

HSRC review

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TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP
Gone and forgotten?



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HOW TO CONTACT US

Pretoria

Private Bag X41, Pretoria, South Africa 0001
Tel: +27 12 302 2000 | Fax: +27 12 302 2001

Cape Town

Private Bag X9182, Cape Town, South Africa 8000
Tel: +27 21 466 8000 | Fax: +27 21 466 8001

Durban

Private Bag X07, Dalbridge, South Africa 4014
Tel: +27 31 242 5400 | Fax: +27 31 242 5401

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Editor: Ina van der Linde

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CORRESPONDENCE

Ina van der Linde
Corporate Communications
Private Bag X41
Email: media@hsrc.ac.za
Fax: +27 12 302 2028

View an electronic version on www.hsrc.ac.za

THE CEO NOTES Dr Olive Shisana



HSRC consolidates gains and charts new way forward

IMPLEMENTING A NEW STRATEGIC THRUST in an organisation is always a risky business. The key to success is first to get buy-in from staff, the governing board and key stakeholders, and secondly to make it work for the organisation on the financial and strategic levels.

The HSRC launched its 2006/07 Annual Report in October – a year since the HSRC re-focused its strategy introduced in August 2005. Among the many aspects that stand out from the Annual Report is the fact that the organisation is financially sound. Also, our strategic direction is paying dividends in terms of research excellence, research implementation strategy, our policy work and our public-purpose research activities.

In *striving for excellence*, measured in terms of the number of articles per researcher published in internationally accredited journals, the organisation has done exceptionally well. Our total publication output during this period reached a record of 1.11 per senior researcher, as against a target of 0.85. Of the articles from the top ten researchers, three were women and six were black, shattering the myth that representivity in the staff profile undermines quality and standards, and bucking the documented South African trend whereby the most productive researchers are white and male. We now need to raise the bar higher than 1.11.

In terms of our *policy work*, the creation of policy deliberation and policy implementation networks is a key strategy to support evidence-informed policy processes. Some of the policy work, undertaken by the Policy Analysis unit (PAU), includes the coordination of research, undertaking of analytical work, and convening of policy dialogues between and among policy-makers, policy-users, social-science researchers, national and international subject experts, and other stakeholders.

PAU is playing a leading role in the creation of a representative network of actors in the interface between social-science research and role-players in the shaping of policy under the auspices of the South African National Commission for UNESCO, constituted as the Management of Social Transformation (MOST) National Liaison Committee for South Africa. The focus of the MOST programme is on building efficient bridges between social-science research, policy and practice, promoting a culture of evidence-informed policy-making and cross-sector policy dialogues on issues of national, regional and international priorities.

In the same vein, researchers are expected to bring multiple agencies and groups together to work collectively in implementation networks to achieve the envisioned research objectives. Examples include the Youth Policy Initiative, which has formed relationships with the Presidency, the Youth Commission, the Umsobomvu Youth Fund, and the Departments of Social Development and Health; and the Employment, Growth and Development Network, with a working group of experts as partners, including government officials, trade unions, and business leaders.

There is an abundance of examples of our *public-purpose research work* in the annual report. To mention but a few, a project on slum-free cities assessed the impact of policies, strategies and activities being implemented in South Africa to reach the Millennium Development Goal Target 11, Goal 6, on action against slums. The study confirmed the successful South African effort in the field of housing delivery, but noted that slums continue to proliferate and that the housing policy needs to take into account the practical requirements for families receiving subsidised houses to keep their new asset so they can use housing as a platform for saving.

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NewsRoundup

PROGRAMME TO GROW OWN CROP OF YOUNG RESEARCHERS

A new researcher development programme at the HSRC, commemorating the international award-winning writer, Es'kia Mphahlele, was launched on Friday, 26 October.

The director of the Capacity Development unit at the HSRC and coordinator of researcher development, Professor Mukole Kongolo, said the programme was named after Es'kia Mphahlele because of his reputation as the quintessential teacher and tireless fighter for the revival of African consciousness. The programme is devised to accelerate capacity development at the HSRC and to contribute to national efforts to grow researchers.

'As a public institution, the HSRC would like to make a contribution in the development of a pool of scientists by offering them cutting-edge opportunities that are rarely available in similar organisations. The main focus is on previously disadvantaged groups as defined by the Employment Equity Act.

'Through this programme we would like to carry our mandate to contribute to a broader transformation of the South African society by developing a cadre of well-developed scientists who can take positions in research environments with ease and assume leadership positions,' he said.



Mr. Tshumu Mongane from the HSRC's Policy Analysis unit (left) and Professor Lesibana Rafapa (right), a senior lecturer and head of the English Department at the University of Venda. Rafapa was the guest speaker at the announcement of the Es'kia Mphahlele Researcher Development programme.

Kongolo believes capacity development is needed at many levels in research and development institutions – ranging from the individual to the national levels. 'Recent preoccupation with economic policies, institutions and markets has somehow diverted attention from the critical middle level of institutions. This has been an unfortunate situation because sustained development efforts depend on effective research and development institutions.'

Institutional capacity development initiatives need to be well planned in order to improve those capacities that most severely hamper institutions' performance levels. And this is exactly what the capacity development programme at the HSRC is aiming to achieve, says Kongolo.

NEW @ HSRC



PROF. ARVIN BHANA, a research director in the Child, Youth, Family and Social Development (CYFSD) programme, has been promoted to deputy executive director in the same programme.



PROF. THOBEKA MDA, former dean of the Faculty of Education at Unisa, has been appointed as deputy executive director of the Education, Science and Skills Development (ESSD) research programme.



DR NOLUTHO DIKO, former assistant professor in the Department of Educational Studies at Ball State University, US, has been appointed as a senior research specialist in the Education, Science and Skills Development (ESSD) programme. She has also taught in the Department of African Languages and Literatures at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, US.



DR SAADHNA PANDAY, a research specialist in CYFSD, has been promoted to the position of senior research specialist in the same programme.



DR OMANO EDIGHEJI has been appointed as a research director in the Policy Analysis unit. Before joining the HSRC, he was a research manager at the Johannesburg-based policy think tank, the Centre for Policy.



PROF. LEICKNESS SIMBAYI, a research director in the Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS and Health research programme at the HSRC has been appointed as deputy executive director of the same programme.



DR ADRIAN HADLAND, a chief research specialist in the HSRC's Democracy and Governance (D&G) programme, has been promoted to research management director in the same programme.



DR PEARL SITHOLE, a research specialist in D&G, has been promoted to the position of senior research specialist in the same programme.

NewsRoundup

HSRC ANNUAL REPORT 2006/07: CLEAN AUDIT AND RECORD TURNOVER

For the seventh consecutive year the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) attained an unqualified audit from the Auditor-General for the 2006/07 financial year. The HSRC also achieved the highest financial turnover in its history, namely an amount of R247.8 million, partly due to the increased allocation from government, which for the first time since 2000 is approaching parity with revenue from external sources of funding.

The organisation has continued to manage its cash flow better by accelerating collection from trade and other receivables since the 2005/06 financial year. In addition, the volume of trade and other receivables has grown from 2005/06 to 2006/07 from R113.8 million to R124.6 million, indicating an increase in external income.



Science and Technology Minister Mosibudi Mangena and Dr Olive Shisana deep in conversation at the function for the launch of the HSRC's 2006/07 Annual Report in Pretoria on 23 October.



Dr Laetitia Rispel, executive director of the Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS and Health programme with Dr Udesh Pillay, executive director of the Urban, Rural and Economic Development programme at the launch of the HSRC's 2006/07 Annual Report.

▶ A project aimed at improving the capacity to enhance monitoring and evaluation of HIV and AIDS by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the US Presidential Emergency Programme for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The overall goal of the project is to develop capacity to generate objective, verifiable and replicable HIV and AIDS-related data to support South Africa's efforts in the prevention, treatment and care of the epidemic. This project is a massive undertaking and covers strategic information, prevention of mother-to-child transmission, medical transmission and the prevention of the further spread of the virus by people living with HIV (HIV positive prevention).

