

REVIEW

Selling nature: Winners and losers in market-based conservation in Tanzania

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Why GPs don't contract for NHI in the Eastern Cape

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SA cities need leadership

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**Low uptake
of NHI by GPs**



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Editor's note

Low uptake among GPs a threat to success of NHI



Ina van der Linde

The government's white paper on the national health insurance (NHI) proposes a single, compulsory medical scheme for all, with private medical schemes being reduced to offering 'complementary services'. A central NHI fund will buy health services from accredited healthcare providers. A critical component of phase two of the implementation plan is the process whereby the state contracts private general practitioners (GPs) to provide services at primary care level.

In the cover story of this edition, Charles Hongoro and colleagues report on a study (page 10) conducted in the Eastern Cape to find out why there is such a low uptake of national contracts by GPs to provide these services. Their findings mention a variety of factors for the low uptake, such as 'inadequate communication and consultations with the local GPs on contract details', a picture that mirrors numerous other research findings on this topic. For example, the NHI's biggest pilot in the Tshwane district, published in the November 2016 *South African Medical Journal* (SAMJ), showed a high level of frustration with the current situation in hospitals, such as drug stock-outs, staff shortages, the pressure of long queues. An article by Dayan Eagar from the Rural Health Advocacy Project mentions that only about 150 out of the country's 27 000 registered medical practitioners not currently working in the public sector have taken up NHI contracts in 2014.

This begs the question of whether the Department of Health is not putting the cart before the horse. The working conditions in hospitals and better contracting stipulations need to be improved to lure GPs into the NHI.

In an insightful opinion editorial on page 20, Ivan Turok ponders

the problems facing hung councils in four of the metros and 28 other municipalities, which promises a period of energetic rivalry and heightened scrutiny of each party's actions and the quality of political management in these municipalities. He warns that governing large fractured cities like Johannesburg or Tshwane is a far more complex undertaking than managing a business or social movement. If the ongoing political contest is dominated by tactical considerations, with politicians intent on gaining some short-term advantage over their rivals, the result may be entertaining, but ultimately draining and debilitating.

On the productive use of land transferred to communities, Tim Hart and colleagues argue on page 7 that the debate should move away from the question of whether land is used 'productively' for agricultural purposes by new owners but should refocus on the question of whether the recipients use the land for agricultural purposes that help to sustain or improve their wellbeing.

Then there is an article by Aubrey Mpungose, who reviews the literature on projects similar to the Durban port-expansion project and warns that this might result in permanent and irreversible negative social, economic and environmental consequences for the community of South Durban.

A last word: After 13 years and more than 50 editions of the *HSRC Review*, the time has come to move on. A new editor will soon be appointed, so watch this space.

With regards

Ina van der Linde

News roundup

Restitution is for everyone

A conference, a first of its kind, on restitution and what it means will take place from 9 to 10 November, at the fitting venue of the Castle of Good Hope in Cape Town. It aims to answer questions such as what restitution is, how it can be achieved by individuals, communities and institutions, and what is needed to ensure a future where there is something for everyone – to have, to do, and to give.

The conference is co-hosted by the Restitution Foundation, the Human Sciences Research Council and the Castle of Good Hope, along with our partners and patrons.

Says Sharlene Swartz, one of the organisers: 'Restitution is a difficult, restless and provocative word. It speaks about confronting injustice and actively deciding what needs to be done to address a past that continues to erode the present despite our many efforts. While it includes the problem of land and socio-economic redress, restitution ultimately aims at restoring dignity, a sense of belonging and all our "humanity".'

Individuals, practitioners and academics in all sectors – community development, sociology, business, education, psychology, economics – as well as across all our divides, whether religious, racial, political, geographical or generational, have been invited.

'The theme *Something for everyone...to do, to have, to be*, is a culmination of years of reflection regarding why we are not yet the country we all so badly want to be,' says Swartz.

'The conference will start with a pilgrimage to help remind all why restitution is so needed – conquest, enslavement, greed, violence, domination – these are all graphically visible at the Castle in Cape Town.'



CEO Crain Soudien in conversation with head of research, Professor Leickness Simbayi and Dr Wiseman Magasela, deputy director-general: Research and Policy Development, Department of Social Development. Credit: HSRC



Thuli Madonsela, Public Protector, speaks at a leadership conference for women. Credit: Trevor Samson. © Business Day.

Speakers at the opening ceremony include Advocate Thuli Madonsela, the former Public Protector, her daughter Wenzile, the general secretary of the EFF at the University of Pretoria, Mrs Nomonde Calata, the widow of Fort Calata, one of the Cradock 4 murdered by the Security Police, and the first person to testify at the TRC, and her son Lukhanyo, one of the eight SABC journalists who protested against recent

censorship by our public broadcaster and who was fired and subsequently reinstated; and Leon Wessels, a cabinet minister in the apartheid administration and subsequently a member of the South African Human Rights Commission, and his daughter Erika, a member of the Black Sash.

For more information, go to <http://bit.ly/2efds3g>

News roundup

Skills policy in South Africa

The South African labour force is made up of 15 million employed and 7.5 million unemployed people. Three quarters of the employed and 90% of the unemployed are from the African population group. Unemployment is also particularly high among young people (15 - 34 years) and this is increasing as more young people join the labour force. This is according to a comprehensive report, *Skills supply and demand in South Africa*, released in September,

The report says education level and skill base of the labour force is lower than that of many other productive economies. Of the employed population, 20% have a tertiary qualification, 32% have completed secondary education, and close to half of the workforce do not have a grade 12 certificate. Sixty percent of the unemployed have less than a grade 12 certificate. This translates to 11.75 million of the labour force with less than a grade 12 certificate.

The three main findings from the research are:

- *Economy and the demand for skills:* The South African economy has been characterised by low economic growth rates, leading to poor employment growth. The sectors in which people work and the types of jobs available are changing. There is an absence of low-wage jobs in the manufacturing sector that could absorb the vast majority of unemployed who are looking for work. There has been a structural shift towards a service economy and a high dependence on high-skilled financial services.

The financial services sector contributes towards growing the country's GDP, but offers negligible opportunities for employment growth. The only sector experiencing



significant employment growth is the state sector and this is not sustainable.

There is a structural mismatch between labour demand and supply: the economy and labour market shows a demand for high-skilled workers but there is a surplus of low-skilled workers. The economy must respond to the twin challenge of participating in a globally competitive environment which requires a high skills base and a local context that creates low-wage jobs to absorb the large numbers who are unemployed or in vulnerable jobs. The economy should create more labour-intensive forms of growth in order to absorb the growing levels of people, particularly young people, as first time labour market entrants.

- *Education and supply of skills:* A critical constraint for the post-school education and training system and the labour market is the quality of basic education. Success in the school subjects of languages, mathematics and science forms the basis for participation and success in technical subjects in post-school education and training institutions, and in the workplace. Even an economy based on a low skill trajectory will require a workforce that has achieved the school leaving certificate and gained basic numeracy and literacy skills.

Presently, each year around 140 000 grade 12 students complete the matriculation examination with a bachelor's pass, and of these only around 50 000 students pass mathematics with a score higher than 50%. The pool of students who can potentially access university and science-based TVET programmes is very small, in comparison to the skill demands in the country.

The university and TVET college sub-systems are the largest components of the post-school education and training system. In 2014, there were around 1.1 million students in the university sector and 0.8 million students in the TVET sector. Since 2010 the TVET sector has been expanding at an average rate of 23% per annum and the university sector has been expanding at an average rate of 2.1% per annum.

Completion rates at both universities and TVET colleges are less than desirable in that in 2014 there were 185 000 completers from the university sector, 21 000 NCV4 and 57 000 NATED 6 programme completers from the TVET sector.

Access to school, universities and TVET colleges has improved. However, quality remains elusive, leading to low progression through institutions as well as low completion rates from schools, TVET colleges and universities.

The skills development focus should not only be on a small number of skilled people in the workplace, but also on the unemployed, the youth, low-skilled people, the marginalised, and those in vulnerable forms of employment, including the self-employed.

- *The link between the tertiary education and the labour market destination:* Nearly half of the higher education

News roundup


graduates are employed in the community, social and personal services sector, which is dominated by the public sector. A high proportion of the science and engineering graduates, from both higher and technical and vocational education sectors, prefer to work in the financial services sector, as opposed to the manufacturing sector. SET qualifications are versatile and graduates will move into different fields of work. The implication for skills planning is that we need a higher number of SET graduates than needed by the SET occupations.

These positions offer graduates a good salary and conditions of service. Unfortunately, this is distorting the labour market and not attracting graduates to the private sector. The private sector must review its human resource strategies to attract more graduates to the sector.

In conclusion

The dilemma facing policy makers is how to respond to these diverse sets of development and occupational pathways, and decide how resources

should be targeted for inclusive skills development. These imperatives may seem paradoxical, but all are essential to achieve a more inclusive growth and development trajectory.

 **Download the full report from**
<http://www.lmip.org.za/document/skills-supply-and-demand-south-africa>.
The report was compiled by Dr Vijay Reddy, Prof Haroon Borat, Dr Marcus Powell, Ms Mariette Visser and Mr Fabian Arends.

Social scientists gather to find ways of tackling poverty and inequality



Under the theme, 'Poverty and inequality: diagnosis, prognosis, responses', 250 HSRC social scientists gathered at the Indaba Hotel from 22 to 23 September to reflect on key research into poverty and inequality.

HSRC CEO Crain Soudien said the conference was designed as another step in the process of deepening reflections on the theme of the HSRC strategic plan – 'Poverty and inequality: diagnosis, prognosis, responses'.

'It is also intended as a space for scholarly and research-based exchanges



to take place among all HSRC researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds, theoretical orientations, and research programmes and institutes.'

The objectives of this conference include stimulating collaboration, networking and debate among all HSRC researchers and creating an awareness of the range of current and planned research work in the HSRC.

'Particular emphasis is on creating opportunities for up-and-coming researchers to present their work and to engage with their colleagues,' he said.

Keynote speakers included Science and Technology Minister Naledi Pandor and Professor Murray Leibbrandt from the School of Economics at the University of Cape Town and director of the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit. He holds the DST/NRF National Research Chair of Poverty and Inequality Research.

The event boasted around 150 presentations spread across seven parallel sessions and a closing plenary session consisting of reflections on the key themes and further research questions emerging from the discussions in parallel sessions. The vast majority of participants (close to 95%) are researchers working in six different research programmes, spread over five different centres across South Africa.

The next HSRC Review intends to focus on the outcome of this conference, so watch this space.

SELLING NATURE:

Winners and losers in market-based conservation in Tanzania

Amidst growing concerns over the unprecedented degradation of many of the world's natural environments, governments, international donors, non-governmental organisations and private corporations have increasingly argued that people need to be paid for 'saving nature', i.e. to make nature conservation more economically viable than other land uses to achieve sustainable development objectives.

