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HSRC CEO DR OLIVE SHISANA WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE COUNCIL (ISSC) IN DECEMBER 2010. THIS IS AN ABSTRACT FROM HER ACCEPTANCE SPEECH.

Over the last 25 years, the social sciences have experienced an increased marginalisation and generalised treatment as a non-scientific body of knowledge that is incapable of contributing new insights and which does not merit enhanced funding.

A resurgent International Social Science Council (ISSC) has begun to respond in strategic ways to this challenge. Today the organisation is leading the charge to take the social sciences to a level where they rightly belong: addressing global issues and challenges; helping humanity to make sense of the world, despite the complexities of the changes constantly taking place all around us.

The ISSC is making it possible for us to continue to be actors and agents of change in our relationship with nature and in the relationships within and between communities and countries.

Two of the most notable achievements of the ISSC are the convening of the first World Social Science Forum held in Bergen in 2010, and the production of the second World Social Science Report in the same year.

Our work in the years ahead will be shaped by the successes over the last few years and the basic reality that there is also plenty of unfinished business and new, emergent challenges to which we must respond.

The world is evolving at an extremely rapid pace; much faster than the dominant and existing social science concepts, theories and paradigms are capable of responding to.

The global social science community itself is still riddled with a multiplicity of fault lines and hierarchies. The global epistemological order continues to be predominantly Euro-American. And the potential for the social sciences to inform policy and social practice in ways that enhance human freedom is still to be fully realised.

The roles of the ISSC would necessarily include that of contributing towards making knowledge truly global, effectively countering the tendency to elevate only certain kinds of knowledge, produced in some parts of the world (the global North), to the status of global or universal knowledge.

I want to pledge that during my presidency we will build on the success of the past while we grow the organisation by increasing membership from the South. To achieve this, we should aim at encouraging the establishment of social science councils or similar institutions in many countries in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia.

We will continue to increase the visibility of the ISSC by asking for, and taking, opportunities to advocate for the social sciences at global meetings such as those designed to follow-up on the International Forum on Social Science Policy Nexus February 2006 held in Buenos Aires, on bridging the gap between research and policy.

We will take bold and innovative steps to help enhance the visibility of social science knowledge produced by researchers in the global South. Close attention will also need to be paid to the social science disciplines that tend to be marginalised under the current global dispensation, and the participation of younger and female scholars in our programmes and activities.

We will strengthen the relations with international bodies, such as UNESCO, relevant UN systems, and with regional bodies such as the African and EU organisations. We will strive to make these organisations acknowledge and work more closely with our member organisations, associations and institutions, particularly those in the regions where they are based.

We plan to find ways to ensure global knowledge production and dissemination by encouraging social scientists to work with natural scientists and scholars in the humanities. We will also encourage publishing articles in open access journals in all regions of the world, including journals published in the global South.

It is a new day at the ISSC. The ISSC has taken a historic turn, to which I look forward, in contributing to hoisting the social science flag high – doing so with an invigorated secretariat, led by an energetic executive director, a highly dedicated staff, and an executive committee of able scholars accomplished in their different fields.



HIV COUNSELLORS: LAY MORE ON

A patient satisfaction survey in 266 clinics in three health districts in the Eastern Cape (Amathole, OR Tambo and Chris Hani) highlighted the role of lay counsellors as frontline workers in combating the HIV pandemic in South Africa.

The report says, in a country where HIV/AIDS has reached hyper-endemic proportions, community health worker initiatives are seen as a way of addressing the crisis in many low- and middle-income settings.

Given that this is a relatively new role in healthcare, and has no formal status in a professional hierarchy, lack of attention is paid to the organisational issues facing lay counsellors.

Although researchers have previously noted the need for adequate support and supervision to help lay counsellors cope, they were not as clear on how this should be provided. Also, lack of information on lay counsellors' involvement in the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) in South Africa, among others, necessitated this study's focus on their experiences, in order to better identify the country's potential HIV-counselling needs.

Results from 74 lay counsellors in Cacadu district health facilities in the Eastern Cape indicated that they experienced medium to high job stress but,

with relatively high job satisfaction, almost all respondents felt they could always or often help their clients.

Inadequate remuneration (less than the minimum wage for full-time work) ranked as the most important challenge when it came to providing PMTCT-related services, followed by poor working environment; lack of training; too many patients; inadequate transport for clients; staff shortages; security; inadequate facilities, insufficient time to do the job; demoralised staff; lack of feedback on job performance; lack of supervision; and people not making use of the facility.

In addition, workers were ill equipped to provide HIV-counselling services, and the need for improved training, together with systematic support and supervision was identified. Also, their role in the HIV-counselling process should be more clarified and formalised, and their career structure with improved benefits strengthened.

The report, Baseline Patient Satisfaction Survey in 266 clinics located in three Health Districts of the Eastern Cape: Amathole, OR Tambo and Chris Hani, is available on www.hsrc.ac.za.



ACTION NEEDED ON EXISTING POLICIES FOR CHILDREN

The South African government has developed strong policies for vulnerable children, some of which have been taken up in other African countries and other parts of the world. But in spite of the excellent policy environment, implementation continues to lag behind, failing to reach many of the country's most vulnerable children.

This is one of the conclusions reached in the first comprehensive review of government-funded programmes and services to protect vulnerable children in South Africa, released this month. The review is intended to enhance understanding of how government, working with civil society, can improve the situation of vulnerable children. It lays out the relevant policies, legislation, and provisions for programmes and services by all government departments with one or more responsibilities for the protection of children. It also identifies, in each area, key policy, services and resource gaps.

These departments include Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Basic Education, Energy, Health, Home Affairs, Human Settlements, Justice and Constitutional Development, Police and the National Prosecuting Authority, Social Development, and Water Affairs.

