e. who has the right to control and define economic development in the area. In Khayelitsha, it is important to note as Seekings points out that the majority of the adults in the township are migrants to the area, while the large majority of young people born over the last eighteen years have grown up in the township. Thus the ways in which the field and social order is constructed and reproduced reflects different generational and gendered subjectivities that frame and contest the meaning of social and geographical space. The state at the same time seeks to establish its sovereignty in the township, through the 're-making' of the space of a dormitory township, with the collaboration of VPUU, into a fully-fledged town with services and infrastructure. It also seeks to assert its authority through state institutions such as the police and putatively establish the symbolic authority of the law and the Constitutional order.

However, the state appears to play a deeply ambiguous role in contestations around authority in the township, which is common to many South African post-apartheid townships. While the sovereignty of the state is not overtly rejected, it is continually contested and is deeply conditional on the delivery of 'services' as well as a variety of other 'goods' both material, social and symbolic. In all its attempts to extend its sovereignty and mastery of the social and political space, the state must contend with pre-existing forms of social order and sovereignty whether these are local informal policing structures or forms of community organisation, that frequently hold a far more powerful social and symbolic resonance than the dry techniques of state intervention and forms of social ordering. At the same time, the state itself is seen to violate the law it seeks to enforce, 'the transgression of the law, and the seeming impunity of the transgressors, produce the further erosion of the symbolic power of the state' (Van Holdt, 2014, p.119). In this context Van Holdt argues, 'the state cannot monopolise either symbolic or physical violence' (2014, p. ). Thus the 'law' exists in tenuous space in the South African context, it is engaged with fluidly and often instrumentally, deployed strategically and then abandoned. This is no doubt on the one hand a result of the imbrication of law with South Africa's colonial and apartheid history but is also about a contestation around

the norms of law in the post-apartheid context, including the right to life (in relation to the death penalty and abortion) as well as the rights of children and women, which are seen to contest social hierarchies.

Young people have a particularly ambiguous relation to the law. They grow up in the context of multiple illegalities and forms of violence. Young people, although born under the post-apartheid government generally accept and participate in forms of violent popular justice, although these are forms of social ordering that draw on repertoires of social ordering established well before they were born. As Wacquant notes, the socially constituted cognitive structures of habitus are both malleable and transmissible, i.e. young people are inducted into forms of social practice through their environment, although they may have grown up in an historical period in which the law of state was meant to displace or be amalgamated with the 'law of the people'. On the other hand some young people, particularly young men, appear to be engaged in a deep contestation around authority in general. Youth gang violence overturns all generational hierarchies. Adults, both teachers and police, retreat in the face of the threat of gang violence. At the same time gang members' entanglement in an imaginary of consumption and a 'lifestyle' that they seek to achieve through violent appropriation rather than education in a world where employment seems increasingly unlikely, implicitly disputes the terms of economic development and democratic 'freedom' in post-apartheid South Africa.

What, therefore it is possible to conclude about violence and social cohesion in Khayelitsha and the nature of the role of VPUU in this context? It is clear that the deeply complex nature of the social fabric means that it is not easy to establish simple causal relationships between an 'absence' of social cohesion and violence. The nature of sociality itself is at issue. Posel thus points to the, 'Simultaneity of constitutional order and everyday practices of violence and alternative social orders' (Posel). One of the traditional 'indicators' of social cohesion are measures around 'trust' between citizens. A study conducted by CJCP in 2011 found that while people were in general willing to help neighbours, they at the same time felt that people in their area were likely to 'take advantage' of others. The report interprets this as a 'lack of trust'.