Financial rewards for 'saving nature'

As a result, new markets and financing instruments have been designed that considerably re-organise the ownership, access and control over natural resources in the Global South. The most significant of these new mechanisms is REDD+, a global initiative that aims to mitigate climate change by financially rewarding forest owners in developing countries for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation; and for enhancing forest carbon stocks through sustainable forest management and conservation.

The REDD+ mechanism has generated unprecedented political support and financial funds for the forest-development sector in developing countries, resulting in the mobilisation of around USD10 billion of international funding in the 2000s and setting in motion a host of multi- and bilateral readiness programmes and demonstration projects across Africa, Latin America and Asia.

REDD+ is a global initiative that aims to mitigate climate change by financially rewarding forest owners in developing countries for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.

Tanzania has been an important beneficiary of REDD+ initiatives because of its vast forest resources (35 million hectares), high deforestation rates (1.1% of forest size per year) and large poor rural population dependent on forest resources for their livelihoods.

Project in action

We conducted empirical research in two case study villages in the Lindi region of Tanzania in 2011/2012, employing qualitative research methods (document analysis, participant observation, focus group discussion and 101 semi-structured interviews) to examine the project implementation process, local politics and livelihood outcomes of one REDD+ initiative, 'Making REDD Work for Communities and Forest Conservation in Tanzania'.

The REDD+ project is a five-year partnership launched in September

2009, which aims to reduce more than 110 000 t of carbon dioxide emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in Tanzania in ways that provide direct and equitable incentives to rural communities to conserve and manage forests sustainably.

To generate equitable benefits from the sale of carbon credits, the project established community-based forest management in the villages. Biodiversity and community development were to become important co-benefits of the forest-conservation project, which received USD 5.9 million in funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Norway. The objective of the project was to sell carbon credits to the voluntary carbon market, and in the longer view via the official REDD+ finance mechanisms.

The gap between policy and practice: some unforeseen drawbacks of the project

Our research showed that project proponents genuinely committed to social safeguards, good governance principles and obtaining the free, prior and informed consent of the villagers to maximise local ownership and development benefits from the REDD+ intervention. However, we argue that their noble efforts of the project proponents were inevitably shaped by the on-the-ground historical political, social and economic context of the villages.

Market-based conservation aims to shift villagers' livelihood practices away from extraction/use to conservation through performance-based payments.

New market-based conservation mechanisms have attracted considerable attention in recent years as a proposed win-win solution to reconcile environmental protection with economic development. But critical scholars have warned of potential 'green grabbing' and the exclusion of local populations from the natural resources they depend on. *Andreas Scheba* describes a study conducted in Tanzania that offers valuable insights to conservation-development initiatives in South Africa and elsewhere.

This meant that despite rigorously following good governance procedures and standards, the launch and implementation of the REDD+ project was influenced by inadequate information flows, unequal power relations, systemic poverty and social inequalities. While project developers undertook serious efforts to redress these issues, participant observation and interviews revealed the continuous challenges around fostering equal participation and democratic governance in a deprived rural context.

We also analysed the effects of the REDD+ mechanism on local tenure arrangements and livelihoods. REDD+ and other market-based conservation mechanisms rely on clear formal property rights and governance arrangements to enable the selling of ‘ecosystem services’ (e.g. carbon credits) from rural villagers to international buyers. Because land tenure in the rural villages was largely guided by customary arrangements, the REDD+ project considerably changed the access to and control over forest resources.

The project resulted in new demarcations of village and forest lands, as well as new management plans and by-laws, which imposed restrictions on villagers in the name of global climate change mitigation. This affected residents living in the villages, whose rights to cultivate farms in the forest were restricted, as well as farmers of neighbouring villages, whose previously tolerated activities were deemed illegal.

The replacement of customary arrangements with formally enshrined rules and regulations created a new understanding of boundaries, rights, community and property, which changed the relations between people and forests, as well as between people themselves.

While carbon payments were intended to compensate villagers for their incurred losses, they were small in amount and did not take into account different opportunity costs of villagers, leaving some of them with higher

While project developers undertook serious efforts to redress these issues, participant observation and interviews revealed the continuous challenges around fostering equal participation and democratic governance in a deprived rural context.

losses than others. In addition, the carbon payments were distributed only to residents who were formally registered in the villages, which meant that farmers, who previously accessed the forest on customary terms, were not compensated.

Finding more positive and equitable methods of ‘saving nature’

While our study examined the REDD+ mechanism specifically in the context of Tanzania, its findings offer valuable insights to conservation-development initiatives in South Africa and elsewhere. It highlighted the importance of acknowledging the gap between policy and practice of market-based conservation and showed empirically how pro-poor measures and approaches become reshaped by the actual social, economic and political conditions in remote rural contexts.

Findings offer valuable insights to conservation-development initiatives in South Africa and elsewhere. It highlighted the importance of acknowledging the gap between policy and practice of market-based conservation.

We also demonstrated how the reliance of market-based conservation on formal tenure rights and governance institutions conflicted with customary land use arrangements, which affected ownership and access to forest resources, creating new winners and losers within and between communities.

While social safeguard processes have been highly promoted as a way to mitigate any potential negative impacts on local people, our study confirms that their implementation lags behind in practice, which has also been documented in other areas across the South, for instance in the context of Madagascar by Professor Mahesh Poudyal and her colleagues from Bangor University and Université d’Antananarivo.

Based on our findings we call for an explicit social and environmental justice assessment grounded in a thorough analysis of local livelihoods to achieve more positive and equitable outcomes from the commercialisation of nature conservation.

Authors: Dr Andreas Scheba, Research Specialist, Economic Performance and Development programme, HSRC.

This article is based on Scheba, A, Rakotonarivo, O.S. (2016). Territorialising REDD+: Conflicts over market-based forest conservation in Lindi, Tanzania. Land Use Policy. Vol. 57. pp 625-637.

Are land reform farms going to waste?

Since its inception in 1995, South Africa’s land reform programme has been severely criticised. But are these criticisms valid and supported by evidence? *Tim Hart, Peter Jacobs, Godfrey Mokwatlo and Precious Chauke* perceive interesting patterns that are emerging in some areas with respect to land usage for agricultural purposes.

Criticisms against the land reform programme include lack of coordinated state support, lack of finances and credit, the increasing shift away from the poor to relatively better-off beneficiaries and the wastage of scarce natural resources. The list seems endless.

One of the common criticisms of South Africa’s land reform programme, particularly when agricultural land has been redistributed to new farmers or returned to land claimants through restitution, is the lack of ‘productive use’ by the recipients. Productive use is often inferred as the use of such land in much the same way as it was used by the previous owner or willing seller.

Such criticisms do not always consider the social and economic differences between the previous owners and the new recipients. In some instances, these differences [between previous owners and new recipients of land] are enormous and related to past and present circumstances. Land reform recipients themselves are far from similar and are diverse in terms of

aspirations, age, gender, social class, education, wealth, skills, family and other social networks, and overall access to livelihood assets and the permanency of livelihood sources. Some applicants desire to own and work small parcels of land but this is mostly discouraged by bureaucrats, agricultural unions and lobby groups.

Similarly, such calls for continuing with the agricultural models and practices of previous owners (some who have sold to avoid pending bankruptcy) do not take into account the challenges encountered by new entrants into firmly established global value chains and the global trends of consolidating farmland and the increasing industrialisation of agriculture. These global trends often compound situations and access to markets and value chains in which variable and significant differences prevail between previous and current owners.

Is it sensible and realistic in contemporary South Africa to argue that the land is not used ‘productively’

for agricultural purposes by new owners? We should rather refocus the question on: ‘are the recipients using the land for agricultural purposes that help to sustain or improve their wellbeing?’

In this article we analyse a survey of 286 land reform beneficiary households in the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and the North West provinces during 2012. Response to a very basic question, ‘Was the household involved in the production of any kind of food or agricultural products during the past twelve months?’, indicates that between July 2011 and July 2012, around two-thirds of the households used land obtained from the land reform programme for agricultural purposes.

The size, practices and purposes of farming operations varied across households and were to some extent related to the provinces and districts in which they were located. Of those households sampled during the survey, 91% received land through the various redistribution components of the land reform programme implemented since 1995. Therefore, the results largely reflect the activities of farmers on farms purchased on the ‘open market’ with a government subsidy.



Rural KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Credit: John Hone – Africa Media Online.

67% of all the respondents engaged in agriculture at the time of the survey.

Agricultural production on redistributed farmland

In the three provinces, 67% of all the respondents engaged in agriculture at the time of the survey, while slightly less than a third did not use their redistributed land for any agricultural purposes. However, analysis of the responses to the question on a province-by-province basis (Table 1) reveals stark

differences in the use of redistributed farmland. In the Western Cape less than half the surveyed households (43%) used the land for agricultural purposes, while almost 80% in KwaZulu-Natal and almost 97% in the North West did so. The greater share of negative responses of the households in the Western Cape affects the overall share of surveyed households engaged in agriculture during this period.

Table 1: Engagement in agricultural production by province

Engagement in agriculture		Share in Western Cape	Share in KwaZulu-Natal	Share in North West	Share of total respondent households
Not currently engaged in agriculture	N	58	25	1	84
	%	56.86%	20.16%	3.13%	32.56%
Currently engaged in agriculture	N	44	99	31	174
	%	43.14%	79.84%	96.88%	67.44%
Total	N	102	124	32	258
	%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Source: HSRC 2013

Note: N = 258 number of valid cases

Less than a third of households did not use their redistributed land for agricultural purposes.

Why the Western Cape figures are much lower than those of the surveyed households in the North West and KwaZulu-Natal is unclear. At this stage we can propose two possible reasons. Firstly, in terms of provincial gross domestic product (PGDP) the Western Cape is the second wealthiest province, next to Gauteng. Similarly, off-farm and other alternative livelihood opportunities are different from those available in the other two provinces and job opportunities may be more readily available. This situation may reduce the dependency on household level agriculture. KwaZulu-Natal is considered to be one of South Africa’s poorest provinces and the North West is considered to be a middle income province in terms of its GDP.

Secondly, the two districts sampled in the Western Cape are perhaps less rural and situated along the northern and southern coastal belts of the province where farmland is relatively more expensive.

In contrast, the four districts selected in KwaZulu-Natal and the North West include large areas of former homelands and are in some cases much more remote in contrast to those in the Western Cape. Remoteness and the

presence of former homelands in these districts may impose a greater need for household agricultural production and possibly a long experience of this practice as a means of supplementing household food supplies or production for local and regional markets. Also, farmland is relatively less expensive in these areas, which may enable any excess of the grant being used to purchase the needed agricultural inputs.