The review was commissioned as part of a larger five-year study looking at the effects of grants and services in enabling families to protect and care for their children under the joint burden of poverty and HIV/AIDS. The study is a collaborative project of the HSRC and New York University, with support from UNICEF, the department of social development, and others. The review finds that social protection – particularly social grants paid to the poorest families in communities affected by HIV/AIDS – provides solid assistance to families. However it is not yet known to what extent social security helps families to access formal services and community networks in providing for their children.

The main author of the review, Patricia Martin, points to a number of structural barriers in South Africa that prevent people living in poverty, especially in rural areas, from improving their conditions through infrastructural development, access to social protection and other means of escaping poverty. These include very poor roads and transport facilities, inadequate communication and illiteracy; all of which make it difficult for South Africans to use those services to which they have a right.

'Not enough is being done to remove these barriers. For example, there is no plan to remedy transport facilities and there are no effective national, provincial or local communication strategies that target rural communities,' Martin says.

'Poor sanitation and infant and childhood malnutrition are two of the biggest contributors to childhood mortality, illness and poor development. Yet there is no enforceable sanitation policy in South Africa and we have no nutrition policy that

addresses food security and hunger so as to effectively prevent malnutrition.'

Martin points to early childhood development as another area that can help families ensure that their children reach their full potential, but there is no policy in place to provide guaranteed early childhood development services that are not centre-based, especially in rural areas.

'Rural areas – where families and children are poorer, where infrastructure lags behind, where services are the least developed, and where the challenges are the biggest – are largely left to be serviced by civil society organisations and community groups. Government, at all levels, does not assume responsibility and accountability for delivery of services provided for in national policies,' says Martin.


'Under these conditions, civil society is left to tackle the hardest problems with insufficient, inappropriate and erratic funding. There is an urgent need for consistent, reliable, sustainable and coherent funding frameworks to sustain service delivery by non-governmental organisations and community groups.'

Another challenge highlighted by the review is that prevention and early intervention are poorly addressed in policy, and few resources are allocated to them. Although the Children's Act and other provisions address this policy gap to some extent, the resource gap and accountability for comprehensive delivery at acceptable levels of quality remains a problem.

Martin hopes that this publication 'will encourage better service delivery of policy provisions, as well as stronger accountability at provincial and local levels, so that already under-served groups are not further marginalised by inequitable access to services'.

The full report, Martin P (2010) Government funded programmes and services for vulnerable children in South Africa, is available on www.hsrc.ac.za and on www.unicef.org/southafrica.





Committing to anti-corruption. A conference goer at the anti-corruption day, jointly hosted by the HSRC, the department of social development, the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) and the National Development Agency (NDA), signs the anti-corruption pledge on 9 December 2010. The objective of this day was to raise awareness of corruption and the role of various parties in combating and preventing it.

DECISIVE ACTION TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The challenge to the SADC

A review of progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in four southern African countries has been undertaken by the HSRC. As the target year of 2015 comes in sight there is increasing interest in, and concern over, whether these countries (Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa) will meet the minimum targets for social progress.

Among researchers in the field there is a wide range of opinions about the application of MDGs to the African context. While some feel that Africa is 'being set up for failure' as the MDG targets are too ambitious, others feel that more progress is being made than anticipated, as in the case of maternal mortality.

To add to this, governments find it difficult to acknowledge complications in progress towards the targets. The differing views beg a common approach and methodology rather than more intense debate.

The HSRC has been conducting research in this field, with the purpose of producing a research brief to engage the SADC and governments in research initiatives to support regional initiatives to spur interventions to bring the MDGs to realisation in 2015. This forms part of a series of research

and policy briefs produced by the HSRC in partnership with George Washington University, with the purpose of highlighting research findings to the widest set of interested parties.

This research brief captures key issues in improving the lives of people in southern Africa through implementing the MDGs in these four countries.

The need for change, identified in progress towards key MDGs, is most urgent in southern Africa, but there are also the greatest opportunities for improvement.

'There is a mixture of hope and realism as the target date of 2015 approaches.

If resources could be mobilised strategically in the region, much more progress could be made and the SADC instrument of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) is explored to this end', says Dr David Hemson, of the Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery programme at the HSRC.

The research brief concludes that in a number of targets the MDGs are being approached but that the pace of change in others is too slow. In a minority of targets no progress is being made.



Dr David Hemson

The full research brief is available on www.hsrc.ac.za.

Employment creation targets ARE ACHIEVABLE

The government is committed to halving unemployment between 2004 and 2014. The HSRC employment scenarios show this required the creation of five million jobs. With the downturn, the same objective has been restated. But running up to 2020, can it be achieved? Yes, absolutely, says MIRIAM ALTMAN.

As the clearest expression of government intention, what does the budget tell us? Five million jobs could be created if the economy grew by an average 4.5% pa between 2010 and 2020, but then government would have to pay for two million public works type jobs costing about R25bn.

Five million jobs could be created if the economy grew by an average 4.5% pa between 2010 and 2020.

The budget forecasts a growth rate of 3.4% this year, rising to 4.4% by 2013. If the economy grew a bit faster, at say just over 5.5% pa, the target could mostly be reached through the market, and only 700 000 public works jobs would be needed, costing about R10bn. Treasury already forecasts a growth rate rising to 4.4% by 2013. So why not stretch it a little?

Sustainable employment growth will depend on new and expanded business investment. The budget offers some important items, such as continued commitment to infrastructure spending and investment incentives. Infrastructure spending accounts for 9% of GDP, but about one-third goes to capital and import-intensive investments by Eskom. In other areas, project management, scheduling and timely payments have been a challenge.

Fortunately, most of our barriers to job creation are self made and rectifiable. We could achieve faster employment creation if these barriers were addressed,

ranging from energy, to water, to transport, among others.