However, it is more likely to point to an interrogation of the conditions of trust in highly contested, deprived contexts in Africa. In such contexts, notions of individual responsibility advocated by contemporary 'empowerment' discourses compete with what Ashforth has described as a belief in magic or the 'paradigm of witchcraft' (2002, p. 123) as a fundamental component of social life. In this context, suspicion and jealousy of the 'other', is founded on an assumption that most human beings are invested with the power of 'magic' i.e. supernatural powers, including the ability to make or take fortunes. Thus, this 'other' can be assigned the responsibility for one's own misfortune and provides a framework within which it is possible to make sense of extreme inequality. People who are affected by 'magic' are generally believed to be in an intimate relationship with the perpetrators, 'lovers, relatives, neighbours, schoolmates and workmates top the list of usual suspects' (Ashforth, 2002, p. 126). This has led to what Ashforth calls 'a presumption of malice in community life' that supplements another more sinister dimension to the principle of interdependence underlying the philosophy of *Ubuntu*, that a 'person is only a person through other persons' with the rider 'because they can kill you' (Ashforth, 2005, p.1). This does not mean that people in general openly accuse each other of witchcraft but that the belief in the potential of underlying malice in community life is a constant sub-text to everyday life. In this environment then, the meaning of trust along with many other aspects of social cohesion, need to be rethought before we are able to meaningfully understand the relationship between what has been termed 'social cohesion' in global discourse and violence.

It is therefore unlikely that any single social intervention will be able to strategically mobilise 'social cohesion' as a defence against violence as VPUU aspires to. The social environment is far too deeply contested and fractured to make it easily malleable to such strategic interventions. This is even less likely when the intervention appears to locate itself in normative opposition to daily practices, values and identities in the social world it seeks to ameliorate. The continuing high levels of violence and under-utilisation of renovated public space speaks to the complexities of 'overcoming' violence through urban upgrading. The provision of urban infrastructure and services is an urgent priority that the state is responsible for attending to. However, as has been pointed out by social activists, there is no comprehensive urban upgrading strategy for the Western Cape. In the absence of such a strategy, creating an island of infrastructural development in a few suburbs of one township, however intrinsically valuable, is unlikely to yield significant sustained or widespread reductions in violence. Khayelitsha is surrounded by similarly deprived urban neighbourhoods, all struggling with common problems of deprivation and violence.

This is not to reject the aspiration for peace in contexts of violence or the importance of interventions oriented towards this goal. It is to argue for the need for humility in the fashioning of these interventions. As Vogler and Markell ask, 'to survive violence, to find a way forward under its weight: is this less or more radical than to dream of overcoming violence in a final exceptional stroke?' (Vogler and Markell 2003: 3). As important is the need to temper the hubris of our vision in relation to social intervention. Pieterse quotes Amin in suggesting an approach that may indeed point to a way forward in our attempts to alleviate social suffering. Amin asks, 'Is it not possible for planners to draw up an urban program without the pretensions of total vision, teleological fulfilment and systemic certitude, offering a clear diagnosis of the threats that cities face, the matters of collective concern that must be addressed, the goals that must be defended to improve urban living for the many and not the few?' (Amin cited in Pieterse, 2012: 46).

This is an approach of humility and exploration rather than the didactic assertion of normativity. If we are to effectively engage with the problem of violence in its multiple forms, we need an open gaze, one that is able to take in the complexity and specificity of violence, which does not flinch at 'uncomfortable' values, practices and identities but instead engages with them in ways that allows for challenge and reformulation, learning and re-learning. It is only on this terrain of 'epistemological equality' that meaningful and ethical interventions can take place in order to meet our aspirations for social justice and substantive 'freedom'. In this engagement we need to fashion new epistemological tools, new conceptual frames that are adequate to the task of describing and analysing the emerging urban space but, which are flexible enough to allow for the continual mobility of contemporary urban society. We need framings and descriptions that enrich our understanding through an examination of what is, rather than depleting our understanding through the measurement and judgement of what something is not.