Is this farmland really wasted?

The perception that the land reform farmers underuse or waste their farmland is questionable. We see that among the households who received agricultural land through land reform in the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and North West, two thirds told us that they actively farmed some or all of the land between July 2011 and July 2012.

Less than a third of households did not use their redistributed land for agricultural purposes during this period. However, this evidence also shows diversity in engagement in agricultural production by beneficiaries across the three provinces. To some extent, the criticisms suggesting that land is not being used for agricultural purposes, or even being ‘unproductive’, should be

treated cautiously based on the current study data.

By its nature farming involves risk. This risk increases by inclusion into the global economy as farming becomes more expensive; by limited support and access to finance; frequent changes in land reform and agricultural policies; and by the changing motivations and circumstances of individual land reform beneficiary households.

The evidence presented here encourages us to argue, contrary to poorly informed perceptions, that in most cases farmland is not wasted by land reform beneficiaries. The study is limited in the sense that we did not investigate alternative (non-agricultural) uses of land. We propose further that longitudinal surveys should be conducted every 12-36 months, asking the same question from the same sample, including a question about alternative uses of land and usage cycles.

Authors: Tim Hart, senior research manager, Economic Performance and Development (EPD) research programme, HSRC; Dr Peter Jacobs, chief research specialist, EPD; Godfrey Mokwatlo and Precious Chauke, master’s interns, EPD.



Doctors in a community hospital.
Credit: Thomas Omondi – Africa Media Online.

Why GPs don't contract for NHI in the Eastern Cape

As part of the strategy to introduce national health insurance (NHI) in South Africa, the National Department of Health embarked on a process of re-engineering primary health care. Achieving this goal requires the participation of the public and private sector providers. Charles Hongoro reports on a study to find out why there is such a low uptake of national contracts by general practitioners (GPs) to provide these services. Here are the findings.

The National Department of Health (NDOH) formulated a contract for general practitioners (GPs) that would allow them to work in public primary health care clinics, with the quality of their clinical work being assured by the district clinical specialist team.

The contract fee is based on an hourly rate, regardless of years of experience. In addition to the national contract, a service level agreement (SLA) was designed that specifically sets out the services to be offered by the GP in a particular district and the special conditions regarding the implementation of the agreement.

The GP contracts were officially announced as part of ministerial consultations on NHI in 2013, and the contract forms were uploaded on the government website, with disappointing results. At the time of the study, none of the GPs interviewed in the district had signed up to the national NHI GP contract.

This study sought to characterise existing GPs, and establish the nature of the obstacles to contracting with the state.

Profiling the GPs

Data was collected through profiling 42 GP practices and administering structured questionnaires. Most GPs, 57% (n=24) were located in

Mthatha (urban area) and the rest were distributed across the rural sub-districts of OR Tambo district.

Of the 42 GPs interviewed, most (91%) were African, and the mean age was 43.3 years (Table 1).

All the GPs had basic medical training; a few had specialised training (n=3), and 50% (n=19) had additional professional education. Most of the GPs (56%) had graduated from the local university (Walter Sisulu) and the rest (36.6%) from the universities of Pretoria (2.4%), Cape Town (4.9%), KwaZulu-Natal (9.8%) and the Medical University of South Africa (19.5%). The mean practice registration period for the GPs was 12.7 years (1 – 37 years).

The majority of the practices were registered (90.5%) and most of the GPs practised solo (87.8%), with the remainder being salaried or locum doctors. The reported mean number of patients seen by GPs per day was 31, ranging widely from 10 to 100 patients per day.

For adults without medical aid cover (uninsured), the mean cash fee was R311, ranging from R130 to R400. The common cash fee, however, was R300. These covered consultations plus additional services such as diagnostics and medicines. For uninsured children, the common cash fee was R250.

At the time of the study, none of the GPs interviewed in the district had signed up to the national NHI GP contract.

Table 1: Demographic profile of GPs interviewed

Characteristic	Category	Statistic
Gender	Male	22 (52.4%)
	Female	20 (47.6%)
Age	Mean	43.3 years (30 – 62 years)
Educational qualifications	MBchB	30 (73.2%)
	BSc + MBchB	5 (12.2%)
	MBchB +Diploma	3 (7.3%)
	MBchB+MMED	1 (2.4%)
	BSc + MBchB + MMED	2 (4.8%)
Years registered as an Independent Practitioner	Mean	12.7 (1 – 37)
Years practicing in current location	Mean	11.1 (1 – 30)
Years practicing in previous location	Mean	10.7 (1 – 37)
Ownership of facility	Yes	14 (33%)
	No (renting)	28 (67%)
Number of years owning facility	Mean	8.8 (1 – 21)

Source: C Hongoro, 2016

But the key reason for the slow uptake was that the contract was never thoroughly explained.



The majority of GPs had a dispensing licence for medicines (85.7%), and existing licences were renewable, with only 14 (33%) GPs indicating that their licences were continuous (i.e. with no expiry date).

Availability of human resources

All practices had at least a receptionist, with the majority having one or two support staff (78.6%). Overall, all GP practices were equipped with and/or had access to basic and functional equipment required to provide general practitioner services which included the following index equipment: otoscope, ophthalmoscope, electrocardiography, ultra-sound scan, spirometer and audiometer. In addition to these index pieces of equipment, most facilities met the basic infrastructure requirements to be registered as practice settings in South Africa.



Table 2: OR Tambo GP profile

Characteristic	Response	Statistic
Practice registration	Yes	38 (90.5%)
	No	4 (95%)
Practice form	Solo	36 (87.8%)
	Solo with locum/ salaried doctors*	2 (2.4%)
	Group as partnership	4 (9.8%)
Cash fee adult uninsured	Mean	R311.46 (R130 – R400)
	Mode	R300.00
Cash fee children uninsured	Mean	R247.86 (R95 – R320)
	Mode	R250.00
Dispensing licences	Yes	36 (85.7%)
	No	6 (14.3%)
Average number of patients seen per day	Mean	30.9
	Mode	30.0
	Mode	25.0

Notes: * Doctors working in a solo practice either as locums or salaried.

Source: C Hongoro, 2016

Low uptake of government general practice contract

At the time of the study, none of the GPs interviewed in the district had signed up to the national GP contract. A myriad of reasons for the slow uptake were provided, but the key reason for the slow uptake was that the contract was never thoroughly explained to them and attempts to do so were more information sessions, with very little interaction between the public officials and the potential private contractor GPs.

Most GPs were uncertain about the conditions of the contract, while a few respondents indicated that the contract remuneration was indeed very low. A notable number of the GPs indicated that they were not offered the contract, which corroborates the aforementioned finding of lack of information about the proposed contract.

Despite the fact that most doctors did not sign the new contract, the majority acknowledged having other

state contracts (70.7%): with the district (51.6%), regional hospital (11.9%), central hospital (16.1%) or a combination of these (9.6%). Only two GPs acknowledged having service contracts with a community health centre in the district.

Those who had state contracts indicated that they were contracted for an average of 23.93 hours per week, ranging from 6 to 80 hours. The reported mean hourly contract rate was R308.64, with a minimum and maximum of R75 and R850 respectively.

Responses to a question of how satisfied they were with their existing contracts were overwhelmingly positive, which is surprising given the non-uptake of the NHI or national contract. Over 66.7% of the GPs agreed or strongly agreed that they were satisfied with their existing state contracts, with the remainder somewhat indifferent or disagreeing. Within the existing other state contracts, GPs reported consulting on average 30 patients per day, ranging from 6 to 100 patients per day.

Reasons for not signing up NHI GP contract

- “Did not attend the roadshows organised in the district and therefore the details of the contract were not explained”
- “The contract was not offered to the GPs”
- “The engagement style at the meetings was more dictatorial and one’s inputs were not taken into consideration”
- “The contract terms were not properly explained”
- “Nothing actually took off which led to my being discouraged from participating”
- “Information given on NHI contract was not clear”
- “I never had clarity on certain issues; not satisfied with terms and conditions of contract”
- “Remuneration not adequate”

Analysis of the findings of the study

The findings of the study were paradoxical: the national contract was not embraced, but at the same time 90% indicated interest in participating and the majority of doctors had other existing state contracts, largely as sessional doctors in hospitals. The reasons proffered for low uptake varied but ultimately centred on a general lack of understanding of the national contract and its governance arrangement, which manifested itself as mistrust and apprehension.

The study showed that there is a sufficient number of independent doctors that could be engaged to support primary care services in the district, with 88% of them already operating solo. With a reported

Advantages and disadvantages of current government contract as GP

Advantages:

- Well-equipped facilities and equipment allow for a variety of cases and procedures that cannot be done in GP practice (wide scope of practice)
- Primary healthcare considered rewarding
- Management of HIV/AIDS patients considered personally rewarding
- Community work rewarding in general
- A convenient working regime
- Job satisfaction
- There is better management of patients at facility
- Can follow up own referred patients in hospital
- Getting clinical support from colleagues and consultants

Disadvantages:

- Inability to work in the same location as own GP practice
- Inadequate infrastructure and equipment in some public facilities
- Poor contract management
- Lack of appropriate accommodation and recreational facilities
- High workload and poor referrals
- Shortage of staff
- Finding a balance between private practice and public service work

Low uptake of the national GP contract was largely due to a variety of factors that can be explained by inadequate communication and consultations with the local GPs on contract details.

The study showed that there is a sufficient number of independent doctors that could be engaged to support primary care services in the district.

average of 31 patients seen per day, the proposed NHI per capita primary care utilisation target of 3 to 3.5 visits per year is likely to be met through such contractual arrangements.

An advantage was that the majority of the general practitioners in the districts originally came from that district and fully understood the local socio-economic-cultural context and were therefore more likely to stay in those communities if their employment and business expectations were met through the proposed national contract.

Overall, the capacity to deliver clinical services on behalf of the state at primary care level was evidently available as most GPs had the basic supportive human resources, equipment and health information infrastructure to even support other forms of contracting, such as contracting out public patients to GP practices.

For a district with a population of 1.4 million people, the possibility of having 1 GP per 22 000 population, although normatively not ideal, is significant for a rural district.

The critical question is how these GPs would be distributed or located to

ensure that they are accessible to all who need their services. Contracting provides the opportunity for the government to purchase services from GPs for specific areas where there is need.

Addressing the low uptake

Low uptake of the national GP contract was largely due to a variety of factors that can be explained by inadequate communication and consultations with the local GPs on contract details; that is, on services to be rendered, payment levels and additional compensation for related expenses such as travel, working regime, contracting-in and -out options.

Misunderstandings create mistrust and apprehension, which are fundamental antitheses of an effective GP contractual arrangement. Most GPs are interested in signing a national GP contract provided it is flexible and allows them to continue with their practice and the remuneration remains competitive.