The aforementioned project is a follow-up of the groundbreaking 2002 and 2005 studies on HIV and AIDS prevalence, attitudes and behaviour, undertaken and coordinated by the HSRC. Results from these studies, contribute to the government's HIV, AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa 2007–2011.

And work done on employment and economic growth through an employment-scenarios project is providing critical insights on how best to address unemployment, ensure growth and reduce poverty. This is the HSRC's contribution to finding evidenced-based solutions to South Africa's job crisis.

The HSRC faces the future with determination and resolve to contribute to finding science-based solutions to the grand social challenges facing South Africa.

For the full report, go to www.hsrc.ac.za

SADC PARLIAMENT TAKES NOTE OF HSRC'S HIV RESEARCH

Professor Linda Richter, executive director of the HSRC's Child, Youth, Family and Social Development (CYFSD) programme, addressed the 23rd plenary assembly of the Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum on the impact of HIV and AIDS on children, youth and families. The assembly met from 17–26 October in Blantyre, Malawi. Dr Zitha Mokomane and Ms Heidi van Rooyen addressed the Regional Women's Caucus and the HIV/AIDS Committee during the working meetings before the opening of the plenary.

In a statement, the assembly says it notes with concern that children living with HIV/AIDS comprise 6% of all people living with the virus and child deaths currently stand at 16% of all AIDS mortality. The assembly concluded that 'addressing the plight of children affected and infected by AIDS should be treated as an urgent priority'.

The assembly also says in the statement that the prevention of infections among adults would have a preventative effect on children. And gender inequalities, negative attitudes and stereotypes are of particular concern since they significantly increase the vulnerability of young women to HIV and AIDS. It recommended the improvement of access to voluntary counselling and testing for young adolescents.

In the statement, the assembly says 90% of mother-to-child transmission of the virus can be prevented and called for 'the urgent improvement in access to PMTCT programmes'. It also called for HIV testing of infants, treatment for mothers and children, and family-based approaches to address the epidemic.

Says Richter: 'I am absolutely delighted that our work and reflections were so well received.'

CYFSD has also received an invitation to address the Pan-African Parliament on the same issue next year.

Child pornography in the age of the internet

A study, the first of its kind, investigated the extent of the manufacture and distribution of child pornography in South Africa, the number of criminal cases in which child pornography played a role, and whether it is possible to establish profiles of perpetrators and children who are vulnerable to this form of exploitation. ADVAITA GOVENDER explains the findings.

THE STUDY, commissioned by the Film and Publication Board of South Africa, looked at the number of criminal cases in which child pornography played a role, and whether it is possible to establish profiles of perpetrators and children who are vulnerable to this form of exploitation.

It was prompted by the new Film and Publications Act which criminalises the production, distribution and possession of child sexual abuse images – commonly referred to as ‘child pornography’, and by increasing concerns regarding the multiplication of child abuse images on the internet and the potential for abuse of children through this medium and through cell phones.

This is a complex field of study since internet child abuse is a recent phenomenon, research data is limited, and the extent of the problem in South Africa is not known and may never be known. Also, no studies have been conducted in South Africa before. For this reason, desk reviews were undertaken, complemented by key informant interviews with members of the South African Police Service and the National Prosecuting Authority, internet service providers and child protection organisations. A consultation was also held with specialists from the UK, including child protection police and academics.

However, some estimates claim that there are more than 1 million child sexual abuse images available on the internet and this figure is escalating. The internet has made it much easier to distribute these images and for ‘communities’ of users to form. It has

...some estimates claim that there are more than 1 million child sexual abuse images available on the internet and this figure is escalating



also made it possible for perpetrators to enter child chat rooms to groom children for abusive acts.

The number of reported child pornography cases in South Africa is also unknown because sexual offence data is not disaggregated by type of crime. The study estimated that fewer than 20 cases of persons possessing, manufacturing or distributing images have been investigated in SA over the past 5 years.

There is no profile of children who are vulnerable to this form of abuse. However, there is some indication that those most likely to be involved in the production of images are children who have an established relationship with the abuser and who do not have adequate supervision, and children with internet and high-end mobile phones (for example, requests from adults to produce pornographic images of themselves or to meet the perpetrator).

Children may be vulnerable when relations with their parents are strained; if they have low self-esteem and if internet use is unsupervised. As the technology is expensive,

far more children are vulnerable to sexual abuse without the use of electronic media. However, as schools obtain greater access to the internet, the proportions may change.

Offender profiles are not reliable. In some cases they may fit the criteria for paedophilia (a small minority of perpetrators). Even these perpetrators may mask their offending behaviour as they are likely to have appropriate adult sexual relationships, hold jobs and otherwise blend into society. One characteristic is that they often take a great interest in children – but so do many others who are not perpetrators.

Among the key recommendations were the following:

- Policing and prosecutorial teams need specialised technological skills to investigate offences, and they need ongoing training;
- Sexual offence statistics must be disaggregated to determine the extent of possession and production of child pornography;
- Computers and mobile phones must have filtering software and parents must be aware of potential dangers;
- Internet service provider's should be obliged to report clients who download and/or distribute child abuse images. ●

Advaita Govender is an intern in the HSRC's Child, Youth, Family and Social Development programme.



Sexual dis-orientation?

How can we make the sexual education system in South Africa more effective in curbing teenage pregnancy in schools, ask MONDE MAKIWANE and LAUREN DANIEL.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION DEPARTMENT released statistics last year indicating that teenage pregnancy in our country remains a worrying problem. A report (Mail & Guardian Online), written by ex-teacher and HIV educator Joan Dommisse, stated that 1 748 teenaged girls were reported pregnant in the Free State last year, 5 000 in the Limpopo area, 5 868 pupils in KwaZulu-Natal, and around 2 550 girls over a two year period in the Gauteng Province. The UN (2000) reported 66 pregnancies in every 1 000 teenage girls in one calendar year, across the country.

The National Education Department injects

millions of rand annually into improving sexual education through Life Orientation classes, concerned with the personal, social, intellectual, emotional, spiritual, motor and physical growth and development of learners. The subject includes modules providing teenagers with sexual education and HIV and AIDS awareness. However, students and councillors interviewed for this article say the education system's method of teaching teenagers about sexual education is failing.

As a councillor who works closely with teenagers in distress at different high schools in Cape Town, Deidré Railoun has ample experience in teaching sexual education and

HIV and AIDS awareness. 'The key question is whether the programmes are achieving their purpose at all. Their purpose is not to lower the rate of teenage pregnancy, but rather to make the youth aware of HIV and AIDS and the precautions they need to take in order to not become HIV positive. I don't believe these programmes are accomplishing their ultimate purpose,' [that is, to lower the HIV rate in youth across the country]... 'so how could they contribute to the lowering of teenage pregnancies?'

Railoun's concern is that the sexual education curriculum taught in schools adopts the stance that it is okay to have sex before



...students and councillors interviewed for this article say the education system's method of teaching teenagers about sexual education is failing



marriage, provided one takes the necessary precautions. 'What they are not being told is that condoms are not fully effective, and sex equals a baby'.

Monde Makiwane, one of the authors of this article, defends the education system in South Africa, saying that they have made

knowledge readily available, '...but it is not always translating into behaviour. The youth need more than knowledge, more than facts. They need to be instilled with values, ambitions and self-governance. They need to know that they control the outcomes of their lives.'

He says research HSRC shows that around 50% of teenage boys are now making use of condoms. However, they do not use condoms with every sexual act, saying that they had often 'acted in the heat of the moment'.

Railoun agrees with this finding. She says the youth still believe HIV or falling pregnant would never happen to them and the programmes are failing to make the problems at hand real to the youth, be it teenage pregnancy or HIV and AIDS.

According to Makiwane, other factors leading to teenage pregnancy are living in an impoverished area and coming from a broken household. His research has shown that girls from poorer families, from broken homes, or whose parents are working, seem to have contributed to the breakdown of value systems in the home. Makiwane says more civil society organisations, whether faith or non-faith-based, should be created and supported to assist teenagers and to take some of the burden off the government and struggling families.