## References

- Aitken, S. (2001), *Geographies of Young People: The Morally Contested Spaces of Identity*. New York: Routledge.
- Amin, A. (2008). *Thinking Past Integration and Community Cohesion*, Paper for presentation at 'Integration and Community Cohesion' Seminar, Belfast Castle,.
- Aravamudan, S. (2012). Surpassing the North: Can the Antipodean Advantage Trump Post-Colonial Belatedness, *The Salon*-Volume Five. <http://jwtc.org.za/resources/docs/salon-volume-5/Aravamudan.pdf> (Accessed: 20 September 2013).
- Ashforth, A., 2002. An epidemic of witchcraft? The implications of AIDS for the post-apartheid state. *African Studies*, 61 (1), 121-143
- Ashforth, A. 2005. *Witchcraft, violence and democracy in South Africa*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Barac, M. (2011), 'Place Resists: Grounding African Urban Order in an Age of Global Change'. *Social Dynamics*, 37 (1): 24-42.
- Bauer, B. 2010. Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading – Experiences from Financial Cooperation [Online] Available from: [http://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/DE\\_Home/KfW\\_Entwicklungsbank/Aktuelles/March\\_2010\\_Experiences\\_of\\_FC\\_Violence\\_prevention.pdf](http://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/DE_Home/KfW_Entwicklungsbank/Aktuelles/March_2010_Experiences_of_FC_Violence_prevention.pdf) [Accessed at 20.04.2010].
- Beall, J., Guha-Khasnobis, B, & Kanbur, R. (2010). *Beyond the Tipping Point: A Multidisciplinary Perspective on Urbanization and Development*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Berger-Schmitt, R. (2000). Social Cohesion as an Aspect of the Quality of Societies: Concept and Measurement. EU Reporting Working Paper No. 4. Centre for Survey Research Methodology, Mannheim. [http://www.gesis.org/fileadmin/upload/dienstleistung/daten/soz\\_indikatoren/eusi/paper14.pdf](http://www.gesis.org/fileadmin/upload/dienstleistung/daten/soz_indikatoren/eusi/paper14.pdf) (Accessed: 13 September 2013).
- Bernard, P. (1999). Social Cohesion: A Critique. CPRN Discussion Paper No. F/09. Canadian Research Policy Networks, Ottawa. [http://www.cprn.org/documents/15743\\_en.pdf](http://www.cprn.org/documents/15743_en.pdf) (Accessed: 20 September 2013).
- Burr, L. (2008). Democracy and its discontents: Vigilantism, Sovereignty & Human Rights in South Africa, *Review of African Political Economy*, No 118, 571-584.
- Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention (CJCP). (2014), *Exploring young people's perceptions & experiences of local police services, efficiency and performance in Khayelitsha*: Final synthesis report. Report prepared for the Commission of enquiry into allegations of police inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a breakdown in relations between the community and the police in Khayelitsha. Cape Town.
- Chatterjee, P. (2001). 'Democracy and the Violence of the State: a Political Negotiation of Death'. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*. 2(1).

- Chen, A. M. (2007), "Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal Economy and the Formal Regulatory Environment". DESA Working Paper No. 46, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York.
- Cichello, P. (2005), 'Hindrances to Self-Employment: Evidence for the 2000 Khayelitsha/Mitchell's Plain Survey. Working Paper 101, Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
- Cichello, P., Almeleh, C., Mncube, L., Oosthuizen, M. (2011). *Perceived Barriers to Entry into Self-employment in Khayelitsha, South Africa: Crime, Risk, and Start-up Capital Dominate Profit Concerns*, Working Paper No. 300, Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
- Coleman, J. (1988). "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital", *American Journal of Sociology*, 94: 95-120.
- Comaroff, J & John Comaroff. (2003) "Reflections on liberalism, policulturalism, and ID-ology: citizenship and difference in South Africa", *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture* 9 (4), 445-473.
- John L. Comaroff, J. (1998). Reflections on the Colonial State, in South Africa and Elsewhere: Factions, Fragments, Facts and Fictions, *Social Identities*, 4 (3), 321-361.
- Comaroff, J and Comaroff, J. (2004) Criminal Obsessions, after Foucault: Postcoloniality, Policing, and the Metaphysics of Disorder, *Critical Inquiry*, pp. 800-824
- Comaroff, J. and Comaroff, J. (2012). *Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-America is Evolving Towards Africa*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
- Connell, R. (2007). *Southern Theory: Social Science and the Global Dynamics of Knowledge*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- David, S., Ulrich, O., Zelezeck, S., and N. Majoe (eds) (2012), *Managing Informality: Local Government Practices and Approaches Towards the Informal Economy: Learning Examples from Five African Countries*. Local Economic Development Network of Africa (<http://ledna.org/documents/managing-informality-local-government-practices-and-approaches-towards-informal-economy>).
- Devey, R., Valodia, I., and C. Skinner (2006), *Second Best? Trends and Linkages in the Informal Economy in South Africa*. DPRU Working Paper 06/ 102, Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town (<http://www.dpru.uct.ac.za/wp-06102-second-best-trends-and-linkages-informal-economy-south-africa>).
- Diouf, M. (2003), 'Engaging Post-Colonial Cultures: African Youth and Public Space'. *African Studies Review*, 46 (1): 1-12.
- Edjabe, N. and Pieterse, E (eds) (2010) *African Cities Reader: Pan-African Practices*. Cape Town: Chimurenga Press & African Centre for Cities.
- Edjabe, N. and Pieterse, E. (eds) (2011) *African Cities Reader II: Mobilities & Fixtures*. Cape Town: Chimurenga Press & African Centre for Cities
- Ekeh, P. (1975) "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: a Theoretical Statement", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 17 (1).