Engagements with the GPs ought to be based on mutual respect whilst providing for wider contractual choices. The findings suggest that



Credit: George Philipas – Africa Media Online.

whilst GPs are interested in contracting with government, they had variable preference of contract design, which means that a one-size-fits-all contract is not advisable.

This article is based on Hongoro, C., Funani, I.N., Chitha, W. & Godlimpi, L. (2016) An assessment of private general practitioners contracting for public health services delivery in O.R. Tambo district, South Africa. *Investment choices for South African education*. 6(525):73 – 79.

Author: Professor Charles Hongoro, director, Population Health, Health Systems and Innovation programme, HSRC.

Suggestions for improvement of the current GP contract

- Improve availability of basic equipment, drugs and medical supplies (ordering and stock management)
- Improve working conditions by employing more consultants, doctors and nurses and spread the workload
- Improve staff time management in patient care
- Administrative support units such as HR must improve communication with staff
- Provide decent accommodation and recreational facilities for staff
- Improve the referral system and decongest referral hospitals
- Provide opportunities for staff to develop themselves e.g. through further training
- Improve remuneration

THE VIEW OF MUNICIPALS ON community protests



How do government personnel perceive community protest? Who are the protesters and why do they protest? What early response mechanisms are available to address these protests to reduce community demonstrations? *Justin Steyn* shared findings from a South Africa Local Government Association (SALGA) study on community protests as perceived by local government during a seminar, co-hosted by the HSRC.

Community protests have become an increasingly urgent area of concern in South Africa. While the Constitution places the onus on local government to promote community participation in the affairs of local governance, the public struggles to find its 'democratic voice'.

Citizens have the right to express their discontent with governance and service delivery, but violence increasingly dictates the language of protestors, as public property, and the property of elected officials have become easy targets for protesting communities. We support stiff penalties for people convicted of public violence, principally due to the economic costs to the country. In Cape Town, for example, the city pays out R6 million per month to repair the uninsured damages resulting from spontaneous violent protest; money that would be better spent addressing the needs of indigent communities.

Community protests are not service delivery protests

Community protests differ from service delivery protests as these include any type of action that occurs within a municipal space, while service delivery protests arise directly from issue-specific matters. Most protests are not directly related to local government's mandates but occur in a municipal space. Local government is the communities' first point of contact with the machinery of state, irrespective of where the service mandate lies.

Findings from a study on protests conducted in 2010 indicated that areas with a high level of protests, such as the metros, actually experienced fairly good service delivery, whilst areas with poor service delivery, such as in KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape, had low protest levels. We wanted to determine how local government perceives these findings.

Study methods

For our study, we targeted metros and districts in high protest areas. A total of 122 people – including municipal managers, technical and services

planners, political representatives, financiers, auditors and local government personnel – participated in a survey comprising metros and districts. Participants were also asked to provide possible recommendations and interventions on how to address protest actions in their communities. The Municipal IQ hotspot monitor (a web-based data and intelligence service specialising in the monitoring and assessment of all of South Africa's 278 municipalities); the PLAAS (Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies) GIS protest incident map and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) interactive map on protest frequencies were used to identify the hotspot protest areas.

Study findings



Statistics from the multilevel government initiative reveal that between 2012 and 2014, the majority of the protests occurred in metropolitan areas; however there's a tendency for rural areas to start protesting more frequently. As expectations are increasing, rural areas, such as those in the Eastern Cape, are engaging more frequently in protests, especially around issues of service delivery and governance.

Many municipalities from across the country said that in their respective areas protests are infrequent (86%), and that service delivery protest action is often driven by issues around safety and security, demarcation, maintenance of water facilities and other bread and butter issues.

The study also found that local government perceived protestors as comprising mostly young people between 18 and 35 (69.5%) years old, criminals (14.4%), people from other municipalities (12.7%) and secondary school students (5.9%), with the smallest category being migrant labourers (1.7%).

As shown in Figure 1 and 2, most protestors were perceived to be male (53.4%), and unemployed individuals (71%).

Violence increasingly dictates the language of protestors, as public property, and the property of elected officials have become easy targets for protesting communities.



Why do communities protest?

Service delivery and accessibility was found to be the strongest motivation behind the majority of protests (49.6%), followed by employment opportunities (42.1%) and roads and maintenance of public facilities (39.7%), forming the top three perceived reasons for protesting. Other reasons include land, access to housing and political leadership (see Figure 3).

Although 38% of local government representatives believed that protests were peaceful and took place with their knowledge, 21 % reported protests to be ‘disorderly with property destruction’, and 14 % said ‘legal protests were likely to turn violent’.

In terms of responding to protests, municipalities generally engaged with protesting communities, as avoiding engagement with protestors would negatively affect the relationship between community members and local government/municipalities.

Strategies for reducing protest actions

Participants provided potential actions that could see a decline in protest activity. The most favoured actions were: better functional ward councils

Service delivery and accessibility was found to be the strongest motivation behind the majority of protests (49.6%), followed by employment opportunities (42.1%) and roads and maintenance of public facilities (39.7%).

Fig 3 Perceived motivation for protest (%)





Fig 4 Municipalities believe that protest could be reduced if: (%)



(53.8%), involving community members in council decision-making, and the provision of monetary and human resources from national government in addressing backlogs (50.4%).

The least favoured courses of action included police using less force in controlling crowd actions (2.5%), private sector wage negotiations (3.4%), and police using more force (5%) (Figure 4). To implement these actions, participants recommended that local government should be equipped with resources such as improved accountability processes, political interventions and strategic deployments, enhanced public participation protocols and systems for meaningful engagement, more income resources, and better policy enforcement capabilities.

How can local government address community protests?

Key recommendations to be considered at local and national level that could change the perceptions of local government towards community protests are as follows:

At local level:

- Development and adoption of early response systems based on existing good practices.
- Proactively identifying issues that give rise to community protest action and using Community Development Workers (CDWs) and councillors to communicate with

communities regarding actions being taken.

- Engaging with communities before projects are planned.
- Improving public consultation and communication processes.
- Actively planning for migration in the Integrated Development Plan (IDP)
- Pursuing densification strategies.
- Synchronising government planning cycles using a bottom-up approach.
- Promoting the IDP as the central planning document of all spheres of government.

And at national level:

- Developing a framework for protest action outside the Gatherings Act that provides a method encouraging proactive redress from all spheres of government;
- Ensuring that local government participation structures are the primary structures through which redress activities occur;
- National and provincial spheres of government must assist in building capacity in public participation structures at the local level;
- Contribute to improvements in coordination between spheres of government; and give communities access to all spheres of government;
- Channelling additional resources into local government to enable it to perform its service delivery mandates.

Conclusion

At present, it is the common view that ‘the community target local government; whenever communities want to protest they want to protest’, even if the local government is not responsible for many of the issues emanating from community grievances. More often than not, service delivery is expanding in the midst of moving targets caused by mandate creep, new legislation and regulations, unclear roles and responsibilities divided between national, provincial and local spheres of government and migratory populations.

Ultimately, protest is about a competition for scarce resources and baskets of resources. Increasing the capacity of local government to provide effective stewardship of its resources, combined with better integrated planning between spheres of government, certainly will do more towards addressing the root causes of protest. However, this must not be viewed in isolation from economic conditions and the levels of job creation provided by the formal private sector. State resources are finite and the state cannot be expected to provide cradle to grave resource packages amid dwindling natural resources and deepening cyclical downturns in the global economy.

Most of the issues providing fertile grounds for community protest reside in state systems that are uncommunicative, uneven communication that leaves communities without knowledge on projects and roles and responsibilities designated to specific spheres of government, or shared service delivery from government.

Communities expect local government to provide service excellence and service leadership and it is up to local government to ensure that it delivers on this expectation within its constitutional developmental mandates and within its efficient use of existing resources and capacities.

Authors: Justin Steyn, policy analyst, South African Local Government Association.



SA's new political landscape opens the door to city-level issues getting the attention they deserve. The metros are too important to be the playgrounds of national political pastimes. They face unique challenges and opportunities requiring ingenuity, risk-taking and commitment to meaningful change. In short, they require credible, capable and courageous leadership.

CRIMINALISING RACISM

in tumultuous times

The South African government is drafting the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill, which was to be tabled in Parliament by September 2016. This is despite existing laws governing unfair discrimination, hate speech, crimen injuria and defamation under which acts of racism can be prosecuted. *Gregory Houston* and team discuss the draft Bill.

Baskets of bitterness

2016-09-18 – News24
<http://www.news24.com/Tags/Topics/racism>

We need to talk about South Africa's everyday

2016-05-10 – News24
<http://www.news24.com/Columnists/MaxduPreez/we-need-to-talk-about-south-africas-everyday-racism-20160510>

The rise of a new black racism in South Africa

Ebrahim Harvey 16 May 2016 – Mail & Guardian
<http://mg.co.za/article/2016-05-16-00-the-rise-of-a-new-black-racism-in-south-africa>

Springbok player's wife condemns racist trolls

2016-10-07 – News24
<http://www.news24.com/Tags/Topics/racism>

The Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill responds to a surge in racist incidents, as well as calling for stricter penalties for racists. It provides for the criminalisation of conduct that amounts to incitement, instigation and conspiracy to commit hate crimes, and hatred encouraged through racist comments on social media.

What is 'racism'?

One of the key areas of contention in developing anti-racism law has been the government's conceptualisation of the term 'racism'. There is currently no clear definition of racism in South Africa. It is only in the draft National Action Plan to combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (NAP) where an overt definition of racism is provided: 'an ideological construct that assigns a certain race and/or ethnic group to a position of power over others ... Racism is a denial of people's basic human rights, dignity and respect. Its expression ranges from small, everyday acts of discrimination, through to barriers and omissions that may be inadvertently established at an institutional level, to acts of threatening behaviour and violence.'

The NAP envisages a policy framework that will be the basis for legislation

dealing with hate crimes, as well as additional measures focused on the criminal prosecution of hate speech. The definition provided in the NAP may, however, inadequately address the historical roots of racism.

Fighting racism through the courts

Current legislative provisions for the prosecution of acts of racism are primarily contained in the Equality Act.

The Equality Act (2000) prohibits unfair discrimination, hate speech and harassment. Hate speech is defined as the publication, propagation or communication of words that are based on gender, disability and race, which must demonstrate a clear intention to be hurtful, harmful or to incite harm and to promote or propagate hatred. Do we need more than this to address racist actions in South Africa?

The Act also provides for the establishment of equality courts, where cases of discrimination can be heard. In February 2004, in the first case considered by the Equality Court, Professor Pierre de Vos (Constitutionally Speaking) and his (gay) partner won a case against the owners of a gay bar in Cape Town after the owners admitted that they had discriminated against De Vos' partner because of his race. As part of a settlement, which was made an order of court, the bar was ordered to pay R10 000 to a non-profit organisation of their choice.