ENERGY SUPPLY AND COST CONSTRAINTS

Energy is a perfect example where electricity shortages will be a brake on job creation up to 2016. Faster action is needed to sign up power suppliers to the grid. More is needed to fund municipal electricity distribution systems. Efforts to promote energy efficiency are central. The new investment incentives that allow for tax deductions where firms invest in new or upgraded technology are welcome if not a little late in coming, more than two years after the onset of the energy crisis. The 12i tax incentive was announced late last year, and the 12l incentive, which will be specifically aimed at energy saving measures, is anxiously awaited.

Fortunately, most of our barriers to job creation are self made and rectifiable. We could achieve faster employment creation if these barriers were addressed.

And while the electricity price is set to double shortly, Treasury has proposed a carbon tax that could add a further 25% to an investor's electricity bill. The policy mix could be improved to ensure that new investments have access to electricity, without having the lifeblood squeezed out in the process. Rapidly rising electricity prices are enough to dissuade energy intensive investments.

TAX DEDUCTIONS AND INCENTIVES

The 12i tax allowance has received considerable attention, but most of the press has suggested it would promote capital intensive projects. However, this is not quite the case. In fact, it marks an important shift away from the historical leaning of the department of trade and industry (dti) to capital intensity.

This incentive allows a tax deduction to the amount of 35% to 55% of capital invested in a new investment valued at over R200m or an expansion or upgrade valued at over R30m. Some of the qualifying activities involve plans for improved energy efficiency, local purchasing of inputs, especially from small and medium enterprises (SMEs), labour intensity and skills development. It also offers a training allowance of R36 000 per employee. This is a step in the right direction, although cash might be more helpful in a downturn, especially for the smaller expansions.

It would have been preferable to hear more about expanded support to companies that aim to invest in Africa and Asia, and about incentives to attract foreign companies to use South Africa as a springboard. More could be said about government's commitment to expanding its local supplier base and paying its suppliers on time. Late payments cause serious cash-flow difficulties for SMEs.

The State of the Nation address reported that the dti's payment hot line has thus far facilitated R210m worth of payments, but much more needs to be done. In fact, this is a location for a pact with corporate South Africa to truly commit to 30-day payments as one way to solve cash-flow problems for SMEs.

Minister Gordhan rightly spoke about the impor-



tance of innovation as a foundation for the SA economy. While public support for research and development has expanded substantially, it is off a very low base. Innovation is going to be an essential ingredient in South Africa's ability to expand its industrial base.

YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

There has been much talk about how to address youth unemployment. No doubt, an expanded economy is essential. Even so, matching youth into jobs is a challenge. Treasury proposes a R5bn tax incentive to subsidise the hiring of youth. The proposed R9bn youth fund aims more broadly to support evidence-based interventions that would enhance youth employability. Depending on how it is spent, this could potentially improve the employment prospects of about 500 000 young people, or about 15% of unemployed under-24s. This is significant.

It would have been preferable to hear more about expanded support to companies that aim to invest in Africa and Asia, and about incentives to attract foreign companies to use South Africa as a springboard.

But is it possible that young people are not employed for lack of work-readiness skills, such as attitude, communication, reading comprehension or IT awareness? Seventy per cent of those who sat the 2010 matric exam achieved a grade lower than 40% in maths and science, and almost half achieved less

than 40% in geography and history. The majority of matric graduates understood less than a third to a half of the curriculum.

A population of young people who are alienated from institutions has been created, who cannot therefore meaningfully engage in the labour market at the most basic level. Reducing the price of labour will not address this fundamental gap. It is essential that the majority have basic capabilities that enable them to work and study further.

Some part of this gap might be addressed through expanded further education and training opportunities. Indeed, it is common to pull young people out of the labour market in countries with high unemployment. Together, the Further Education and Training, National Skills Fund and SETAs reach a maximum of 5% of the 4.5 million unemployed under 35-year-olds, with proposed spending of R43bn over the MTEF. The critical challenge lies in improving quality and pass rates to enable meaningful expansion of mid-tier learning.

GROWING THE PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME

The expanded public works programme (EPWP) must reach more people, even if the economy grows faster. Half of the programme still aims to intensify labour absorption in public infrastructure projects. But the

EPWP was also revamped to encourage municipalities, ward committees and non-profit organisations to generate opportunities. The idea was to encourage more dispersed design and delivery so as to expand reach. The emerging programmes are Community Works and Employment Incentives for municipalities and the non-profit, non-state sector.

But is it possible that young people are not employed for lack of work-readiness skills, such as attitude, communication, reading comprehension or IT awareness?

The budget is a little hard to follow but funds allocated specifically to EPWP job creation rise from about R1.4bn in 2010/11 to R2.5bn in 2012/13. Considerably more funding will be needed – up to five times more.

Programme expansion will depend substantially on improved communication, support and financial management, as increasingly NGOs are meant to know about it and access the funding. If successful, the CWP and 'non-state sector Employment Incentive' should deepen service delivery as local structures stabilise and strengthen.

Author: Dr Miriam Altman, distinguished research fellow, HSRC, and member of the National Planning Commission.

CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE

A promise betrayed

The future of The Congress of the People (Cope) looks bleak, as bitter leadership clashes have dented its moralist orientation, big business is reluctant to be seen supporting opponents of the ANC, and black professionals and the black middle classes have been alienated by the party's stand against affirmative action, writes MCEBISI NDLETYANA.

In examining the performance of Cope in the 2009 elections, it is clear that the party's appeal was undercut by, among other factors, persistent racial inequality as it tried to project a trans-racial image. Then there is the excessive reliance of many on political office as a source of income, rather than furthering the party's principles.

Cope at first enjoyed extensive media coverage to the detriment of the ANC, because of high-profile defections and the news value of a party seen as rivalling the ANC. But at crucial periods during the election campaign it lost visibility.

Founders Mosioua Lekota, Mbhazima Shilowa and Mluleki George asserted that what had become of the ANC after the 2007 national conference at Polokwane was a deviation from the 'real ANC'.