- Fetterman, D.M. (2010). *Ethnography: Step by Step*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition, Sage Publications, Inc.
- Fourchard, L. The politics of mobilization for security in South African townships, *African Affairs*, 110(441), 607-627.
- Foxcroft, M., Wood, E., Kew, J., Herrington, M., and M. Segal (2002), *Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: South African Executive Report*. Graduate School of Business, University of Cape Town.
- Gillespie, K. (2014). *The context and meaning of 'mob justice' in Khayelitsha*: Report for the Khayelitsha Commission: Commission of Inquiry into allegations of police inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a breakdown in relations between community and police in Khayelitsha.
- Godoy, A.S., 2006. *Popular Injustice: Violence, Community, and Law in Latin America*, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press
- Goodenough, W.H. (1976), 'Multiculturalism as the normal human experience', *Anthropology and Education Quarterly*, 7(4): 4-7.
- Graham, A., Giles, C., Krause, M., Langa, U. (2011). Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading in Khayelitsha, Cape Town: Achievements and trends of a bilateral financial cooperation programme. In. (eds) Coester, M & Marks, E. International perspectives of crime prevention 3: Contributions from the 3<sup>rd</sup> Annual international Forum 2009.
- Green, A. Preston, J. and Janmaat, G. (2006) *Education, Equality and Social Cohesion*. Palgrave, Basingstoke.
- Grootaert, C. (1998). *Social Capital: The Missing Link?* Social Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 3. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOCIALCAPITAL/Resources/Social-Capital-Initiative-Working-Paper-Series/SCI-WPS-03.pdf> (Accessed: 20 September 2013).
- Grovogui, S. (2011). "A Revolution Nonetheless: The Global South in International Relations", *The Global South*, 5.1, Special Issue: The Global South and the World Disorder, pp. 175-190.
- Hart, K. (1973), "Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1: 61-89.
- Hornberger, J. (2011) *Policing and human rights: The meaning of violence and justice in the everyday policing of Johannesburg*.
- Holloway, L. & P. Hubbard (2001), *People and Place: The Extraordinary Geographies of Everyday Life*. Harlow, England: Pearson.
- Hunter, M., 2010. *Love in the time of Aids: Inequality, gender, and rights in South Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Isandla Institute. (2011). *The right to the City: Access, Opportunity and City Making*. NGO Submission.
- Jenson, J. (1998). *Mapping Social Cohesion: The State of the Canadian Research*. Canadian Policy Research Networks (CPRN) Study No. F/03, Ottawa. [http://www.cccg.umontreal.ca/pdf/CPRN/CPRN\\_F03.pdf](http://www.cccg.umontreal.ca/pdf/CPRN/CPRN_F03.pdf). (Accessed: 20 September 2013).

Legal Resources Centre (LRC) (2014). English Opening Statement, Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry into allegations of police inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a breakdown in relations between community and police in Khayelitsha, Khayelitsha.

Margold, J.A. From cultures of fear and terror to the normalization of violence: An ethnographic case, *Critique of Anthropology*, Vol 19(1) 63–88.