The Equality Court can refer a civil case involving hate speech for criminal prosecution, thereby providing a forum where civil remedies are available against hate speech and unfair discrimination based on race. However, they have not been well-utilised and available remedies have not been tested sufficiently.

A drawback with all criminal prosecutions is that the standard of proof required (beyond reasonable doubt) is higher than a balance of probabilities. This makes it easier for complainants to prove their case in the Equality Court, where the lower standard

Hate speech is defined as the publication, propagation or communication of words that are based on gender, disability and race, which must demonstrate a clear intention to be hurtful, harmful or to incite harm and to promote or propagate hatred.

of proof (a balance of probabilities) weights the balance in favour of the victims.

South Africa is not the first country in the world to seek solutions to this problem. Internationally, the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) is indicative of the recognition that racism is a political problem, and that governments should play a central role in eliminating all forms of racial discrimination, outlawing hate speech, and criminalising membership in racist organisations.

Anti-racism and hate speech criminal legislation is found in many countries around the world. For instance, the Public Order Act applicable in England and Wales provides for a maximum sentence of seven years' imprisonment. The French law of 1972 prohibits hate speech. The penalty for violating this prohibition is up to a year of imprisonment and/or a fine of up to €45 000. The Gayssot Law in France introduced a new way of punishing racists in 1990: at the discretion of judges, guilty parties can be stripped of certain civil liberties, such as the right to stand for public office.

Criminalising racist speech and conduct can send a zero tolerance message; the criminal record stays with the perpetrator and has long-lasting consequences.

Effectiveness of anti-racism laws

There is wide disagreement about the effectiveness of anti-racism laws. Some argue that at the very least the existence of such legislation signals to society that racism is an intolerable evil, others that stiffer penalties may discourage

perpetrators from carrying out acts of racism. Still others claim that there is evidence that anti-racism legislation is effective as racially aggravated charges have been brought and convictions or guilty pleas obtained since the introduction of this kind of legislation elsewhere.

On the other hand, critics of existing anti-racism legislation in other countries describe the laws as weak, lacking in sufficient enforcement, ineffective and symbolic. Critics also point to the difficulty found in proving discriminatory behaviour, especially the intention to 'provoke discrimination, hate, or violence'.

Notably, Mari Matsuda describes the impact on individuals when governments fail to do something: 'To be hated, despised and alone is the ultimate fear of all human beings. ... The aloneness comes not only from the hate message itself, but also from the government response of tolerance. ... The government's denial of personhood by denying legal recourse may be even more painful than the initial act of hatred'.

On balance, South African public sentiment seems to be more in favour of new legislation than against it, wanting to see dignity upheld and racist conduct punished.

Authors: Dr Gregory Houston, chief research specialist, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD), HSRC; Prof. Narnia Bohler-Muller, executive director; Nkululeko Majosi and Zandile Matshaya, master's interns; Gary Pienaar, senior research manager; Dr Vanessa Barolsky, research specialist, all DGSD.

Note: A version of this article appeared as an opinion piece in various newspapers.

AN ENDURING VOTE OF CONFIDENCE: Public trust in the Electoral Commission



A voting station in Soweto in a school classroom.
Credit: Jonathan Katzenellenbogen – Africa Media Online.

The Electoral Commission of South Africa has overseen successful national and provincial elections and five municipal elections to date. Apart from administrative efficiency, the extent to which the public continues to express confidence in the Electoral Commission is instrumental to the overall credibility of elections and to democratic legitimacy more broadly and it is therefore important to constantly monitor the general population's attitudes towards the election management body. In this article, *Benjamin Roberts*, *Steven Gordon* and *Jaré Struwig* examine and discuss the views of South Africans towards the Commission and how this has changed over time.

Free and fair elections are the cornerstone of liberal democracies worldwide, and election management bodies by extension represent one of the most critical public institutions. To better understand how the public feels about the Electoral Commission in South Africa we rely on data from three principal sources:

- The South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), a nationally representative survey series conducted annually by the HSRC since 2003. Each survey round consists of a representative sample of individuals older than 15 years, with a sample size for each round of interviewing ranging between 2 500 and 3 500. To extend the data series back to the 1999-2001 period, we also draw on the HSRC Evaluation of Public Opinion Programme (EPOP) series, which has a similar sample design.
- Afrobarometer data is included as a basis of comparison.
- The 2016 Election Satisfaction Survey (ESS), which was commissioned by the Electoral Commission, and consists of a representative sample of approximately 13 000 voters that were interviewed at 300 randomly selected voting stations during the course of election day.

Free and fair elections are the cornerstone of liberal democracies worldwide.

Changing patterns of trust over time

In late 2015, two-thirds (66%) of the adult public stated that they strongly trusted or trusted the Commission. By comparison, nearly one-fifth (17%) voiced distrust, with an equivalent share (17%) offering a neutral view. In Figure 1, patterns of trust in the election management body between 1999 and 2015 are presented. We also overlay the total level of public trust in the institution derived from Rounds 3-6 of Afrobarometer (Rounds 1 and 2 are excluded due to the use of different coding on response options). The results show that trust has fluctuated over time, ranging from a recorded low of 49% in 2000 to a high of 74% in 2010.

Following a dip and subsequent recovery in trust in the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was a progressive, upward trend in confidence between 2001 and 2010, rising from 63% to 74% over this period. A fairly steep decline then occurred between 2010 and 2014, with trust falling by 20 percentage points.

However, as can be seen from the graph, there was a significant upswing in trust in late 2015. The Afrobarometer trends portray a similar trajectory, with relatively similar levels of trust between Round 3 (2005/06) and Round 4 (2008/09), followed by a rise in confidence between Round 4 and Round 5 (2011/12), and a subsequent downturn between Round 5 and Round 6 (2014/15).


The only pattern that is not captured by the Afrobarometer data is the upswing in trust between 2014 and 2015. We have to wait for future rounds of both these data series to see whether or not this upswing is maintained.

Questioning the rumours of crisis

Following the conclusion of the 2016 election, there was debate on social media regarding the latest results of Afrobarometer (Round 6) on trust in the Electoral Commission, questioning why only slightly more than half the public (55%) trusts the institution. This prompted some discussion of a crisis of legitimacy. We maintain that such rumours of crisis are rather alarmist and ill-founded for a number of reasons.

The social media discussion focused on one round of data in isolation. Yet, the analysis of the graph in Figure 1 points clearly to the importance of examining data trends. There have been demonstrable ebbs and flows in trust in the Electoral Commission over time, and even though there was a downturn in trust between 2010 and 2015, levels of trust in 2015 were certainly not the lowest recorded since the late 1990s. The fieldwork period for the 2014/15 Afrobarometer round also predates the upswing detected in the SASAS round conducted in October through December 2015.

Fig 1 Trust in the Electoral Commission, 1999-2015 (%)



Source: Evaluation of Public Opinion Programme Survey 1999-2002; South African Social Survey (SASAS) 2003-2015; Afrobarometer Rounds 3-6, 2005/06-2014/15.

Note: The dashed line represents no data collected within that particular period.

Confidence in the Electoral Commission in late 2015 stood at considerably higher levels than the three tiers of government, Parliament, political parties and politicians.

More importantly, we should be looking at patterns of trust not only over time, but also from a comparative perspective, taking into account the relative ratings of different institutions. From Figure 2, it is clear that confidence in the Electoral Commission in late 2015 stood at considerably higher levels than the three tiers of government, Parliament, political parties and politicians.


More specifically, trust in the Electoral Commission was 20 percentage points higher than that recorded for national and provincial government, 30 percentage points higher than local government, and 40 percentage points above that of political parties and politicians.

A matter of performance?

Although not shown in Figure 2, our research shows that the fluctuating pattern of confidence in the Electoral Commission is common to many other political and social institutions in the country over the same reference period. The years where trust in the Commission rose or fell over the last fifteen years are mirrored in evaluations of the various other institutions that we have been monitoring in our survey series.

This raises the question of what factors are driving such evaluations. A thorough discussion of this is beyond the scope of this short article, but our multivariate

Fig 2 Confidence in select institutions, 2015 (percent that trust or strongly trust)



Source: South African Social Survey (SASAS) 2015

analysis of trust in the Commission did point to the role of general political disillusionment. When there is growing negativity in the political mood in the country, including satisfaction with democracy, service delivery, institutions and leadership, then trust in the Commission falls in tandem, and vice versa. The implication is that public evaluations of the election management body are not informed exclusively by its actual performance, but additionally by general political disaffection or contentment among the public.

To put the issue of political disillusionment further into perspective, the Election Satisfaction Survey 2016 found that 91% of the voting public trusted the Electoral Commission. This is appreciably higher than the 66% trust level expressed by the adult public as a whole ten months earlier in the 2015 SASAS round. One might argue that these enthusiastic ratings might be buoyed somewhat by voters having just had a positive voting experience at the time of interview. Irrespective of this, it does suggest that low trust or even distrust in the Commission is likely to be significantly higher among those that did not participate in the election. This is reinforced by the SASAS 2015 finding that political disillusionment accounts for close to three-quarters (72%) of intended electoral abstention, with administrative factors playing a relatively nominal

role. Those who have voted before are generally positive in the assessment of a range of aspects of the Commission's electoral performance.

The final count

The results outlined in this article demonstrate that the Electoral Commission remains one of the most trusted institutions in the country. Variation in patterns of confidence over time is related to broader views about the performance of democracy and politics in the country. Consequently, when trust in the Commission declines, this does not necessarily reflect unhappiness with the conduct of this institution, and is more likely to signal mounting public disillusionment with democracy and governance at the time.

It is important that we continue to adopt a longer-term, comparative perspective in evaluating the state of public institutions such as the Electoral Commission and ensuring that unwarranted pronouncements of decline are not made. The real story for now lies in political disillusionment and how this is increasingly influencing electoral and other forms of political participation and expression in the country.

Authors: Ben Roberts and Jarè Struwig, SASAS coordinators; Steven Gordon, post-doctoral fellow, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD) research programme, HSRC.

FAMILIES AND CHILDREN: Promoting family wellbeing and cohesion

Apartheid policies had devastating effects on family life in South Africa; the creation of homelands, forced resettlement and migratory labour policies strained and disrupted family relations. *Ben Roberts, Jarè Struwig and Zitha Mokomane* draw on a recent study on family cohesion and values, and actions for promoting child wellbeing.

The family is critical to achieving a healthy, cohesive society. Stable, well-functioning families tend to exhibit higher levels of social capital and resilience which, in turn, contributes to greater social cohesion at the societal level. Conversely, the absence of a stable, nurturing family environment has been found to have a profoundly damaging impact on the individual, often leading to behaviour which is, in turn, profoundly damaging to society.