Adrian Lange is the acting principle of the School of Hope in Athlone on the Cape Flats, an area notoriously associated with gang violence and drug abuse. The school provides education to learners, from grade 9 to 12, who have missed out on education due to circumstance such as drug abuse or family issues. He claims apartheid townships for 'non-whites', created far from economic centres, and migrant labour are two reasons for the rise in teenage pregnancies and the epidemic of HIV and AIDS facing us in this country.

Christeline Carolus, a Life Orientation and English teacher at the School of Hope has observed that in some government schools the teachers merely skim over the curriculum, not paying enough attention to engaging the youth in discussion surrounding sexual education. 'The success of the curriculum has to do with how the subject is taught. Most educators just teach the bare minimum.'

She has been personally accompanying pregnant girls at the school to clinics and providing the necessary contingency plans to ensure the girls still attend school. She is adamant that government schools should

not be sending girls away if they fall pregnant. 'It is important that we keep these girls in school, or they sit at home with nothing to do, when they could be learning,' she says.

Geordie Scholtz (19), whose first sexual encounter was extremely violent and has led to drug abuse and a promiscuous life style, is one of the girls who have benefited from the school's alternative methods. She has a baby of a year old. 'The school is a lot more lenient than the schools my friends attend. I have many pregnant friends. I am allowed to take my baby to the doctor when she gets sick, I just need a certificate.'

She is dismayed that sexual education in the classroom provides access to condoms and other contraceptives. 'They are giving us the permission to have sex by making the condoms available.' Her emphatic stance is that educators should be teaching abstinence to the youth, not correct condom usage. Scholtz confides that girls as young as eleven are engaging in risky sexual behaviour in her neighbourhood. 'It's a disgrace.'

A recently released study by the HSRC found no evidence to suggest that teenage girls are deliberately falling pregnant in order to receive the Child Support Grant, as is often believed. However, Shereen Gorvalla, director at Leliebloom House, a centre for children from high risk backgrounds, has seen otherwise. 'I do know that in some communities, like Elsie's River and Delft, girls choose to fall pregnant as a means to getting the grant. Some girls fall pregnant by drug and gang lords who will then encourage them to go for the extra money given by the state,' she says.

The Makiwane et al. (2007) report suggests that this is not a widespread phenomena, as only 20% of teens who bear children are beneficiaries of the Child Support Grant.

From the opinions expressed in this article, the government has options when it comes to improving the ways sexual education is taught within schools. Factors which contribute to high teenage fertility rate in South Africa are complex. There are many interventions that can be tried to improve existing programmes, without resorting to out-dated punitive measures, which in many cases also punish the children who never asked to be born. ●

Dr Monde Makiwane, is a senior research specialist at the HSRC's Child, Youth, Family and Social Development programme, and Lauren Daniel is a master's student at UCT.

No evidence of a dependency culture in South Africa

A worrying discourse has begun to infiltrate public opinion on social security in South Africa in recent years, particularly prevalent in debates about the future of social grants, linking reliance on social grants with the emergence of a 'dependency culture'. But, say MICHAEL NOBLE and PHAKAMA NTSHONGWANA, a study has shown that there is no evidence that social grants generate a culture of dependency.

THE ROOTS OF THIS DEBATE go back many centuries to notions of the 'undeserving poor' entrenched in pre-welfare state Britain. However, the more recent roots are to be found in neo-liberal thought which emerged in the 1980s, particularly in the US, spreading to any state which offers cash transfers as part of its anti-poverty armoury and which has concerns that expenditure on state transfers is becoming a strain on the national fiscus.

It is a disingenuous thesis. Its starting point is that the poor are responsible for their own poverty and are inherently indolent, preferring to rely on state support than entering the labour market. It ignores the role social grants can play in restoring dignity to the unemployed and in helping place the unemployed in a better position to seek employment. Worst of all it flies in the face of evidence that the unemployed, far from being feckless, have a strong attachment to the labour market, and would much prefer the opportunity to support themselves through paid work if the opportunity presents itself.

Though the spectre of the 'dependency culture' is most commonly raised by right-wing opponents of states espousing social democratic values in the northern hemisphere, its proponents have found sympathetic ears in South Africa. Often we hear it said that in South Africa social grants foster dependency and that people should be given a 'hand-up' not a 'hand-out'.

The view is often taken that a social safety net in the form of grants is anti-development, and is even antipathetic to home-grown anti-poverty solutions. This is far from the truth – to be opposed to social grants for the unemployed, is to be aligned with western neo-liberals found in anglo-saxon states such as the US and to a lesser degree the UK.

Research from developed countries which do provide a social security safety net has shown no evidence of a dependency culture. But what about the situation in South Africa?

Though South Africa's social grant system is becoming more comprehensive due to the expansion of the Child Support Grant (CSG), a big hole in the social safety net remains in the form of lack of support for healthy, unemployed people of working age. Denied unemployment insurance, because most of them have never been formally employed, there are persuasive arguments for providing a social grant for this group as it would be an important plank of any anti-poverty strategy and serve as a bridge until sufficient employment opportunities became available.

However, issues of affordability notwithstanding, those opposed to extending the social grant system may still raise the arguments of 'dependency' as one of the reasons not to. The Centre for the Analysis of South African Social Policy (CASASP) at the University of Oxford and the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) consequently collaborated on research to look



for evidence for the existence of a 'dependency culture' within South Africa.

Using a specially designed module in the HSRC's South African Social Attitudes Survey 2006, some hard facts emerge which demonstrate a very positive orientation of both the unemployed and existing social grant recipients towards work; general support for an extension to the social security system to provide support for the unemployed; and, importantly, no evidence that social grants generate a culture of dependency.



In the first instance we examined the extent to which paid work conferred dignity on those in employment. In response to the statement 'A person has to have a job to have dignity', two-thirds of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed.

We might expect that those without jobs could have adapted to their circumstances and might hold differing views about the importance of work. However, when asked to comment on the proposition that 'I feel alright about being out of work because so

many other people are out of work too', those not in paid work overwhelmingly disagreed.

Interestingly poor people appeared to demonstrate a greater attachment to the labour market than non-poor people: 82% of poor people stated that it was important to hang on to a job even if they didn't like it. And relatively few poor people would leave a job they didn't like unless they had another job to go to. Overall, two-thirds of respondents disagreed or disagreed strongly with the statement 'If I did not like a job, I would leave, even if there were no other job to go to'.

Over 70% of the population considered work to be the 'normal thing to do' and 66% thought work helped overcome feelings of isolation. This social integration role of work was stressed most by black Africans, among whom nearly 69% agreed or strongly agreed that work gave them a sense of belonging to the community compared to only 57% of white respondents.

When asked what was the greatest obstacle to finding jobs, around 60% cited 'no/few jobs available'. Although this is a 'demand side' factor which will require macro-economic policy shifts to take effect, some of the other reasons cited are 'supply side' and give pointers to other possible interventions. e.g. 21% gave 'not enough qualifications' and 12% gave 'not enough relevant experience' as reasons for not getting a job. The data suggest that there was a great willingness to train to get the necessary skills. Looking at just the unemployed population, over 80% of black African respondents said that they would be very or quite willing to move to find work, compared to around 50% of other unemployed respondents.

We found widespread support for extending the cover of the social assistance scheme to unemployed people: 84% of poor people agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition that 'People who can't get work deserve help in the form of social grants'. Support was weakest among the 'non poor' (66%) but still there was a clear majority in favour, and 79% of unemployed respondents supported the proposition.

There was also general agreement about the need for government to spend more money on social grants for the poor even if it means higher taxes: just under 72% of respondents whose households are currently receiving grants agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition, compared to almost 63% of

those in work and almost 60% of the 'non poor' group.

In order to explore general attitudes to social grants we asked all respondents about their view of whether claimants were 'deserving'. In response to the statement: 'Most people on social grants desperately need the help', poor and non poor people, all population groups, and both those working and not working, overwhelmingly supported this view.