This was when a lack of funds stalled the printing of posters, already delayed by a squabble over whose face should appear on them, and when ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe prevailed on the SABC not to give live coverage to the launch of Cope's election manifesto.

Apart from the fact that this was a confusion of roles between the ruling party and that of a public institution, Mantashe insisted that media coverage be determined by proven public support. His logic was specious, to say the least, as media attention is attracted by newsworthiness and not by popular vote.

THE RISE OF COPE

Cope sprang into existence on 16 December 2008 from a schism in the ANC, and retained the liberation tradition by claiming descent from the pre-2007 ANC. Founders Mosioua Lekota, Mbhazima Shilowa and Mluleki George asserted that what had become of the ANC after the 2007 national conference at Polokwane was a deviation from the 'real ANC'.

Lekota wrote: 'the leadership has taken a direct and unadulterated departure from the Freedom Charter by calling for a political solution in the matter of the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions vs the president of the ANC. What happened to "There shall be equality before law"? Or are we now to have political solutions to every citizen's criminal case?'

Thabo Mbeki, removed as president of the country, asserted that the 'cult of personality' allowed by Jacob Zuma would have been opposed by all past leaders of the ANC, 'with every fibre in their revolutionary bones'.

A gathering at the Sandton Convention Centre prior to the founding conference of Cope drew 5 000 people from across the country and various stations in life, at their own cost. An organisational report claimed 428 000 paid-up members.

ROLE OF SYMBOLISM

The symbolism of a people's movement stretched to the location and date of the party's formation – Bloemfontein and 16 December. It was there that the ANC was founded in 1912, and its military wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), was formed on 16 December, revered in the pre-1994 period as the Day of the Covenant.

The name of the new party, Congress of the People, was an even more obvious claim to the legacy of the anti-apartheid struggle, being derived from the historic mass multi-racial gathering in 1955, at which the seminal Freedom Charter was adopted.

Under the slogan 'A new agenda for change and hope for all', Cope made morality, constitutionalism and meritocracy as the centrepiece of its election strategy.

COPE'S ELECTION PLATFORM

Under the slogan 'A new agenda for change and hope for all', Cope made morality, constitutionalism and meritocracy as the centrepiece of its election strategy. The manifesto offered a clean leadership with integrity, based on constitutional values and emphasising an independent judiciary.

Cope sought to capitalise on the moral revulsion at a possible Jacob Zuma presidency. Cleared of rape, he had been elected ANC president in December 2007 while still facing charges of corruption.

Cope's stance on affirmative action appealed to white professionals, but not to their black counterparts.

Prof. Barney Pityana, ordained minister and then vice-chancellor and principal of the University of South Africa, in his speech to the national convention,



charged Zuma with lacking 'moral consciousness'. The appointment of Bishop Mvume Dandala, former head of the Methodist Church in southern Africa, as presidential candidate underscored this moralist approach.

Part of Lekota's trans-racial appeal was his critical stance on affirmative action, which he denounced as racist and an obstacle to building a non-racial society.

An emphasis on meritocracy completed the two-pronged election strategy, and the party zeroed in on the slow rate of delivery and poor quality of essential services, citing incompetence and scarcity of skills in the public service, exacerbated by the ANC policy of cadre deployment.

MATERIALISM VS VALUES

In the election build-up it became clear that materialism rather than value-based considerations would largely determine the way people voted. Targeted constituencies, though sharing a value system, were irreconcilable, as they were separated by racial inequalities. Business chose profit-making over being seen supporting Cope.

Lekota was unhappy with Dandala as presidential candidate, but Shilowa and his supporters backed the

man who came from a tradition of black theology, and was a former chairperson of the radical SA Students' Organisation. Cope became mired in a leadership dispute.

Yet the party's future looks bleak, as it promised upright leadership, only to be mired in ugly leadership rivalry, as well as a leadership exodus after the elections.

Cope's stance on affirmative action appealed to white professionals, but not to their black counterparts. The Black Lawyers' Association (BLA) and the Black Management Forum (BMF) attacked the party, with Andiswa Ndoni of the BLA charging that Cope was 'determined to reverse the few gains made by black people ... in order to attract white votes'.

Black professional bodies tagged Cope as 'anti-black'. To them the party was essentially, to borrow from the president of the Congress of SA Trade Unions, Sdumo Dlamini, the 'new black DA [Democratic Alliance]'.

Unrealised 'defections' from the ANC, and a number of high-profile defectors returning, undercut the storyline of a hemorrhaging ANC and ascendant Cope. Lack of money cast doubts on the notion that Cope was the 'new show in town'. The party could not generate enough funds for election posters, suggesting the moneyed class were not convinced Cope was a worthy investment.

FALLING ON ITS OWN SWORD

Cope won 1 256 133 of the 17 389 246 votes cast, the third-highest number among 26 parties, and it had strong support among low-income earners and the unemployed.

Yet the party's future looks bleak, as it promised upright leadership, only to be mired in ugly leadership rivalry, as well as a leadership exodus after the elections. Individuals seemed determined to secure positions at any cost, either for egotistical reasons or to secure material benefits.

Political office has long been the main source of income for South Africa's black political elite, who as in other post-colonial states come from the impoverished masses. Most did not have technical or professional skills to secure employment elsewhere.

This also compromised the party's ability to stick strictly to principles, and contributed to its failure to carry its auspicious start to full fruition. In the final analysis, Cope therefore did betray its promises.

Summary of an article published in the Journal of African Elections 9(2).

Author: Dr Mcebisi Ndletyana, senior political research specialist, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery programme, HSRC.

KEY ISSUES IN THE 2011 GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS

Residents in townships and informal settlements have taken to the streets, emboldened by the president's recent State of the Nation address and a wave of nation-wide mass action over better wages. They have used as leverage the state's failure to deliver basic services and create jobs at the rate required over the past two years in which the Zuma administration has been in power.