Recognising this, and the importance of families, the Programme to Support Pro-Poor Development (PSPPD) financially supported a project that focused on better understanding patterns of family cohesion and values in South Africa, using data from the 2012 round of the South African Social Attitude Survey (SASAS).

The intention of the project was to design evidence-based policies aimed at strengthening and promoting the wellbeing of South African families.


Children and alternative family forms

South Africans are still relatively prejudiced against certain alternative family forms. Small shares of South Africans believe that a lesbian (23%) or a gay (18%) couple can bring up a child as well as a heterosexual couple. Despite this, trends over the last decade show a

softening of negative attitudes toward homosexual marriages and parenting. Other alternative family forms, such as single parenting, are more readily embraced by South Africans, with 69% agreeing that a single parent can raise a child as well as two parents together.

There is also a strong recognition of the role of fathers in raising children, with 72% of adults saying that men

Fig 1 Level of agreement that lesbian/gay couples can raise a child as well as female-male couples




should not have less responsibility for childrearing than mothers, 75% saying being a father merits considerable respect, and 88% holding the view that most fathers want a loving relationship with their children. There is, however, widespread concern that men are unable to be co-resident with their children because of various structural reasons, which has resulted in a reasonably strong appeal (56%) for state assistance to support fathers.

A significant majority of South Africans also continue to support efforts to encourage the adoption of non-kin children in need. Slightly over half (53%) of the adult public agree that society should be doing more to encourage the adoption of children in need.

Gender ideology and work-family balance

The family survey included a number of items examining gender ideology with specific reference to the tensions between women’s economic participation and caregiving responsibilities in families.

Overall, the findings largely point to support for the traditional gendered division of labour, with female employment generally only tolerated



due to economic necessity. Thus, while three-quarters of the adult population believes a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work, 62% express the opinion that most women prefer domestic duties and childrearing to formal employment.

There is also ambivalence in responses to statements regarding young children suffering when their mothers work, and family life suffering when the woman has full-time employment.

The data suggest that women’s gender roles have not been fundamentally transformed. The enduring support for the gendered division of labour has a number of implications for both women and men who are unable to break out of their stereotypical roles. Women who work are likely to experience a double burden of domestic and employment responsibilities. In addition, working mothers may experience stigma, with paid employment seen as the antithesis to ideal femininity and motherhood.

Working mothers may experience stigma, with paid employment seen as the antithesis to ideal femininity and motherhood.

Table 1: Determining child poverty using the socially perceived necessity method

Percentage of adults defining items as essential child needs	Percentage saying essential		Rank (1=high; 24=low)		Change 2007 – 2012	
	2007	2012	2007	2012	(%)	Rank
Three meals a day	91	90	1	1	(1)	–
Toiletries to be able to wash every day	90	87	2	2	(3)	–
A visit to the doctor when ill and all medicines required	88	86	4	3	(2)	+1
All fees, uniform and equipment required for school	88	84	3	4	(5)	(1)
Clothing sufficient to keep warm and dry	85	80	5	5	(5)	–
Bus/taxi fare or other transport to get to school	75	73	7	6	(2)	+1
Shoes for different activities	79	63	6	7	(17)	(1)
Own bed	62	60	9	8	(1)	+1
A desk and chair for homework for school aged children	49	54	12	9	5	+3
Own room for children over 10	40	47	16	10	7	+6
Some new clothes	67	46	8	11	(20)	(3)
Educational toys/games	46	43	13	12	(3)	+1
Story books	50	40	11	13	(10)	(2)
Pocket money/allowance for school aged children	59	38	10	14	(21)	(4)
A computer in the home for school aged children	32	32	19	15	(1)	+4
A school trip once a term for school aged children	45	30	14	16	(15)	(2)
Presents at birthdays, Christmas	40	26	15	17	(14)	(2)
Leisure/sports equipment	34	22	17	18	(11)	(1)
Own cell phone for secondary school aged children	22	22	22	19	–	+3
Toys or materials for a hobby	33	21	18	20	(12)	(2)
Some fashionable clothes for secondary school aged children	32	19	20	21	(13)	(1)
A birthday party each year	30	15	21	22	(15)	(1)
A CD player/MP3 player/iPod for school aged children	12	9	24	23	(3)	+1
A PlayStation/Xbox for school aged children	13	9	23	24	(4)	(1)

Source: SASAS 2007, 2012

Children in the family

Nearly all South African adults (97%) agree that raising children is one of life’s greatest joys. Large shares also opposed the idea that having children imposes restrictions on the freedoms of parent (63%), imposes a financial burden on families (59%), or restricts parental career opportunities (58%). There is also a deeply rooted notion that adult children are an important source of help for elderly parents (83% agree). Nevertheless, a notable minority share (25-28%) does recognise that

having children places constraints on employment and career prospects of one or both parents.

How child poverty affects families

What effect does child poverty have on families? What does the adult population regard as essential for all children to secure an acceptable standard of living? In 2012, 9 of the 25 definitional items were deemed ‘essential’ by at least 50% of the adult population (Table 1). Many of these items relate to basic needs, such

as food, hygiene, health care, education and clothing, and these were regarded as essential child needs by the highest share of South Africans.

The results confirm that the public’s definition of child poverty continues to encompass core elements of material deprivation, human capital deprivation and health deprivation, all of which relate to key areas of government intervention to promote child wellbeing.

Further findings show that inability of parents to provide for their children’s basic needs erodes the dignity of the



parents and children alike. Poverty alleviation policies are therefore not only fundamental to material needs but there is a clear demand for the state to address family poverty as the basis of preserving dignity.

Key recommendations

Based on the analysis emanating from the research on family cohesion, we propose the following:

- **Child poverty:** The socially perceived necessities method, which includes determining fundamental basic needs such as food, hygiene, health care, education and clothing, should be applied in determining the extent and nature of child poverty, vulnerable groups and spatial concentrations of deprivation.
- **Poverty and material inequalities:** Government intervention should be implemented that respects and protects the dignity of citizens, which is an important indication that the state is seen as a legitimate authority in providing social protection that ensures that the needs of families are adequately met and quality life is promoted.

- **Diverse family forms:** Public support is required for the promotion of non-kin adoption alongside kinship care, which could represent a critical opening the government should build upon to encourage the adoption of children in need. Interventions should be aimed at shifting people's negative views related to same-sex family rights and at promoting the benefits of family diversity.
- **Policy support for fathers:** Policies and programmes should be pursued to promote positive male and fatherhood roles. Mechanisms and policies such as paternity and parental leave need to be put in place to ensure a greater balance between work and family responsibilities and gender equality in parenting.
- **Employment-family policies:** Coherent employment policies should strive to promote gender equity in the labour market and family policies need to recognise the significance of the male's involvement in households, for example, policy provisions for men's parental leave to promote caring by

Policies and programmes should be pursued to promote positive male and fatherhood roles.

both parents. Likewise, although family diversity is recognised in policies, the main focus remains on 'family preservation' in line with conventional gender roles.

- **Childrearing:** Caregivers of children need to be provided with information, knowledge and skills that will enable them to accomplish positive child outcomes without delaying their own career and economic advancement. The availability of state-subsidised services such as affordable child day-care and after-school care would go a long way towards complementing parental responsibilities in terms of children's wellbeing, protection and development. Evidence-based, positive parenting programmes could also be implemented and made available to parents nationally.

Authors: Benjamin Robert and Jarè Struwig, SASAS coordinators and senior research managers, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD) programme, HSRC; Dr Zitha Mokomane, associate professor, Department of Sociology, University of Pretoria, previously a chief research specialist, Human and Social Development research programme, HSRC.

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SPECULATIVE MEGA-PROJECTS: Impacts of proposed port expansions in Durban

The age of mega-projects is upon us, with the proposed expansion of the Durban harbour just one example. *Aubrey Mpungose* reviews the literature on similar projects and warns that the port project might result in permanent and irreversible negative social, economic and environmental consequences for the community of South Durban.

Cities around the world are increasingly undertaking large urban development projects (mega-projects) as a way to market and brand their cities as investment, tourism, production and consumption spaces. We are confronted on all sides with large-scale projects such as highways, railways, dams, airports, shopping malls, waterfront projects and sports stadia. This is true also of South Africa with our 2010 FIFA World Cup stadia building frenzy, Gautrain, and the proposed Airtropolis in King Shaka and OR Tambo international airports.

This study focuses on some key findings derived from a literature review of global experiences of mega-projects, particularly as they may provide valuable lessons for the rollout of the port expansion project in the eThekweni Municipality.

Scepticism about the benefits of mega-projects

Recent literature in urban studies contends that this increasing trend of cities adopting the mega-project concept is a consequence of globalisation, neoliberalism, and the shift from industrial to post-industrial economies. This is a response to the increasing demand for cities to be internationally competitive and thereby boost tourism and attract investments.

Mega-projects have not been immune to criticism. An emerging body of research examining the social, economic, environmental and spatial outcomes of mega-projects around the globe suggests that large development and investment projects are characterised by:

- Minimal commitment to socially just policies with the primary orientation towards profitability and competitiveness;
- Delivery by quasi-governmental organisations; and
- Operating within introverted business-oriented modes of governance that lack democratic accountability and exclude public participation.

A rapid scan of available literature suggests that a significantly large number of mega-projects overestimate their benefits and undermine the socio-economic and environmental costs and risks.

In a study of 258 transportation mega-projects in 20 countries across five continents, Bent Flyvbjerg from Oxford



Durban expansion.
Credit: John Hone – Africa Media Online.

A significantly large number of mega-projects overestimate their benefits and undermine the socio-economic and environmental costs and risks.

University estimated that nine out of ten projects overran their costs. He noted that promoters and planners of most mega-projects appeared to provide inaccurate information about cost-benefit analysis and forecasting.

Studies also suggest that speculative mega-projects result in significant and often unintended socio-spatial, economic and environmental consequences, such as displacement.

It is argued that the ‘economic and physical scale of today’s mega-projects is such that the whole nation may be impacted in both the medium and long term by the success or failure of just one project’. In Bangalore, for example, mega-projects resulted in displacements of rural farmers and many poor urban dwellers who were pushed out of the city.

This has policy implications, says Flyvbjerg, as lawmakers, investors and the public cannot trust information about costs, benefits, and risks of large infrastructure projects produced by promoters and planners of such projects.

Port expansion activity of the Durban harbour

The port of Durban is the major gateway for exports and imports in southern Africa and contributes significantly to the country’s GDP. Recently the port has faced issues of inefficiencies and traffic congestions which have made it unable to cope with the rising demands placed on its services.