Mbembe, A (2001). *On the Postcolony*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

McCracken, M. (1998). *Social Cohesion and Macroeconomic Performance*. Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS), Conference: The State of Living Standards and the Quality of Life, October 30-31. <http://www.csls.ca/events/oct98/mccr.pdf>. (Accessed: 20 September 2013).

McDowall, L. (1999), *Gender, Identity and Place: Understanding Feminist Geographies*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Meagher, K. (2009), *Culture, Agency and Power: Theoretical Reflections on Informal Economic Networks and Political Process*. DIIS Working Paper 27, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen.

Mirafteb, F. (2009). *Insurgent Planning: Situating Radical Planning in the Global South*. *Planning Theory*, 8(1): 32-50.

Motsemme, N., 2007. Loving in a time of hopelessness: On township women's subjectivities in a time of HIV/AIDS. In: Gasa, N. ed. *Women in South African history. Basus'iimbokodo, Bawel'imilambo / They remove boulders and cross rivers*. Pretoria: HSRC Press.

Myers, G. (2011), *African Cities: Alternative Visions of Urban Theory and Practice*. London, New York: Zed Books.

Neves, D & A. du Toit (2012), "Money and Sociality in South Africa's Informal Economy", *Africa*, Vol. 82, No. 1: 131-149.

Nuttall, S and Mbembe, A (eds.) (2008). Johannesburg: The Elusive Metropolis. Durham: Duke University Press.

Nuttall, S and Mbembe, A (eds.) (2008). Johannesburg: The Elusive Metropolis. Durham: Duke University Press.

O'Reilly, K.(2012) *Ethnographic Methods*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Routledge.

Orlie, M., A., 2002. The desire for freedom and the consumption of politics, *Philosophy Social Criticism* 28 (395), DOI: 10.1177/0191453702028004524, pp. 395–417

Pellizoni, L. (2003) Uncertainty and participatory democracy, *Environmental Values* (12) 2, *Environment, Policy and Participation* (May2003), 195-224.

Pfigu, T. (2012) *Local responses to a travelling model of crime prevention and crime management: community policing in Stellenbosch*, South Africa PHD Dissertation University of Stellenbosch .

- Philip, K. (2009), *Second Economy Strategy: Addressing Inequality and Economic Marginalization: A Strategy Framework*. Strategy Paper for Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies, Pretoria (<http://www.tips.org.za/publication/second-economy-strategy-framework-addressing-inequality-and-economic-marginalisation>).
- Pieterse, E. (2008). *City Futures: Confronting the Crisis of Urban Development*. London: Zed Books.
- Pieterse, E. (2011) 'Introduction: rogue urbanisms', *Social Dynamics: A Journal of African studies*, 37:1, pp. 1-4
- Pieterse, E. (2012). *High Wire Acts: Knowledge Imperatives of Southern Urbanisms*. Johannesburg. Workshop in Theory and Criticism, Salon 2012. Retrieved July 20, 2013, from [http://jwtc.org.za/salon\\_volume\\_5/edgar\\_pieterse.htm](http://jwtc.org.za/salon_volume_5/edgar_pieterse.htm).
- Pieterse, E. and Simone, A. (eds) (2013) *Rogue Urbanism: Emergent African Cities*. Johannesburg: Jacana Publishers in association with African Centre for Cities.
- Pillay, S., 2008. Crime, community and the governance of violence in post-apartheid South Africa. *Politikon*, 35(2), 141–158.
- Posel, D. (2004). Afterword: vigilantism and the burden of rights: reflections on the paradoxes of freedom in post-apartheid South Africa, *African Studies*, 63 (2), 231-236.
- Povinelli, E.A., 2006., *The empire of love: Toward a theory of intimacy, genealogy and carnality*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.
- Rabinow, P. (ed.). (1991). *The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought*. Penguin Social Sciences. New York & Canada: Penguin Books.
- Rao, V. (2006). Slum as theory: the South/Asian city and globalization. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 30(1):225-232.
- Robinson, J. (2006), *Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development*. London: Routledge.
- Rogerson, C. M. (2007), "'Second Economy" versus Informal Economy: A South African Affair', Editorial, *Geoforum*, Vol. 38, No. 6: 1053-1057.
- Roy, A. (2009). The 21st-Century Metropolis: New Geographies of Theory, *Regional Studies*, 43(6): 819–830
- Roy, A. (2011). Slumdog Cities: Rethinking Subaltern Urbanism. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 35(2):223-238.
- Sampson, R.J., Raudenbush, S.W. & Earls, F. (1997), 'Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy', *Science*, 277: 918-24.
- Seekings, J. and N. Nattrass (2005), *Class, Race and Inequality in South Africa*. New Haven CT: Yale University Press.