The recent 'service delivery' protests in Wesselton township are a case in point. Residents living in conditions of poverty and squalor are beginning to flex their muscles ahead of the municipal elections scheduled for the end of May 2011.

It is also an attempt to signal to the ANC that the centralised 'cadre deployment' system may be the reason why local government is incapacitated and, consequently, delivery compromised.

REASONS FOR THE PROTESTS

Preliminary research suggests that the unrest is likely to continue, and could become a national phenomenon. While not gainsaying the legitimacy of protest action with respect to a lack of basic service delivery in impoverished areas, the term has often become a pretext for a range of other issues that need foregrounding.

Most of these are political in nature, and appear to coalesce around the need to signal to the ANC-led government, unambiguously, that all is not well, and that the ballot as a means of participation in an electoral democracy is insufficient.

In simple terms, it is a statement of intent suggesting that conventional forms of political participation – like elections, ward committee forums, community meetings and presidential imbizos – may not be working optimally. It is also an attempt to signal to the ANC that the centralised 'cadre deployment' system may be the reason why local government is incapacitated and, consequently, delivery compromised.

It is the above scenario that is the mostly likely basis for aggrieved residents in our many under-ser-

viced townships and informal settlements to conclude that a more effective way of engaging the state (in realising development goals) are national mass action campaigns, from strikes over better wages, to protest action over a lack of basic 'service delivery', to mobilisation efforts with respect to enhancing the prospects of job creation, to national campaigns advocating the benefit of a more interventionist developmental state.

It is an interesting and curious feature of our celebrated constitutional democracy that, despite its infancy, a large majority of South Africans feel that conventional mechanisms of engaging the state are failing, and that alternatives may be more effective.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PROTEST

It is an interesting and curious feature of our celebrated constitutional democracy that, despite its infancy, a large majority of South Africans feel that conventional mechanisms of engaging the state are failing, and that alternatives may be more effective.

The irony should also not be lost on us that, during a highly repressive pre-1994 period (particularly in the late 1980s), it was mass action at a local level over access to items of collective consumption that brought the apartheid-state to its knees. The struggle for freedom during this time in many ways revolved around local pockets of resistance – often violent – that provided the basis for mass mobilisation. 'Illegitimate' local councillors bore the brunt of residents' frustration. Interestingly, 16 years into our democracy, local protest action continues to coalesce

around issues like access to basic services, with councillors again the target, and burning tyres and looted shops very much a feature of the local political landscape. The pictures from Wesselton two weeks ago, or for that matter Orange Farm last year, or even Balfour the year before, bear striking resemblance to the visuals captured in Tembisa, Katlehong and Khayelitsha in the late 1980s.

It is interesting that in Minister Gordhan's budget, despite the emphasis on infrastructure spending over the next five years to the value of R802bn (which, no doubt, will have a cross-cutting effect/impact across all spheres of government), he allocated only 9% of the total budget of R950bn to local government. Having said this, government has emphasised that spending on a number of priority areas, like education and housing, will have a direct impact on municipalities, as will the intention to create locally generated employment opportunities.

The pictures from Wesselton two weeks ago ... bear striking resemblance to the visuals captured in Tembisa, Katlehong and Khayelitsha in the late 1980s.

Other key issues in the run-up to the elections will revolve around state capacity, what constitutes appropriate delivery mechanisms in achieving key objectives, what the necessary policy instruments should be, and whether the country's often contradictory policy imperatives – driven largely through ideological doggedness and political intransigence – impairs the development mandate articulated by national government recently. The issue of the future of provinces, the highly conten-



tious boundary demarcation process, and inter-sphere cooperation and coordination are also likely to feature, as will the department of cooperative governance and traditional affairs' (CoGTA) ability to deliver on a critical national mandate.

The ANC's local government election manifesto promises to 'fix broken local government' by, inter alia, creating 400 000 housing units close to working centres; upgrading informal settlements in 45 municipalities; creating 80 000 mixed-income and social renting housing units; fast-tracking the provision of water, sanitation and electricity; and creating local jobs through infrastructure projects.

THE ROLE OF 'SOCIAL COMPACTS'

Clearly the disconnect between councillors and communities will make these targets difficult to achieve, as will a lack of capacity at a local level. Locally driven 'social compacts' may assist the process, but what is needed is bold, assertive and accountable leadership that drives and champions locality-specific interventionist strategies.

Such social compacts should also identify the technical skill and capacity that is required in this regard; make adequate resource allocations (for example, by accessing a municipality's portion of the Municipal Infrastructure Grant by cutting through red tape); identify a time-lined plan of action; enforce appropriate accountability mechanisms and transparency measures; and make sure that regular assessments of this model, based on its impact on the lives of communities in disadvantaged areas, are made.

Case study research conducted in Latin America, East Asia and parts of central and North Africa are replete with examples of how effective implementation of the above model has mitigated poverty levels

and has reduced income inequality. The research also shows that this model has created access to jobs and livelihoods, reduced the dependency on social welfare grants, given communities a stake in the economy, and allowed them to access credit to improve their lives.

What is needed is bold, assertive and accountable leadership that drives and champions locality-specific interventionist strategies.

It is a model that is specifically outcomes-based, and far better than the precepts and principles embedded in the many 'turn-around' strategies, and mostly dormant Integrated Development Plans (IDPs), that are a common feature of South Africa's municipal landscape.

There is no gainsaying the importance of long(er)-term strategies that are the feature of municipalities throughout the world. But in local communities afflicted with high levels of poverty and inequality, evidence from throughout the developing world (reinforced by rigorous impact-assessment research) has confirmed

the effectiveness of multiple strategies of intervention that in tandem address the complex interplay of factors specific to local government.