It is against this background that the Transnet Port Authority has proposed the expansion of the port. The proposed development includes transforming the Clairwood racecourse into the Logistics Park and the development of the new dig-out port. The development is all located in the South Durban Basin of eThekweni Municipality, which has one of the highest concentrations of industries and business in the city.

Protests and objections to the development

The proposed port expansions have not been immune to criticism. The KZN Department of Economic Development, Tourism and Environmental Affairs initially rejected the environmental impact assessment (EIA), arguing that the Clairwood racecourse is the last major wetland area south of the city and serves as a major habitat for birds, amphibians and other fauna and flora. The EIA was rejected based on concerns that developers and consultants involved in the EIA had given low scores to the environmental value attached to the wetlands.

At a community level there have been several protests concerning the exclusion by Transnet of community stakeholders from the decision-making process. A key concern expressed by communities is the impact of this expansion on an already serious problem of traffic congestion. They argue that more trucks, (over and above the existing heavy motor vehicle traffic in the area) will enter the area, adding to the congestion.

A key issue arising from the literature review was that of potential displacement of the existing social and economic activities as a result of mega-projects. Transnet and other developers have not clearly outlined in any publicly available documentation the scale and extent of displacement that could result from the proposed expansion.

Graham Muller Associates, who were commissioned to undertake an EIA on behalf of eThekweni Municipality, found that ‘a significant area will be displaced, compensation may require remaining areas of coastal grassland such as the racecourse in addition to significant areas outside the area. The loss of habitat associated with port development may not be replaceable in the location. It may be necessary to conserve other areas within the Municipal Area’.

Another problematic issue is [and will result in] the displacement of

16 small-scale farmers currently operating out of the former Durban International Airport site, producing affordable vegetables for neighbouring communities.

Interestingly, members of the fishing community have noted with concern the impact of the expansion on their accessibility to ‘fishing spots’ and the South Durban Community Environmental Alliance, a civic advocacy coalition, which has been championing environmental rights in the area for two decades, has stressed that the South Durban basin is one of the most polluted areas in South Africa, and posited the view that the proposed port expansions will serve only to exacerbate the problem.

Consequences

As shown in other international case studies on mega-projects, a preliminary scan of the literature indicates that proposed port expansions in Durban may follow what is known as ‘mega-project syndrome’. Several commentators have argued that the plans to build a new port may result in permanent and irreversible negative social, economic and environmental consequences for the community of South Durban.

It is noted that this paper has not explored the potential economic and other benefits of the expansion and whether the negative effects might be mitigated through careful planning

The author intends to pursue these questions in greater depth through both primary and secondary data collection and analysis. As Durban has set itself out to brand itself as the ‘most caring and liveable city’, mega-projects can both contribute to and undermine this vision. The study will seek to further explore the perceptions and attitudes of the local community towards the transformation of the Clairwood racecourse and the dig-out port.

Author: Aubrey Mpungose, master’s intern, Economic Performance and Development research programme, HSRC.

KEEPING TOURISM IN THE Western Cape competitive



Constant innovation in tourism is vital to keep this key growth sector competitive. A study by *Irma Booyens* and *Christian Rogerson* has found that although tourism establishments in the Western Cape find innovative ways to enhance their businesses, these are mainly incremental in nature and more should be done to recognise, encourage and support innovation by these establishments.

Innovation comprises new and improved ways of doing things, which translates into businesses introducing new products (or services), processes or business practices to the market. Economic theory holds that innovation boosts long-term economic growth and economic health for businesses, cities and nations.

Tourism establishments thus have to innovate and adapt constantly to stay ahead of the game or to simply survive in a highly competitive, globalised tourism economy.

Tourism is an integral component of the growing service sector in the Western Cape which collectively accounts for more than 70% of the gross geographic product and contributes significantly to employment creation in the province. Research by Christian and Jayne Rogerson of University of Johannesburg has shown that, despite the strong growth of the tourism sector over the last two decades, the performance of the Western Cape tourism economy has weakened in recent years. Innovation in the tourism sector is thus vital for enhancing the competitiveness of tourism initiatives in the Western Cape to grow the province's tourism economy.


In this study we investigated the innovation activities of tourism establishments (i.e. private businesses, not-for-profit organisations, and public entities such as museums) in the Western Cape. Our analysis is presented in two sections: the nature of innovation

in tourism establishments and the degree of novelty of the innovations; and findings on tourism innovation by category and sector.

Tendencies and novelties in innovation

Research questions centred on whether tourism establishments had made new, significantly improved or only small changes (or upgrades) to their products (or services), processes or practices, during the reference period of 2010 – 2012.

Innovation propensity refers to realised innovations or implemented changes. Up to 60% of tourism establishments were innovative because they had introduced new products, processes or practices, or made significant improvements to these during the reference period, while the other 40% merely implemented small changes (or upgrades) which are not regarded as innovation (Figure 1).



Tourism establishments thus have to innovate and adapt constantly to stay ahead of the game or to simply survive in a highly competitive, globalised tourism economy.

This said, 25% of tourism innovations can be considered as novel, since they were either new to a particular market, a first in South Africa or first in the world (Figure 2). By contrast, three-quarters of tourism innovations were merely new to the establishment and incremental and could therefore not be considered as novel.





Fig 3 Tourism innovation by category (%)



Tourism innovations by category and sector

The focus now shifts to the tourism innovation categories (or types), namely product, marketing, environmental, organisational, process, structural, and social innovations (Figure 3).

In terms of the degree of novelty per category, the most 'new' innovation activities occurred in the product category, followed by the environmental and process categories. Novel innovations in this category mostly comprised new products, processes or environmental practices; while innovations in the organisational and marketing categories were more incremental than tourism innovations since they comprised more significant improvements and upgrades than 'new' innovation activities.

Product innovations included new or significantly improved service offerings, typically in relation to attractions and

activities, accommodation, travel and transport services, and food and beverage offerings.

Marketing innovations were those with new or significantly improved marketing practices, including the uptake of e-marketing, changes in marketing strategy, rebranding, entry into new markets, and strategic alliances and product bundling for marketing purposes.

Environmental innovations refer to new or improved methods or practices around saving energy, reducing water usage, minimising waste, and contributing to conservation. Organisational innovations in tourism would include new franchising agreements, corporate restructuring, business expansion and the adoption of new and improved methods to enhance operational and administrative processes, productivity and efficiency, staff training, and health and safety.


Process innovation largely consists of new or significantly improved web-based, e-portal or other online platforms; specifically integrated management; central reservation; online booking customised ticketing; and yield and revenue management systems.

Structural innovation includes new or significantly improved collaboration and regulatory structures, networks or initiatives to maximise overall benefits to a local economy, community or destination. Typical examples are collaboration with various stakeholders to improve environmental and social sustainability practices; drive conservation and environmental practices in nature-based clusters; or market an area or destination.

Social innovation is defined as the implementation of new or significantly improved products or services, process or practice to ensure social benefits. Examples include new or significantly improved sport and skills development programmes; community outreach programmes focusing on the provision of medical care and education; route networks to stimulate tourism development and entrepreneurship in rural areas; and visitor centres highlighting social justice issues.

In terms of tourism innovation per sector, the accommodation sector has the largest number of innovative businesses (22%), followed by the attractions and activities (17%), travel and visitor services (10%), catering (6%) and transport (5%) sectors (Figure 4).

Fig 4 Innovative tourism establishments by sector (%)



The accommodation sector performed strongly in terms of environmental innovation. The attractions and activities sector had the most product innovations, as well as the most structural and social innovations.

The providers of leisure or recreational activities typically remained competitive by introducing new tourism products, while catering firms characteristically opted to open new shops (considered as an innovation if done during the reference period); innovations in this sector, however, are observed to be highly incremental. Overall, the transport sector is observed to be the least innovative.

Conclusion

This research shows that even though tourism innovation is widespread in the Western Cape and of significance for the competitiveness of tourism establishments, the nature of tourism innovation is largely incremental.

This means that tourism establishments have a higher propensity to introduce upgrades rather than innovations, and

Even though tourism innovation is widespread in the Western Cape and of significance for the competitiveness of tourism establishments, the nature of tourism innovation is largely incremental.

most innovations were new only to the establishment and not to the sector. Whilst incremental innovation creates value for individual tourism enterprises, novel innovation cumulatively enhances the competitiveness of destinations and the growth of the tourism economy as a whole.

Product, marketing and environmental innovations were widespread in tourism; and the accommodation, attraction and activities, and travel and visitor services sectors were dynamic in terms of innovation. These findings add to perspectives on innovation in tourism.

We believe that more should be done to recognise, encourage and support innovation by tourism establishments. Overall, innovation is recommended

as a focus area for policy support and further research in tourism.


Authors: Dr Irma Booyens, senior research manager, Economic Performance and Development (EPD) programme, HSRC; Prof Christian M. Rogerson, research professor, School of Tourism and Hospitality, University of Johannesburg.

The authors wish to acknowledge the financial assistance of the National Research Foundation and the School of Tourism and Hospitality at the University of Johannesburg. The figures in this article were prepared by Johann Booyens.

This article is based on a recent paper by Irma Booyens and Christian M. Rogerson in the International Journal of Tourism Research (2016), DOI: 10.1002/jtr.2071.



HISTORICAL SYMBOLS: a source of social cohesion or subjugation?



Wooden throne decorated with royal motifs such as the long two headed snake and superimposed leopards. In front of the throne is a leopard's pelt. In Mankon and the Grassfields in general, the leopard is considered to be a royal animal and is believed to be endowed with the attributes associated with the king, who it is believed may turn into a leopard at will. It is, moreover, the king's exclusive right to keep a slain leopard and retain its pelt, while the hunter's reward includes conferment of a title by the king. The animal's pelt is spread on the ground where the king's throne is placed. Apart from the king, or some sub-chiefs, no other person is allowed to use the above throne objects. Mankon Museum, Mankon, Cameroon. April 2005. (Photo by Sue Malvern).

The key functions of historical structures and artefacts are to uphold the heritage of a community, shape the community's identity, promote social cohesion, and spark conversations on societal issues. *Refilwe Mashigo* applies findings from a Cameroon study to the recent debate on historical monuments in South Africa and concludes that, for museums to play their role in serving the public, they must remain free from political control.

While most of the historical structures gracing South Africa's parks are easily and freely accessible to the public, this is not the case in the Cameroon Grassfields. In line with the government's policies to bring history and heritage closer to its people, museums in Grassfields are often erected in restricted areas, contradicting the very reason for their being.

Artefacts in Grassfields are under the control of kwifor – a secret regulatory society. According to Dr Mathias Fubah Alubafi, the siting of museums in restricted areas, such as a king's palace, induces the community to regard these artefacts as 'sacred and secret', thus impeding the learning experience of its members.