- Seekings, J. (2013), *Economy, society and municipal services in Khayelitsha*: Report for the Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Police Inefficiency in Khayelitsha and a Breakdown in Relations between the Community and the Police in Khayelitsha. Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
- Simelane, B.D & Citizen Surveys Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention (CJCP). (2011), *Community Safety Barometer*, Provincial Government of the Western Cape: Community Safety Department.
- Simone, A. (2008) the politics of the possible: Making urban life in Phnom Penh. *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, 29: 186-204
- Simone, A. (2007). Deep into the Night the City Calls as the Blacks come Home to Roost. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 24(7–8): 235–248
- Simone, A. (2004). *For the City Yet to Come: Changing African Life in Four Cities*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Stavrakakis, Y., 2006. Objects of Consumption, Causes of Desire: Consumerism and Advertising in Societies of Commanded Enjoyment, *Gramma 14*: 83-106.
- Steck, Didier, Morange & Rubin (2013). Informality, public space and urban governance: An approach through street trading (Abidjan, Cape Town, Johannesburg, Lome and Nairobi). In Bekker, S. and L. Fourchard (eds) (2013). *Governing cities in Africa: politics and policies*. HSRC Press, Cape Town.
- J Steinberg 'Establishing Police Authority and Civilian Compliance in Post-Apartheid Johannesburg: An Argument from the Work of Egon Bittner' (2012) *Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy* 22 (4) 488.
- Swilling, M. (2011), 'Re-conceptualizing Urbanism, Ecology and Networked Infrastructures'. *Social Dynamics*, 37 (1): 78-95.
- Swilling, M. & Annecke, E. (2011). *Just Transitions: Explorations of Sustainability in an Unfair World*. Cape Town: Juta Books.
- Vogler, C. and Markell, P. (2003) 'Violence, Redemption and the Liberal Imagination, *Public Culture* 15 (1): 1-10.
- Von Holdt, K., Langa, M., Molapo, S., Mogapi, N., Ngubeni, K., Dlamini, J., and Kirsten, A (2011). *The Smoke that calls. Insurgent Citizenship, Collective Violence and the Struggle for a Place in the New South Africa*. Eight Case Studies of Community Protest and Xenophobic Violence, Johannesburg, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV) and Society Work and Development Institute (SWOP),.
- Von Holdt, K. (2013) The violence of order, orders of violence: Between Fanon and Bourdieu, *Current Sociology*, 61(2) 112–131.
- Wacquant, L. (2011) Habitus as Topic and Tool: Reflections on Becoming a Prizefighter, *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 8, 81–92.
- Warren, M.E. Can participatory democracy produce better selves? Psychological dimensions of Habermas's discursive model of democracy, *Political Psychology*, 14 (2), Special Issue: Political Theory and Political Psychology (Jun., 1993), 209-234.

Western Cape Government. (2012). Shadow report on safety information, *Murders in the Western Cape: A case study*. Department of Community Safety.

Woolley, F. (1998). Social Cohesion and Voluntary Activity: Making Connections. . Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS), Conference: The State of Living Standards and the Quality of Life, October 30-31. <http://www.csls.ca/events/oct98/wool.pdf>. (Accessed: 20 September 2013).

Woolman, S. (2013) *The selfless constitution: experimentalism and flourishing as foundation of South Africa's basic law*, Cape Town: Juta.

Yiftachel, O. (2009). Theoretical Notes On 'Gray Cities': the Coming of Urban Apartheid? *Planning Theory*, 8(1): 88-100

Zizek, S. (2008). *Violence*, London, Profile Books LTD,.