Had President Zuma articulated his and the ANC's election manifesto in the above manner, the scepticism that has already been expressed, and the sense of resignation felt, could well have given way to a sentiment that affirmed the role and value of local government as the first point of delivery in our constitutional democracy, despite party loyalties and political allegiances.

It would make 52-year-old Wesselton resident and shopkeeper Sandi Mkhwanazi feel a lot better. She has vowed to keep her vote to herself, recently commenting '... the protests here were justified. Nothing works in this municipality. Service at the clinic is pathetic. You have to be in the queue before 4am' (*Business Day*, 25 February 2011).

Author: Dr Udesch Pillay, executive director, research programme on Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery, HSRC.

Elections don't lessen conflict

Why the 'senseless' post-poll violence?



VANESSA BAROLSKY examines the way in which South Africa's fourth democratic elections, held in April 2009, have been interpreted as if it was the triumphal moment of democratic politics. According to this interpretation, elections are capable of steering the country inevitably towards a state of permanent peace through an ideology-free, mechanical process – a world in which 'history has ended',¹ a world free from ideology and hence free from the stain of violence.



Elections, therefore, are seen as merely a managerial exercise, divorced from wider relations of power and conflict. The fundamentally conflicting nature of democratic politics is ignored in favour of an emphasis on 'consensus' in pursuit of 'national unity', obfuscating underlying power inequalities on which such consensus is frequently based.

The failure to recognise the conflicting nature of democratic politics, and exclusionary citizenship created by the drive for 'consensus' and 'national unity', creates the space for unmediated forms of violence, as marginalised citizens violently express an intolerable weight of frustration.

With a large voter turnout and little violence directly related to polling, the April 2009 elections in South Africa were hailed as an indicator of the 'maturity' of South Africa's democracy. But in the days following the elections, violent community protests swept across the country, such as the burning of a library in Siyathemba township in Mpumalanga, and have remained ongoing to date.

This article investigates the apparent paradox between the 'peacefulness' of South Africa's election process and the violent community protests that predated and have continued since the country's fourth democratic elections.

UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRACY

This article disputes common sense expectations that elections can conclusively mitigate conflict in society, and questions the aspiration towards consensus on which this expectation is founded, which hides the implication of power in this ostensibly 'ideology-free' process.

This understanding of elections is grounded in

¹ Fukuyama F (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press.

a juridical, administrative vision of the political that is unable to encompass conflict within the political and social domains because it cannot recognise the struggles for popular sovereignty on which many of these, sometimes bloody, conflicts are founded.

The failure to recognise the conflicting nature of democratic politics, and exclusionary citizenship created by the drive for 'consensus' and 'national unity', creates the space for unmediated forms of violence, as marginalised citizens violently express an intolerable weight of frustration.

As Neocosmos in *From Foreign Native to Native Foreigner* (2006) points out, the way in which citizenship has been constructed in post-apartheid SA has been fundamentally 'passive'. Being born in South Africa confers citizenship status, rather than the active participation that existed during the struggle against apartheid.

Chatterjee in *Democracy and the Violence of the State: A Political Negotiation of Death* (2001) seeks to interpret as profoundly political the struggles of Indian citizens in South Africa. These citizens engaged in sometimes violent, popular struggles which occurred outside the law and formal institutions. He observes that there has been a 'widening of the arena of political mobilisation ... from formally organised structures such as political parties with well-ordered internal constitutions, and coherent doctrines and programmes, to loose and often transient mobilisations, building on communication structures that would not ordinarily be recognised as political'.

POST-ELECTORAL ANTAGONISM STARKLY EVIDENT

South African analysts have struggled to interpret the violence that continues to characterise South African society, and in particular the idea that the holding of regular elections indicates an unambiguous acceptance among citizens of the values and framework of liberal democracy; and an assumption that the institutions and processes of this framework can conclusively lessen conflict in society.

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Elections don't lessen conflict

Why the 'senseless' post-poll violence?



Chipkin in *Democracy in South Africa: The State of Solidarity* (2009), however, argues that one cannot assume democratic social relations will follow automatically from democratic political institutions.

This is starkly evident in the South African context, if one compares the high levels of legitimacy enjoyed by formal political institutions with the violence characterising many aspects of our social relations.

Contrary to much social-capital literature, which assumes that democracy can function only if there are high levels of civic engagement and social connection between citizens, the South African case demonstrates that democratic institutions can take root in a society ambivalent about democratic norms and values. In this South Africa is not alone – this is also the case in many other recently democratised countries in the global South.

The closing of space for a viable and meaningful opposition to the status quo in this post-ideological, consensus-driven world can give rise to dangerous forms of anarchy, as people lack meaningful channels through which to express discontent.

Previous Afrobarometer surveys have indicated that the wider citizenry continues to show conditional enthusiasm for liberal institutions. Only a third of the electorate consider the procedural components of the political system non-negotiable – majority rule, regular elections, freedom to criticise government, and multi-party competition.

Mattes in *Democracy without People: Political Institutions and Citizenship in the New South Africa* (2007) found that the popular demand for democracy between 2000 and 2006 remained stable, rather than showing an upward trend.

Further analysis found that only 35% declared themselves unwilling to give up regular elections, and 'live under a non-elected government or leader' who could 'impose law and order, and deliver houses or jobs'. In other words, 65% of respondents were prepared to make this compromise.

FUNDAMENTAL ALIENATION

Yunus Carrim, former deputy minister of cooperative governance and traditional affairs, wrote in relation

to South African citizens' involvement in violent community protests: 'It reflects a far more fundamental alienation of people from our democracy. It suggests an acute sense of marginalisation and social exclusion ... Many of the protesters are alienated from the state as a whole, not just local government, and not just the whole state, but from society too.'

While it is assumed that the aspiration for free and fair elections is a common-sense objective, ... what is seldom questioned is whether these aspirations are achievable, or even desirable, and whether, in seeking to impose consensus which disallows opposition, we unleash unmediated forms of violence and opposition.