In an attempt to inform Cameroon's government of the consequences of establishing new museums in palaces, 35 participants, ranging from museum officials and government representatives to local and foreign museum visitors, were interviewed to establish the preference between public museums and museums built within kingdoms.

In assessing the case of the Grassfields museums, Alubafi argues that the community members are deprived of the opportunity to engage with their heritage through historical artefacts and structures, as is their right. Due to the location and restriction of the palace museums, Grassfields museums experienced a significant decline in the number of visits to these museums between 2009 and 2013, despite the activities undertaken to increase the numbers.

'This decline is occurring in spite of the fact that many traditional activities – such as annual dances, death celebrations, twin celebrations, periodic rituals to the ancestors and deities of the kingdom, as well as contemporary or secular rituals by community members – take place in these palaces, sometimes attracting a large population on a daily basis' (Table 1).

In contrast, South Africa's structures of historical significance, monuments placed in the public eye, are easily accessible and are consequently open to constructive criticism from members of the community.

Recent demonstrations and conversations on colonial structures in South Africa, such as the #RhodesMustFall movement, have triggered debate in society around structures and symbols that define our history. In essence, historical structures such as statues and museums exist to

inform future generations on historical events and trigger conversations on an array of societal issues and current affairs.

The #RhodesMustFall movement not only changed the narrative on colonial symbolism, education and race in South Africa, but also spread to the United Kingdom, where the statue of Cecil John Rhodes at Oriel College, Oxford University, was also brought under scrutiny. Because of the location and accessibility of both monuments, the communities were impelled to discuss their relevance in today's society.

Although the movement brought contrasting results, with the removal of the statue at the University of Cape Town, and its retention at Oriel College under a clearer historical context, it is evident that accessibility to the monuments prompted a fresh discourse on historical backgrounds and other social matters.

Table 1: Annual estimates of visitors to modern palace museums in Cameroon Grassfields

Museum	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Mankon	311	305	301	271	238	1 426
Babungo	111	109	102	98	92	512
Bandjoun	297	288	275	240	210	1 310
Baham	249	241	230	220	210	1 150

Museums in restricted areas, such as a king's palace, induces the community to regard these artefacts as 'sacred and secret', thus impeding the learning experience of its members.

Reflecting on the removal of the statue in South Africa, Advocate Sonwabile Mancotywa of the country’s National Heritage Council writes: ‘The recent protests around statues have shown us that we need to pay proper attention to the symbols of our democracy. We all need to ask what symbols could represent our societal values and can serve as an inspiration.’

Public policies, people and participation

How then have policies on heritage preservation in Cameroon Grassfields influenced its community’s lack of engagement with its heritage, cultural practices and history?

The study argues that policies on the establishment of museums in the king’s palace failed to consider the relation between the community and heritage symbols, and consequently, community members had less interest in visiting palace museums. Alubafi suggests that ‘museums should be established in community centres where greater focus is on the relation between the museum and communities rather than between the king and the museum, as is the case with the palace museums’.

Moreover, Grassfields museums are perceived as being associated with royalty and consequently ‘a site of

power relations or as an institution representing the interest of elites’. Young people and women, however, challenge this relation and question the kingdom’s claim of its dominance over historical artefacts. As a sign of protest, young people have become creative with traditional royal cups made from cow horn, engraving them with images of Bruce Lee, a Hong Kong-American film actor known for his action-packed martial arts roles.

The politics of museums and artefacts

Defying tradition and challenging the role assumed by the elite vis-à-vis the community’s heritage symbols corroborates the argument that placing museums within the king’s palace hinders social engagement on issues that could result in social change and criticisms that the kingdom cannot refute. By establishing ‘community centre museums’ – museums which are accessible and apart from kingdoms – community members begin to engage in conversations that not only expand their knowledge of their heritage or history, but also question their relevance in today’s society, as witnessed with the #RhodesMustFall movement.

So what are the avenues for changing these policies to museum access? Alubafi recommends the following:

- Public policy revisions should be effected that allow for museums to be relocated to or constructed in community centres because of their restriction-free access.
- The Cameroon legislature should revise its public policies in order for community centre museums to be constructed on communal land rather than on land owned by the king or elites. This will minimise the influence of kings, traditional elites and ‘royal eligibles’ on the facility.
- In building museums, there should be community consultations to ensure that the museums conform to communal principles and to encourage community participation and ownership of the facilities.
- Museums should adopt an inclusive approach by focusing on issues affecting the entire community, including commoners, women, the youth, elites and visitors.
- Museums in community centres should collect and display secular and entertainment arts rather than only sacred and secret art as is the case with the palace museums.

In conclusion, to foster engagement on issues of heritage and how it is interpreted by today’s generation, governments should consider establishing monuments outside areas under their control. In order to realise its wish to bring heritage to its community, Cameroon Grassfields should consider building museums that are freely accessible, under no royal or elite control and reflective of the community’s heritage, and not only the royal relics. Common spaces such as parks, town squares and libraries are areas that are welcoming and safe, and are thus the preferred spaces for monuments that will promote community involvement and reflect the culture of all those who live in it.

Author: Refilwe Mashigo, former science journalist, Research Use and Impact Assessment, Science Communication, HSRC.




A scene in the Cameroon Grassfields depicting traditional elites and ordinary members of the community quarrelling and fighting over items believed to be reserved solely for elites. In one section, an elite holding a staff or stick points a buffalo horn drinking cup to an ordinary member of the community cautioning him about his limitations on the type of objects he can use. In another section, an elite is seen fighting with an ordinary member of the community over chicken gizzard. In most of the Bamenda Grassland and in fact, the Cameroon Grassfields as a whole, the gizzard is the reserve of the most elderly and titled holders of the land. Women and youths or ordinary people are not allowed to eat it. Emmanuel's Art, Bamenda, Cameroon. May 2012. (Photo by MA Fubah).

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The Racket

A rogue reporter vs the American elite



Author:	Matt Kennard
Pub month and year:	September 2016
ISBN soft cover:	978-1-9282-4609-1
Format:	198 x 129 mm
Extent:	416 pages
Rights:	Southern African rights [Zed Books]

About the book

The rhetoric of ‘freedom and democracy for all’ has become almost synonymous with the US. However, at home its business elites have enslaved the poor and underclasses and further afield, while masquerading as a force for good in the world, the US has enslaved much of humanity in the name of progress.

In this controversial book, investigative journalist Matt Kennard takes us deep into the dark heart of American power. From the corporate state, the prison state and the state of the environment, to humanitarian intervention, the free trade fetish and the divide-and-rule of the working class, *The Racket* reveals how, no matter which side of the border we are on, we are all being conditioned to condone this modern form of slavery.

Slumming It

The Tourist Valorisation of Urban Poverty




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Rights:	Southern African rights [Zed Books]

About the book

Have slums become ‘cool’? More and more tourists from across the globe seem to think so as they discover favelas, ghettos, townships and barrios on leisurely visits. But while slum tourism often evokes moral outrage, critics rarely ask about what motivates this tourism, or what wider consequences and effects it initiates. In this provocative book, Fabian Frenzel investigates the attraction that slums have for their better-off visitors, looking at the many ways in which this curious form of attraction ignites changes both in the slums themselves and on the world stage.

Covering slums ranging from Rio de Janeiro to Bangkok, and multiple cities in South Africa, Kenya and India, *Slumming It* examines the roots and consequences of a growing phenomenon whose effects have ranged from gentrification and urban policy reform to the organisation of international development and poverty alleviation. Controversially, Frenzel argues that the rise of slum tourism has drawn attention to important global justice issues, and is far more complex than was initially acknowledged.



Price R280,00

Cricket & Conquest

The History of South African Cricket Retold
Volume 1, 1795–1914



Author:	A. Odendaal, K. Reddy, C. Merrett and J. Winch
Pub month and year:	October 2016
ISBN soft cover:	978-1-9282-4613-8
Format:	235 x 168 mm
Extent:	536 pages
Rights:	World rights


About the book

The first of its kind for any sport in South Africa: a cricket love story of epic dimensions with details which will blow readers away. *Cricket & Conquest* goes back to the beginnings 221 years ago and fundamentally revises long-established foundational narratives of early South African cricket. It reaches beyond old whites-only mainstream histories to integrate at every stage and in every region the experiences of black and women cricketers.

A purely British military game at first, cricket accompanied the process of colonial conquest every step of the way in the nineteenth century. This book and its companion volumes explain how racism came to be built into the very fabric of cricket’s ‘culture’ and ‘traditions’, and how it was uncannily tied to the broader historical processes that shaped South Africa. The unique experiences of our different cricket communities are described in ways that have not been done before. The exhaustive research and inter-connections highlighted here make this a COMPLETELY NEW general history of South African cricket.



Price R330,00 | \$25,95



RPL as Specialised Pedagogy

Crossing the lines

Author:	Linda Cooper and Alan Ralphs
Pub month and year:	September 2016
ISBN soft cover:	978-0-7969-2522-0
Format:	240 x 168mm
Extent:	176 pages
Rights:	World rights

About the book

Internationally, Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) has become a standard component of education policy reforms aimed at meeting the requirements of a globalised labour market on the one hand, while responding to demands for widening access to further and higher education on the other. However, despite the promises of RPL to enable 'optimal inclusion', this ideal is not easily realised in practice.

Drawing on case study research of RPL practices in four different contexts in South Africa, *RPL as Specialised Pedagogy: Crossing the Lines* offers a novel theoretical framework for understanding RPL not simply as an assessment practice, but as a specialised pedagogy for navigating knowledge boundaries across different contexts. The book develops a conceptual language for describing what is common and distinctive about RPL practices across different sites and contexts, thus providing a unique contribution to a field that has traditionally been under-theorised. *RPL as Specialised Pedagogy* will be of significant interest to RPL practitioners and educators, to researchers and students in the field, and to policy researchers and policy makers.

Price R280,00

Liberating Masculinities


Author:	Kopano Ratele
Pub month and year:	October 2016
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Extent:	192 pages
Rights:	World rights

About the book

Covering a range of topics, from clothes and violent death, through a better sexual life and tradition, to race and feminism, *Liberating Masculinities* presents ways to understand the contestations around masculinity and gender relations. Kopano Ratele offers both theoretically rich and psychologically insightful analyses to liberate men, as well as those who are involved in the making of men, from oppressive and injurious models of masculinity.

Kopano Ratele's *Liberating Masculinities* is a book of strengths. It combines theoretical sophistication and political engagement with a deceptively easy accessibility. It has a firm Black, African and South African location, whilst looking outwards to the world. And it rehabilitates the question of liberation within the politics of men and masculinities, and away from the notorious largely US 'men's liberation'. I warmly recommend the book.

Jeff Hearn, professor, Örebro University, Sweden; Hanken School of Economics, Finland; University of Huddersfield, UK; author of *Men of the World*.



Price R290,00 | \$17,95