There has been some speculation that the CSG discourages work seeking among the recipients, even though this grant is for children and is set at R200 per month. We asked respondents whether the CSG is too high and discourages job seeking – only 13% of the 'poor' and 17% of the 'non poor' either agreed or strongly agreed. On the other hand 71% of all respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed, ranging from 77% ('poor') to 65% ('non poor'). The responses of those whose households were in receipt of CSG were not significantly different from households where no CSG was in payment.

We asked unemployed respondents whether they consider themselves better off claiming grants than working: three-quarters rejected the assertion that it is not worth them working. These data, therefore, provide little evidence of the existence of a 'dependency culture' among the workless.

These research findings refute the notion of a dependency culture among South Africans who live in households that receive grants. There was neither support for the proposition that receipt of CSG discourages people from finding work nor that people felt better off claiming grants than working. It was evident that the attitudes of the poor and those receiving grants were very similar to those of other respondents, and all respondents demonstrated a strong commitment to work. The most important factors in reducing people's chances of finding employment were perceived to be linked to the structural conditions of the labour market and the wider economy rather than the motivational characteristics of the unemployed and the arrangements of the grant system. ●

Michael Noble is professor of Social Policy and director of the Centre for the Analysis of South African Social Policy at the University of Oxford, and HSRC honorary fellow. Phakama Ntshongwana is a research officer at the Centre for the Analysis of South African Social Policy, University of Oxford.



Traditional leadership Gone and forgotten?

The debate about the relevance of traditional leadership and governance has displayed the glaring absence of factual information so sorely needed to inform public policy with regard to the role of this institution. Fortunately, writes YAW AMOATENG, new evidence has emerged that could further inform discussions on this topic.

THIS INFORMATION is contained in the 2005 South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Questions on this topic were included in a much broader South African Attitudes Survey, and although it does not provide all the answers, it certainly provides a basis for more such empirical studies on whether the institution of traditional leadership is still relevant in twenty-first century South Africa.

This is all the more important in view of the fact that interrogation of the data has served to debunk several of the myths that have led to the previously inescapable conclusion that traditional leadership has outlived its usefulness and as such must be consigned to the dustbin of history.

Specifically, the survey ascertains the public's opinions and attitudes towards several issues and institutions in the country, including the four levels of governance,

namely national, provincial and local government on one hand, and traditional authorities on the other.

This is pertinent to the debate on traditional leadership, which essentially revolves around the question as to whether traditional governance is compatible with the ethos of liberal democracy which underpins the country's Constitution. The detractors of traditional leadership have suggested that *participation* under traditional governance is

Figure 1: Level of trust in traditional authorities by gender and residence




Figure 2: Trust in traditional authorities by age





Figure 3: Satisfaction with access to municipal officials



limited to a few, especially older males, in the polity. In other words, in the distribution of societal resources under traditional governance, the youth and women are discriminated against.

According to this line of thinking the institution of traditional leadership is sustained by the idiocy of rural life which is essentially patriarchal. This survey shows that the resilience of traditional leadership may be due to the institution's flexibility with regard to change, and the increasing rate at which chiefs and their retainers are being educated.

Such changes may have largely contributed to the transforming attitudes towards the institution. For example, the study showed that in the minds of black Africans there is no distinction between traditional authorities and local government, while they perceive the provincial and national governments as representing one structure. With the exception of the Eastern and Northern Cape Provinces, the level of trust in traditional authorities was higher than that for local government, with the level of trust ranging from 52% in the Eastern Cape to 68% in Limpopo.

Even in the Western Cape and Gauteng, where there are no traditional authority structures, the level of trust in traditional authorities was 44% and 41% respectively; in fact, in the Western Cape the level of trust in traditional authorities was higher than that in both provincial and national governments, a situation which could be reflecting in-migration from traditional authority provinces into two of the country's economically dominant provinces.

In terms of rural/urban residence, while the level of trust in traditional authorities was expectedly higher among rural residents, slightly more than four out of every ten urban residents trusted traditional authorities.

Table 1: Relationship between province and trust in levels of governance in South Africa

Level of governance	Province (%)									
	WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GT	MP	LP	Total
Traditional authority	44	52	25	63	64	59	41	63	68	57
Local government	24	80	42	54	53	52	39	59	48	53
Provincial government	36	86	50	73	74	64	50	71	71	67
National government	37	95	72	74	74	77	67	78	72	76

Source: 2005 South African Social Attitudes Survey

And most significantly, there were no gender differences with regard to the level of trust in traditional authorities among either urban or rural residents.

As far as age is concerned, even though persons aged 50 years and over were more likely to trust traditional authorities (65%), significantly, almost six out of ten (55%) young adults, aged between 16 and 24, said they trusted traditional authorities; interestingly, young adults' level of trust in traditional authorities exceeded those of the middle generations.

In short, what the survey shows is the resilience of the institution of traditional leadership and hence the reality of the dual nature of the institutional culture in the country. The fact that there was more trust in traditional authorities than local government is significant in the light of the historical claim by traditional leaders that 'they are the local government'.

In fact, in a related question about 'satisfaction with access to municipal officials', while almost six out of ten (56%) urban residents said they were satisfied with access to municipal officials, less than one out of five rural residents (16%) said they were satisfied.

...what the survey shows is the resilience of the institution of traditional leadership and hence the reality of the dual nature of the institutional culture in the country



This information is hardly surprising in view of all the service delivery protests we have witnessed in recent months.

It would be helpful if our intellectual energies were employed in generating the sort of factual knowledge to help identify a model that would accommodate traditional governance in both the design and implementation of policies and programmes that seek to address the needs of the ordinary citizenry. ●

Professor Yaw Amoateng is a research director in the HSRC's Child, Youth, Family and Social Development programme. He is currently leading a project on Dynastic Families in Africa and consulting for the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa on a project to harness traditional governance for service delivery in southern Africa.

FLOORING THE CROSS?

Since 2003, the HSRC has annually conducted the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), asking a nationally representative sample of people aged 16 and older their views on, among other things, whether elected representatives should resign when they change parties.

BEN ROBERTS analyses the findings.

THE SEPTEMBER floor-crossing season is over, and political parties and analysts again had a field day, reinvigorating the debate on whether the floor-crossing legislation should be abolished.

But how do the constituents feel about the fact that the councillors, members of provincial legislatures (MPLs) and members of parliament (MPs) whom they have elected can walk over to a political party whose policies they do not support?

The SASAS data present an opportunity to study some of the predictions and critical sentiments levelled at the practice of floor-crossing. And particularly the view that it is undemocratic, since it distorts and undermines the interests of voters as expressed through democratic elections.

Over the four-year period from 2003-2006, between two-thirds and slightly more than three-quarters of the sample agreed with the view that elected politicians should resign when they change office (FIG 1). In addition, opposition to floor-crossing appears to be exhibiting a distinct upward trend, rising from 68% in late 2003 to 77% in late 2006.

Disapproval of floor-crossing has increased among all population groups, though to varying degrees (Figure 1). In 2003, the black African population was the most opposed (71%) to floor-crossing. There has been a small increase in aversion since then, with approximately three-quarters of this group voicing their disapproval by late 2006.

By contrast, the coloured population was largely unsure of floor-crossing in 2003 (with 51% declaring their disapproval and 19% undecided). There has nonetheless been a groundswell in opposition since (from 51% in 2003 to 79% in 2006). A similar trend is exhibited by white and Indian population groups, with opposition to floor-crossing rising from 63% to 87% over the period for the former, and from 63% to 80% for the latter.

With regard to party support, about three-quarters of ANC supporters express

disapproval towards floor-crossing, a figure that has remained reasonably constant over the period (Figure 2). Attitudes among Democratic Alliance (DA) supporters have fluctuated between 70% and 82% over the four years, while those aligned towards the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the Independent Democrats (ID) have become swiftly and resolutely disapproving of floor-crossing.