Thus, while liberal conceptions assume that conflict can be mediated through administration and regular elections, allowing people to 'choose their representatives in a neutral playing field', these undoubtedly important processes are in fact intricately coordinated with a deeper struggle for sovereignty. This struggle is often expressed in bloody conflict against an 'other'.

The conventional assumption is that elections are able to 'magically' manage and resolve the fundamental contradictions and antagonisms of society in a dangerous obfuscation. It conceals a conservatism that seeks to impose a manufactured consensus on society and ignores the unequal power relations embedded within this 'consensus'.

The closing of space for a viable and meaningful opposition to the status quo in this post-ideological, consensus-driven world can give rise to dangerous forms of anarchy, as people lack meaningful channels through which to express discontent.

One reason for optimism, however, is that in the light of its fractured and divided past South Africa became increasingly concerned with the quest for national unity and reconciliation, which would hopefully prevent violent conflict between antagonistic groupings.

Mattes argues that the focus of the ruling ANC on nation-building has been at the expense of an emphasis on democracy, as 'support for democracy remains to some extent contingent on whether the state is able to deliver'.

OPPOSITION LEADS TO OSTRACISM

This emphasis on 'nation-building', combined with the continued political dominance of the ANC, has meant that the space for contesting dominant ideological paradigms is weakened. Opposition to this 'national vision' can lead to ostracism and 'othering'.

In the post-colonial global South, the contradictory impact of consensus-driven politics is particularly stark, since the transition to democracy in many of these countries has frequently been accompanied by rising violence, as the deregulation associated with transition creates new opportunities for contestation.

While it is assumed that the aspiration for free and fair elections is a common-sense objective which merely requires tinkering with electoral mechanisms, codes of conduct, deployment of election officials and so on, what is seldom questioned is whether these aspirations are achievable, or even desirable, and whether, in seeking to impose consensus which disallows opposition, we unleash unmediated forms of violence and opposition.

A number of valid explanations can be offered for violence – inequality, municipal corruption, lack of access to local government, housing policy and migration – but these all balk at the point at which we are asked to link them with the actual violence, which often appears profoundly irrational.

To quote Chatterjee: 'This is a zone where ... the certainties of civil and social norms and constitutional proprieties are put to the challenge. Rights and rules have to be, seemingly, negotiated afresh. Only those voices are heard that can make the loudest noise, and can speak on behalf of the largest numbers. There is violence in the air.'

Summary of an article published in the Journal of African Elections (2010) 9(2):79–99, Elections: Extinguishing antagonism in society?

Author: Dr Vanessa Barolsky, chief researcher, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery programme, HSRC.

ABSTINENCE AMONG SA YOUTH

Is there buy-in?

The goals of the five-year Abstinence and Be Faithful Among Youth (ABY) project were to bolster abstinence, faithfulness and the avoidance of unhealthy sexual behaviour among youths. KEITSHEPILE GEOFFREY SETSWE and KHANGELANI ZUMA conducted a quantitative baseline evaluation of the ABY project in five South African cities, with data collected from 1 620 respondents just before the ABY intervention started.



Many young women in sub-Saharan Africa are engaging in premarital sex before age 20. Among young men, sex before marriage is even more common. A significant minority of youths are even engaging in sex before the age of 15. Research also shows that almost half of new HIV cases occur among young people aged 15–24, making efforts to change sexual behaviour among youths a vital component in the fight against the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

In a South African population-based survey, 40% of male and 25% of female South African youths aged 15–24 reported having more than one concurrent sexual partner.

Adolescent sexual behaviour has been found to create social and psychological problems such as an early commitment to a serious relationship, anxiety, guilt and fear, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), abortions, and single parenthood, which often leads to poor developmental outcomes.

THE ABY PROJECT

HIV/AIDS prevention through sexual abstinence is a cornerstone of HIV-prevention campaigns targeting the youth, as is encouraging safer-sex practices such as condom use, and the distribution of condoms at no cost. Such campaigns often have disappointing results, however, even in areas where condoms are widely available and awareness about STIs is high.

The goals of the Abstinence and Be Faithful Among Youth (ABY) project, implemented by the Olive Leaf Foundation, were to enhance local responses among the youth in South Africa to prevent HIV infection through encouraging abstinence, faithfulness and the avoidance of unhealthy sexual behaviour among youths over a five-year period.

ABY interventions promoted dignity and self-worth, the importance of abstinence in reducing the transmission of HIV, the importance of delaying sexual activity until marriage, the development of skills for practising abstinence (and, where appropriate, secondary abstinence), the elimination of casual sexual partnerships, the importance of marriage and mutual faithfulness in reducing the transmission of HIV among individuals in long-term relationships, and the importance of HIV counselling and testing as a way of significantly reducing the risk of HIV infection.

HIV/AIDS prevention through sexual abstinence is a cornerstone of HIV-prevention campaigns targeting the youth.

This study was conducted using two types of questionnaires, one for learners aged 10–14 years and another for learners/youths aged 15–24 years. Key ques-

tions centred on awareness and knowledge of HIV/AIDS, attitudes towards people living with HIV/AIDS, views on dating, relationships, sexuality and pregnancy, views on abstinence and faithfulness, the role of the media, role models and workshops in encouraging abstinence and faithfulness, and the effect of peer-group pressure and violence on abstinence and faithfulness.

Youths indicated that abstinence was a good choice because it protected against STIs and pregnancy.

EVALUATING VIEWS ON ABSTINENCE

Previous studies on the teaching of abstinence in schools in South Africa which investigated whether abstinence messages were appropriate and effective, found that abstinence levels were 81% (87% in intervention female participants and 75% in intervention male participants) in South Africa. The reasons cited for abstaining from sex were: the individual was not ready; to protect his or her health; and that friends were teasing him or her.