The inclusion of the New National Party may appear erroneous, but some respondents still list it as their party of choice, despite its dissolution and merger with the ANC in 2005. This group also expressed deep-seated and escalating concerns about the floor-crossing regime. Collectively, between 76% and 79% of supporters of the other smaller parties do not support the legislation.

Gender differences appear to be relatively insignificant over the period, with men and women almost equally averse to the notion of floor-crossing. A similar result is found in respect of age, with attitudes to floor-crossing for younger cohorts approximating those of older cohorts. All age groups generally demonstrate growing resistance, ranging in a 63% to 82% band over the four years.

As anticipated, there has been a dramatic upsurge in antipathy towards floor-crossing among the public in the two provinces that have been most affected during the window periods, namely, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. Through the practice of floor-crossing, the ANC assumed governance of the Western Cape for the first time, while making salient gains in representation relative to the IFP and DA in KwaZulu-Natal. Over the four survey rounds, opposition to floor-crossing rose 30 percentage points in KwaZulu-Natal (from 60% to 90%) and 28 percentage points in the Western Cape (from 57% to 85%).

In the other seven provinces, opposition to floor-crossing in 2006 ranged from 63% in Mpumalanga to 80% in the Eastern Cape. Declining opposition to floor-crossing is

evident among residents of Mpumalanga and the Free State, which may be related to the strong ANC support base in these provinces.

One issue often raised by political analysts in relation to the floor-crossing debate is the notion that it poses challenges for the health of our democracy. Examples include adverse influences on voter turnout, trust in Parliament and faith in politicians. Although empirical evidence to support these assertions still remains relatively limited, the SASAS data provide preliminary insight into the impact that floor-crossing is having on the attitudes of the voting public.


With regard to voter intention, the percentage of South Africans older than 18 indicating that they would not vote if there were a national election tomorrow has increased in recent years for both those opposed to and approving of floor-crossing.

Between 2004 and 2006, the percent indicating they would not vote more than doubled for those that disapprove of floor-crossing (from 6% to 13%), while the figure rose by two-thirds for supporters of the legislation (from 6% to 10%). More importantly, the gap in levels of apathy between the two groups has widened, from 0.2 percentage points in 2004 to three percentage points in 2006. While this difference should not be overexaggerated, it is significant in suggesting that floor-crossing is beginning to fuel voter apathy.

As for trust in Parliament, the results remain more inconclusive. Since 2004, trust in the institution has deteriorated for opposers to floor-crossing. Yet, the same trend is characteristic of supporters of floor-crossing between 2003 and 2005, to the extent that the levels of trust are virtually indistinguishable. The gap in levels of trust in Parliament narrowed consistently from 2003 to 2005. However, the 2006 results are substantively different, with parliamentary trust notably higher for supporters than detractors (67% versus 54%). We will have to wait to see whether this new pattern persists.



Figure 1: Disapproval of floor-crossing by population group, 2003–2006 (%)




Finally, with regard to satisfaction with democracy, the trendlines for both floor-crossing supporters and detractors have again been moving in the same direction (Figure 3). For both groups, we observe a discernible decline in satisfaction since 2004. However, those who disapprove of floor-crossing tend to be consistently less satisfied than those that voice support. Floor-crossing therefore does appear to have a modest dampening effect on confidence in democracy.

At a discussion on electoral democracy in October, ANC spokesperson Smuts Ngonyama asserted: ‘Let the people speak... A general consensus position must be reached. If the majority of people say they don’t want floor-crossing. [The] ANC is not married to any floor-crossing’ (IOL, 10.10.2007).

Judging by the overwhelming and mounting disaffection towards floor-crossing, it would seem that the people have decisively spoken. Although this aversion is demonstrably higher in provinces most affected by the outcomes of the floor-crossing windows, disapproval of the legislation is widely shared across population groups, party affiliation and age groups. A failure to respond to this demand is likely to further enhance the risk of voter apathy and alienation among parts of the electorate. Therefore, in adherence with the Freedom Charter’s vision that ‘The People Shall Govern’, it is hoped that


Figure 2: Disapproval of floor-crossing by party affiliation, 2003–2006 (%)



political parties will reflect on the empirical observations reported above as they continue to engage each other on options pertaining to the future of floor-crossing. ●

Ben Roberts is a research specialist in the Urban, Rural and Economic Development research programme.

Figure 3: Satisfaction with democracy, by support of floor-crossing (%)



The numbers game

Public support for sports quotas


After the euphoria of the Springboks' victorious return from the 2007 Rugby World Cup has died down, there is still serious discontent with the pace and process of transformation in sport, but also much division on the desirability of sports quotas as a means to fast-track transformation. JARÈ STRUWIG and BEN ROBERTS analyse the results from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) on this issue.

THE RESULTS FROM THE SURVEY indicate that over the four-year period from 2003–2006, a slim majority of the population favours racial quotas in national sports teams. However, there are strong racial disparities in the level of support, with the black African population more than four times as supportive as the white population.

Politicians have openly stated that the representativeness of South African teams is more important than victories, and that transformation should be sped up even if this undermines the ability to be successful at international level. The other view is that the highly controversial system of sport quotas will undermine the nation-building capacity of sport and also that it is detrimental to the ability of teams to compete successfully.

As can be seen in Figure 1, the percentage of South Africans aged 16 and older who agreed that there should be racial quotas in national sports teams stood at 55% in late 2006. Between 2003 and 2004, levels of support dropped, after which it seems to have fluctuated within a narrow band.

Figure 1: Percentage of South Africans aged 16 and older that support racial quotas in national sports teams




We can only speculate at this stage about possible explanations for the decline in support between 2003 and 2004. It may have had something to do with the relatively poor performance of our national teams in the 2003 cricket and rugby world cups. It is also quite likely to reflect the public debate on quotas that ensued for most of 2004. Highlights of this debate included SA Rugby Football Union (SARFU) president Brian van Rooyen's campaign for scrapping the quota system in rugby, as well as ANC Secretary General Kgalema Motlanthe's firm defence of race quotas in sport in contrast to Sports Minister Makhenkesi Stofile's announcement that they were no longer required.

Turning attention to population group differences, we can immediately observe that support for sports quotas has consistently been the highest among the black African population group and the lowest among the white population (see Figure 2). In late 2006, the gap between the groups could not have been starker, with 63% of black African people voicing support for the quota system, compared to the rather dismal 14% among the white population.

Despite this attitudinal gulf, it is nonetheless important to underscore that declining support has occurred for both groups over the interval. Support among the black African population reflects the national picture, with a discernible drop in support between 2003 and 2004, followed by more subtle fluctuations thereafter. For the white population, there has been a continuous, gradual erosion of support, dropping from approximately a quarter of the group in 2003 to less than one in seven in 2006.

Figure 2: Percentage that supports racial quotas in national sports teams, by population group



For both the coloured and Indian population groups, the results are more ambiguous. Although there was a notable decline in support for both groups between 2003 and 2005, this was followed by a firm upswing between 2005 and 2006, especially among Indian respondents.

It remains unclear what factors have produced this change in direction. For instance, does it reflect confusion and ambiguity or does it mirror sports developments between 2005 and 2006? Examples could include the record breaking One Day International against Australia at the Wanderers in March 2006, or the racial slur by an Australian commentator against Hassim Amla, the first Indian player in the national team, in August 2006. The jury remains out and such trends should be the subject of critical reflection as we continue to discuss the merits and shortcomings of sports quotas.

There are small gender differentials in support for quotas in sport, to the extent

that the figures are virtually indistinguishable in certain years. There is also a moderate age effect, with the youth (those aged 16–34 years) being more in favour of quotas than older cohorts, especially those aged 65 and older.

While the SASAS data point to strong national pride and unity (results not shown), the sports quota results suggest that decision-makers need to be sensitive in ensuring that the progressive realisation of sports teams that reflect the country's demography does not further polarise segments of the population. The focus should be on a joint partnership between government and civil society to address fundamentals, such as the lack of training and coaching facilities.

Initiatives being undertaken by Sports and Recreation South Africa to facilitate access to sport and recreation, such as at school sport level and Siyadlala ('Let's play') mass participation programmes, represent a crucial step in the right direction. However, the department currently receives less than 1% of total government budget expenditure, which constrains the scope of such interventions. And this figure includes the allocation to the department's 2010 FIFA World Cup Unit. If we were to remove this amount from consideration, the percentage drops to below 0.1% of total government expenditure. While private initiatives and corporate social investment in sport development obviously need to be factored in, ultimately more weight needs to be given to this social service if we are to break down social and cultural barriers in the pursuit of equity and unity in South African sport. ●

Jarè Struwig is a senior research manager and Ben Roberts is a research specialist in the Urban, Rural and Economic Development research programme of the HSRC.

¹ Realised sample sizes were 4 980 respondents in 2003, 5 583 in 2004, 2 884 in 2005, and 2 939 in 2006. The smaller samples in 2005 and 2006 were due to the inclusion of the sports quota question in only one of the two versions of the SASAS questionnaire fielded in those years.



Employment equity

Can it produce a representative workforce?

The call by the minister of finance, Trevor Manuel, to review Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) has fuelled similar calls from organisations such as the Democratic Alliance, Solidarity, the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Freedom Front Plus. But what elements of BEE/affirmative action need to be reviewed, asks GEOFFREY MODISHA.

THESE GROUPS ARGUE that policies marginalise whites and the poor of previously disadvantaged groups. Affirmative action policies, the argument goes, benefit a group of already established black elite and middle classes which undermines the goal of creating

a non-racial labour market. These groups assume that labour-market transformation comes as a result of the inherent ability for markets to deal with racial inequities. Hence, there is a need for a sun-set clause or class-based affirmative action.

There is a need to review the idea of representivity embedded in the Employment Equity Act (EEA). The Act's emphasis on the acquisition of skills for affirmative action candidates serves to redress skills imbalances of the past, and simultaneously to utilise skills possessed by whites for the undisturbed running of the South African economy. The ultimate goal is to include the white minority in the creation of a non-racial labour market. The government's Joint Initiative for Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) is the latest development in an attempt to create this by encouraging expatriates with skills to return to the country.

The class-based argument that affirmative action policies benefit the black elite and middle classes, is more appropriate to countries like the US, New Zealand and Malaysia where the designated groups constitute the minority to be assimilated into the mainstream economy. But South Africa is different because of the need to facilitate representative participation of previously disadvantaged groups, who constitute the majority of the population.

The Act attempts to address historical injustices and will also minimise discrimination in the labour market so as to create diversity in the workforce. This enables South African companies to adapt to global and diverse markets, as evidenced by an increasing expansion of our companies on the African continent.

The ideology of representivity, however, seems to be at the core of implementing

affirmative action. In his book, *Affirmative Action Around the World*, Thomas Sowell argues that the representation of all racial/ethnic groups in the workforce is an unachievable goal because different ethnic groups have specific occupational preferences. For example, it should not be a surprise if in South Africa whites dominate the economy, a trend which can also be confirmed by the fact that white women are benefiting from the EEA, whereas blacks dominate politics; Afrikaners dominate agricultural occupations and amaXhosa government employment.

This may be because of the historical context, but the remaining question is to what extent can affirmative action reverse this history?

Pursuing representivity in South Africa is also challenged by International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 111, which stipulates that affirmative action policies should have a limited life-span so as not to create unnecessary inequalities and punish those who are not the direct perpetrators of racial inequalities. The convention gives affirmative action a lifespan of 10 years.

The argument that affirmative action policies, EEA in particular, discriminate against the white minority does not have strong legs to stand on in South Africa. Developments suggest that the implementation of affirmative action policies is a concerted effort to create a non-racial labour market. Nonetheless, there might be a need to review some elements, the idea of representation in particular, if the legitimacy of the BEE project is to be maintained in the country. ●

Geoffrey Modisha is a researcher in the HSRC's Democracy and Governance programme.





Affirmative action is **class-based and exclusive**

Affirmative action is neither a rejection of non-racialism, nor a sudden affirmation of Africanism within the ANC. Rather, it epitomises an ideological tension between nativity – meaning ways of thinking that are innate rather than acquired – and non-racialism that has plagued the discourse from its very inception in the nineteenth century. MCEBISI NDLETYANA analyses the history around these opposing forces and the effect it has on the redress policy.

WHEN THE ANC WAS FORMED in 1912, it was racially exclusive and only opened up to all races as recently as 1985. Yet, this did not make the pre-1985 ANC racist. ANC founders were wholly Euro-centric, and maintained good relations with the white folk. The exclusiveness simply reflected a loss of faith in the liberal agenda and a shift towards a new belief in self-reliance and action rather than the reliance on white politicians to agitate on behalf of black Africans.

Throughout its existence, the ANC was neither purely non-racial, nor exclusivist. Rather, the two ideological strands fused into a hybrid, especially after 1950. African nationalism was re-defined. Euro-centricity made way for Afro-centricity. The ANC retained cross-racial alliances and embraced non-racial citizenship but still excluded non-Africans from its membership. The exiled ANC actually sought to look even more African in order to please the African leadership on the continent and to give the ANC an undoubtedly African identity.

Frankly, the nationalist discourse remained largely distrustful of non-Africans. This repeatedly surfaced when non-racial membership was discussed in the ANC, both in 1969 and 1985. After all, ANC thinking defined apartheid primarily as oppression of Africans while the other races enjoyed apartheid privileges, albeit in different ways. The commitment of these other groups to

the liberation of Africans was questioned. But the ANC could not remain exclusive in the light of non-Africans joining its non-racial military-wing, Umkhonto We-Sizwe, an indication of their willingness to die for the cause of African freedom.

Yet, even this self-sacrifice proved insufficient a reason to grant non-Africans full membership. The 1969 conference resolved to allow them to serve in organisational committees, but would not elect non-Africans into decision-making structures, especially not onto the National Executive Committee (NEC). But the increasing non-racial character of the resistance movement back home would force the exiled ANC to make a full concession at the 1985 conference – not without limitations though. The top three positions of the organisation – president, general secretary and treasurer – were to be reserved for Africans only.

Affirmative action, therefore, is a reflection of ideological contestation within the nationalist discourse. To argue that this policy shows a sudden Africanisation of the ANC, as Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert does, shows a gross misreading of the history of African nationalism in South Africa.

In the same vein, the nationalist discourse has always made a connection between citizenship and the possession of material resources. This was particularly pronounced in the 1950s, but highly contested. This

eventually led to a split and the formation of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). The latter wanted ownership of resources to be restored wholly to Africans, whilst the ANC preferred common ownership. But the issue of redress for Africans, in particular, would increasingly gain urgency within the ANC.

The ANC's 1970s resistance to the adoption of the term 'black' was motivated by concerns for post-apartheid redress. This term homogenised the political experience of the three groups – African, coloured and Indian – which underplayed their varying experience under apartheid. It also insinuated equal claims to post-apartheid redress, without taking into account the severity of racial oppression on Africans. This question assumed even greater urgency from the mid-1980s as the negotiations on the post-apartheid dispensation gained ground.

The problem with affirmative action and the redress regime in general, is its class bias towards the middle and upper classes. The indigent and working class are excluded from redress, as they are shunted aside towards social grants, which barely help them survive. Redress, although focusing on race, should cut across classes. Broad-based empowerment, for one, provides a remarkable base to build upon further redress mechanisms. ●

Dr Mcebisi Ndletyana is a senior research specialist in the HSRC's Democracy and Governance programme.

Which black republic?

There is a bigger issue at stake than media freedom in the current claims and counter-claims about the independence of newspapers. We get a sense of it from a recent column by Mukoni Ratshitanga, President Thabo Mbeki's spokesperson (*Mail & Guardian*, 21 September 2007), writes IVOR CHIPKIN. There he seeks to locate the discussion about the rights and responsibilities of the media in the context of a debate about values.

'WHAT VALUES, freedoms and rights,' he asks, 'did we fight for and what place should they occupy in society?'

For Ratshitanga the nature of these values is unmistakable. This is what he says in reply to his own question above: 'The centre of our moral universe, which must be vigorously asserted, as do all people assert theirs, is African'. This rhetorical manoeuvre lets him defend Dali Mpofu's withdrawal from the National Editors' Forum. It turns out that the manner in which the *Sunday Times* criticised the minister of health was in conflict with African norms and values.

Yet there is reason to be less confident than Ratshitanga that post-apartheid values should be 'African' values.

The struggle against apartheid in the name of non-racialism, and under the banner of the Freedom Charter, has a complex genealogy. What is often overlooked in the current situation is that, among several tendencies, it also articulated a vision of a cosmopolitan, democratic society. Let us recall that the Freedom Charter invoked a principle of geography, rather than any ethnic or cultural principle, as the basis of South Africa's unity. 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it,' the Charter declared. This is one of the key aspects of the non-racial tradition. What South Africans had in common was simply that they happened to

live in the same territory. [Read Mcebisi Ndletyana's article on page 15 in this regard].

It is important to identify this cosmopolitan tendency for at least two reasons. Currently a certain revisionism is taking place that wants to underplay this aspect of the ANC tradition, if not write it out of history altogether. Moreover, the prospect of a workable cosmopolitan society in South Africa has made the current project of historical importance for progressive forces around the world. The stakes are very high: if South Africa is to be democratic is has to be non-racial.

This is why it is important to identify the politics against which it conflicts in the current situation. The dominant challenge to the democratic project comes today from those wishing to articulate and defend a certain idea of the Native Republic – one that defends and encourages a certain standard of African norms.

A recurrent feature of the last few years has been the claim that criticism of the ANC government amounts, in effect, to a campaign against a Native Republic. The frequency and vigour of these claims has increased over the last couple of months. It seems likely that we will hear them more and more as the current presidency tends further towards crisis. These claims are normally associated with the following assertion: that critics of

the government, if they are not white, then they are, at least, animated by a 'white' view.

Others have been dismissed as mere dummies (unwitting or not) of their master's voice. Media reports are frequently dismissed as part of a campaign to discredit particular ministers and/or government in general. Sometimes it is said that racist subversion masquerades as critique. The argument goes that the intention or effect of criticism is to call into question the competence of black leaders in particular and black people in general. Even more sinister, by so doing, criticism is said to undermine the legitimacy and the sovereignty of the black government and the Native Republic more generally. Hence, and herein lies the *coup de grace*, criticism serves not to develop the democratic space, but to undermine it.





Usually these matters are dealt with in the public domain as questions of fact. Is it true that so and so is a white liberal, or worse, a racist? Or that such and such a journalist is incapable of thinking for themselves? Or that the media reflects white interests set on subverting the Native Republic?

We are regularly reminded by some commentators that not all black people act in their own interests. How? There were black people complicit in the apartheid project (as askaris, spies, homeland officials and politicians and so on). Following this logic, a government is not black simply when it is populated by black people.

Herein lies the novelty of South Africa's anti-apartheid tradition, especially as it was articulated by the African National Congress and its allies. It broke with the very logic of

apartheid, and nationalism generally, by refusing to reduce blackness to a question of race or culture. Incidentally, this was the centre-piece of Frantz Fanon's own dispute with the negritude movement.

Blackness was not simply a racial or cultural quality. Its measure was, above all, *political*. The term 'black' referred both to those people that had been oppressed and exploited by apartheid and to those people that conducted themselves on the basis of certain political values. It is the nature of these values that is currently at issue today. There are some who would suggest that the values of racial solidarity or solidarity based on some or other 'native' personality are at the heart of the ANC tradition. What is certainly true, however, is that black values were construed as democratic values.

Apartheid was resisted because it was violent, racist, exploitative of black people and undemocratic.

On these terms, a Black Republic (or a National Democracy) is not a Native Republic. Its measure is the degree to which the democratic project is advanced in South Africa, not the extent to which 'authentic' black figures occupy positions of power and authority. We must endorse this vision of the republic against those wishing to invest the notion of blackness with a different standard. ●

Professor Ivor Chipkin a chief research specialist in the HSRC's Democracy and Governance programme, and the author of Do South Africans Exist? Nationalism, Democracy and the Identity of the People (Witwatersrand University Press).



Rural tourism hampered by national marketing

During the past decades, tourism has begun to find much wider recognition as an economic sector with the potential to make a contribution towards development. JOHAN VILJOEN looks at one of the most intriguing sustainable development themes, rural tourism.

RURAL TOURISM consists of leisure activities carried out in rural areas and includes different types of tourism activities, such as community-based tourism, ecotourism, cultural tourism, adventure tourism, guest farms, backpacking, riding and agri-tourism. Developing tourism in rural areas increases participation of the poor and brings wider benefits, for instance, involving ownership and management.

The economic potential of tourism as a key driver of growth and development in South Africa is based on the competitive advantages that the country has in its natural and cultural resources. South Africa's fast-growing tourism industry also complements a worldwide trend towards alternative tourism, signalling a break away from the perception of sun, sea and sand as representative of the ideal holiday.

The White Paper on the Promotion of Tourism in South Africa contends that the prime tourism attractions are not located in the city centres but in the rural areas. Many rural tourism types are indeed ideally suited for developing tourism in rural localities with the necessary environmental qualities and provide rural inhabitants with the opportunity to participate and share in the benefits of tourism development.

However, many rural areas, despite having attributes that would favour tourism development, fail to compete with established urban tourism destinations such as Cape Town and Johannesburg. A number of reasons have been offered for this phenomenon. One reason is that the national marketing efforts by South Africa Tourism supports contemporary tourism patterns that benefit top tourism destinations with little benefits flowing to other regions. Placing emphasis on major tourism draw-cards in international marketing campaigns makes sense in growing international tourism arrivals per se but contributes little to developing lesser known tourism regions.

Despite the hurdles that inhibit tourism development in rural areas, some small towns and locations have managed to buck prevalent trends with tourism growing in significance as a lead sector for local economic development (LED). Stilbaai and Clarens are examples of particularly successful small-town LED's, where tourism represents the main sector of development. Route tourism is another example of emerging LED strategies, where the collective marketing and promotion of a grouping of adjacent tourism facilities takes place in order to compete more effectively with established

tourism destinations. The Midlands, Highveld and Magalies Meanders are examples of successful route tourism initiatives that supported enterprise development and employment creation. These initiatives are well supported by domestic tourists, but still have some headway to make with wooing international customers.

Remedies for the unequal distribution of tourism benefits in a free market system is not a simple task, but should start with a change in the mindset of key tourism role-players that promotes established tourism draw-cards to the detriment of other locations. Certain types of tourism, such as budget tourism and backpacking, have been known to bring benefits to remote and otherwise marginalised regions that international mass tourists seldom visit. Further investigation and more support is undoubtedly warranted for these and other tourism types that will directly benefit other regions with a high tourism potential. ●

Mr Johan Viljoen is a senior researcher in the Urban, Rural and Economic Development research programme. This article is based on an occasional paper, Rural tourism development in South Africa: Trends and challenges, which can be downloaded or ordered from www.hsrapress.ac.za.

What's happening to Mandela's children?

The generation of post-apartheid youth is widely seen as something of a disappointment, laments FAITH RAKATE in this opinion article about her generation's lack of interest in politics, their consumerism, their 'lack of moral fibre' and their crass materialism.

SO MUCH HAD BEEN EXPECTED of 'Mandela's children'. They were designated to follow in the footsteps of earlier generations of revolutionary youth. They should be leading the democratic movement; they should be defending the gains of the revolution and, with their energy and efforts, they should be accelerating development.

So what has happened? Instead of grasping the torch of freedom and charging into the future, the youth have either sat around or headed off to the mall. Negative perceptions around the youth are building momentum. It is commonly assumed they are behind the endemic violence, the unruly behaviour and the lack of discipline that characterises life 13 years after the advent of democracy.

The presidential succession saga has thrown the youth onto the centre-stage of public and intellectual debate. Prominent ANC politicians have appealed to the youth for their political support, but few of these politicians clearly spell out the place of the youth in leadership other than as followers or pawns in the political game.

In addition, it has commonly been argued that the lack of accountability in South Africa's political system has inevitably led to

diminishing levels of public participation, especially among the youth. The political system, as democratic and equitable as it is, has nonetheless been designed in a way that creates apathy among the young. Whose fault is it then when the youth grow bored?

Politicians urge militant action, but fail to provide any avenues for progress within their own parties or any means for ordinary people to genuinely influence policy. Parents urge careerism and affluence at a time when there are very few jobs to be found. Veterans bemoan the youth's attraction to materialism, but they themselves condone or participate in the creation of a multi-media platform from which a massive multiple promotion of consumerism has been waged. In this campaign, the media has almost exclusively targeted the emerging middle class youth.

Parents themselves are often poor role models while some struggle heroes are engaged in a vulgar bid to accumulate as much money as possible. What signal does that send out?

The youth in South Africa are currently faced by enormous challenges just to survive, let alone to excel. Unemployment, drug and alcohol abuse, early pregnancies, involvement

in crime both as perpetrators and victims, and the daunting threat of the HIV and AIDS pandemic all pose the severest of tests.

The relentless urging of the corporate world and of the youth's own parents to accumulate wealth and to consume lavishly is beginning to reap what it has sown: a youth generation that lacks vibrancy, dynamism and altruistic values. Worse than that, when reality sets in, the impossible expectations imposed by peers and families will lead almost inevitably to diminished self-worth, depression, alcohol and drug abuse and perhaps criminality and prostitution. It is a vicious cycle, the creators of which refuse to acknowledge their own complicity. Instead they blame the youth for the very features that characterise them and which are necessary for the passage to maturity.

In many ways, the post-apartheid youth of today contrast sharply with their revolutionary predecessors. In many other ways, they are exactly the same. ●

Faith Rakate is a master's intern in the HSRC's Democracy and Governance research programme.



What is the prognosis for a National Health System?

Heeding the call of the ANC's National Policy Conference on a national health insurance (NHI) system for the country, the HSRC hosted a colloquium on health within a comprehensive social security system to initiate further debate and evaluate the progress made thus far. The colloquium explored a number of policy options and challenges for a national health system (NHS), financed through national health insurance. Colloquium coordinator CLAIRE BOTHA reports.

THE QUESTION of what health system South Africans want is not a rhetorical question; it requires us to seriously consider the current state of South Africa's decaying health services. Words like accessibility, equity, and efficiency in health care should no longer remain mere aphorisms.

Despite considerable progress since 1994, key failures of the public health system are pervasive. As a consequence, the South African Human Rights Commission cautioned during its public hearings into the right of access to health-care services that the current level of health care could erode the constitutional right of access to health for all.

Notwithstanding the implementation of a number of policies, based on the tenets of the ANC's 1994 National Health Plan (NHP), the public health system is still afflicted by the challenges of inadequate and equitable access to health services, its delivery and quality, and health-care funding.

Many argue that these challenges are nested in the dual structure of the South African health system, with the public-private sector disparities and the nature of the interface (or lack thereof) serving as major impediments to an equitable and sustainable health system. The inability to affect a relative redistribution of resources locked into the private sector to ensure equity of the health system as a whole, gives rise to a highly unequal and polarised health system.

A stagnant but a well-entrenched private sector with a guaranteed clientele and heavily subsidised (directly and indirectly) by the public sector, consumes the bulk of financial resources – in excess of 60%. Direct and

indirect subsidies relate to tax exemptions on medical scheme contributions and the subsidised training of health-care workers, who, upon completion of training end up practicing in the private sector. The private sector covers only approximately 15% of the population's middle-to-high-income earners, regardless of race – and remains over-resourced and under-utilised.

This leaves the public sector to cater for approximately 85% of the population on a health budget of less than 40% of total health expenditure. South Africa's unequal and highly polarised health-care system is fuelled by – if not rooted in – the funding arrangements for health care, giving rise to its overwhelming challenges.

To add to the private health sector's inclination towards cost-inflation which is mired in a weak regulatory environment and with obvious limitations to entitlements, the consumer bears an increasing portion of the financial burden. The South African private health-care sector has turned to managed health-care (MHC) initiatives to control the surging health costs. Although well intentioned, these initiatives could perversely reinforce the dumping of patients prematurely onto the public health sector once private health cover benefits have been exhausted.

GOVERNMENT'S HEALTH INTERVENTIONS

The industry has seen a number of government interventions aimed at curbing runaway health costs, for example, reforms to tax subsidy and single-exit pricing of medication. But these have had little impact on reducing costs.



Whereas some argue that government intervention will transgress and even stifle competition, government's direct and indirect subsidy to the private sector distorts the free-market arrangement anyway. A public health system under pressure to extend health care to its population – especially those lacking medical scheme cover – makes the South African public health system in need of much refocused attention.

A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM

So, what is the alternative? What is needed is a developmental approach to health care, supported by sound, well-developed and comprehensive policies that press forward with the transformation towards a National Health System, as articulated in a number of policy documents. The goal is to see some progress towards a National Health System for universal coverage of health services.

At the colloquium, a lively debate ensued on different policy options of universal health-care coverage for South Africa, nested within a comprehensive system of social security. The colloquium's main purpose was to initiate policy dialogue and critical



- In pursuit of the National Health System, the following steps need to be taken:
 - Strengthen the public sector through increased human resource capacity by: implementing the National Department of Health's HR strategy; improved governance of the District Health System and public hospitals; and increased tax funding of the public health system.
 - Distribute health-care resources equitably between the users of the public and private.
 - Improve the public/private interface so as to explore various synergies such as the sharing of resources to improve efficiencies.
 - Curb excessive costs in the private sector.
 - Reform the tax subsidy of medical scheme contributions to reduce the indirect funding of the private sector.

The following suggestions were offered in relation to health-care funding:

- Funding of the National Health System through tax funding and mandatory contributions; revenue collection by existing institutions such as the South African Revenue Services (SARS); and pooled funds administered by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), or a resource allocation agency, or a central equalisation fund.
- The Government Employees Medical Scheme (GEMS) could be an alternative system for revenue collection, pooling of funds and administration, in which case the Basic Health Care Package could be offered by its low-cost Sapphire option.
- Services could be purchased from both the public and private sectors at affordable rates.
- A capitation payment system could be used with fee-for-service reserved for specified services.
- Affordability, percentage contribution and capitation fees could be determined by costing the basic health care package.

The 2007 draft ANC policy resolution calls for the implementation of a NHI System as a vehicle towards a national health system. The critical question, which we hope to answer as this debate progresses, is what inputs are required to take the process forward. ●

Ms Claire Botha is a chief research manager in the Policy Analysis unit of the HSRC. The full colloquium report will be available on hsrc.ac.za soon.

Whereas some argue that government intervention will transgress and even stifle competition, government's direct and indirect subsidy to the private sector distorts the free-market arrangement anyway ”

discussions on how health services are accessed, provided and funded and to formulate ideas, views and recommendations that could be presented to those involved in health policy development.

In the opening address at the colloquium, the minister of health welcomed and supported the use of different forums that could engage and influence policy processes. Of particular importance is the following extract from the minister's speech:

Stakeholders have different platforms to express their views and to try to influence government to move in one direction or the other. This is one of those platforms, and our view is that we are here to listen to suggestions and views we can take into consideration as we formulate the stance of the government, which we will ultimately take to Cabinet.

Universal coverage of health services should

be considered in terms of concept, level, content of services and funding arrangements with regards to the health system to which it applies. Any reform towards a National Health System should be guided by the policy objectives that the policy option seeks to pursue with the following underlying principles for consideration in guiding the policy option:

- The right to health
- Social solidarity
- Universality
- Equity
- Universal access to health care
- Efficiency in resource use.

Key issues that emerged during the deliberation at the colloquium include:

- Advocacy for a National Health System as envisaged by the 1994 National Health Plan, namely a centrally-funded, basic package of care, free at point of use.




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
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


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