Youths indicated that abstinence was a good choice because it protected against STIs and pregnancy. Another South African study, this time on transitions to adulthood in South Africa, found that adolescents were 3.9 times

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ABSTINENCE AMONG SA YOUTH Is there buy-in?

more likely to practise secondary abstinence in 2001 than in 1999. Girls were 9.3 times more likely to abstain while boys were 2.2 times more likely to abstain. Young people clearly have strong views on and support for abstinence. They also have strong views on and perceptions of remaining faithful to one partner.

In line with these findings, the ABY study found that young people had strong views on abstaining from sexual intercourse (Table 1). A significant number of young people (83%) said that it is possible not to have sex for as long as you are able to. Only 8.8% of the young people thought it is not possible to not have sex for as long as you can. About 8.2% of the respondents were unsure whether it was possible or not to not have sex for as long as you can. The results show that few respondents strongly disagreed that it is possible to not have sex for as long as you can, with a linear increase towards strongly agreeing.

Comparing young men to young women, the ABY study showed a strong association between gender and whether it is possible not to have sex for as long as you can. Young men were more likely than young women to be in agreement. Similarly, the older the respondents, the more likely they were to agree that it is possible to not have sex for as long as you can.

Comparing age, the older the respondents (15–19), the greater the likelihood that they were to support abstinence as a way of preventing HIV infection (Table 2).

72.1% said role models can help young people abstain from sex, while 14.9% said role models cannot help young people to abstain from sex.

THE IMPACT OF MEDIA AND ROLE MODELS

Current statistics show that the majority of South African youth (78.4%) believe that newspapers, television and radio encourage faithfulness in relationships, while only 10.0% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. In total, 11.7% of the respondents are unsure of the media's role in encouraging faithfulness in relationships.

In a survey conducted by the Kaizer Family Foundation (KFF) and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) among nearly 4 000 South Africans aged 15–24 in 2006, an overwhelming majority (96%) said that television and radio are generally doing a good job of communicating about HIV/AIDS, and 89% said that television and radio has had a positive impact on their own understanding of HIV/AIDS and related sexual activity.

In agreement with these findings, this study showed that 68.1% of participants said that the media had a

Table 1: Young people's views on abstinence

VARIABLE	TOTAL	It is possible to not have sex for as long as you can (%)				
		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Unsure	Agree	Strongly agree
Overall	1 122	1.7	7.1	8.2	22.5	60.5
Sex						
Male	482	2.3	7.7	11.0	25.7	53.3
Female	640	1.3	6.7	6.1	20.0	65.9
Age in years						
10 to 14	423	1.0	11.58	10.64	24.59	52.25
15 to 19	609	1.97	4.60	7.22	22.50	63.71
20 to 24	90	3.33	3.33	3.33	12.22	77.78
City						
Johannesburg	158	1.27	5.06	5.06	24.05	64.56
Cape town	432	2.78	6.71	11.81	23.38	55.32
Durban	151	3.31	8.61	5.30	23.18	59.60
Port Elizabeth	333	0.00	8.71	6.31	21.02	63.96
Mthatha	48	0.00	2.08	8.33	16.67	72.92

Table 2: Young people's views on the role of abstinence in preventing infection with HIV

VARIABLE	TOTAL	Not having sex is the best way of preventing infection with HIV (%)				
		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Unsure	Agree	Strongly agree
Overall	1113	1.98	7.91	11.68	20.49	57.95
Sex						
Male	480	1.67	8.13	15.00	21.25	53.96
Female	633	2.21	7.74	9.16	19.91	60.98
Age in years						
10 to 14	421	0.95	9.03	13.54	24.23	52.26
15 to 19	602	2.82	7.81	11.63	17.94	59.80
20 to 24	90	1.11	3.33	3.33	20.00	72.22
City						
Johannesburg	148	1.35	4.73	9.46	22.30	62.16
Cape town	433	3.00	8.31	14.09	19.40	55.20
Durban	151	4.64	7.95	8.61	21.19	57.62
Port Elizabeth	333	0.00	8.11	9.31	22.22	60.36
Mthatha	48	0.00	12.50	22.92	10.42	54.17

The two different questionnaires were administered for the different age groups, but the results reported in the tables are for the entire collected data.

positive influence on encouraging abstinence. In total, 68.7% of young people said that the media encouraged faithfulness in relationships and 84.6% said that life-skills workshops were helpful in encouraging them to remain faithful to one partner.

Role models are also important influences on young people's sexual behaviour. Of the respondents in the study, 72.1% said role models can help young people abstain from sex, while 14.9% said role models cannot help young people to abstain from sex. A significantly large number of respondents (84.3%) said that leadership and life-skills workshops are helpful in encouraging young people to abstain from sex.

MAKING ABSTINENCE REAL

The findings of this study are a valuable guide to the views and perceptions of young people. There was

strong support for abstinence as a way of preventing infection with HIV. In total, 78.5% of young people believed that not having sex is the best way to prevent HIV infection.

Summary of an article published in Health SA, Journal of Interdisciplinary Health Sciences. This article can be downloaded from www.hsag.co.za.

Authors: Professor Keitshepile Geoffrey Setswe, head, School of Public Health, Monash University, South Africa, former director, HSRC; Dr Khangelani Zuma, director, HIV/AIDS, STIs and TB programme, HSRC.



BINGE drinking

Catch it early

A survey of South Africans' habits highlights the need for early interventions to address the growing scourge of alcohol abuse, KARL PELTZER, ALICIA DAVIDS and PETER NJUHO maintain.

In South Africa the burden of disease attributable to alcohol use in 2000 was estimated at 7.1% of all deaths and 7% of total disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs). In terms of alcohol-attributable disability, alcohol-use disorders ranked first (44.6%), interpersonal violence second (23.2%), and foetal alcohol syndrome third (18.1%).

As there is a need for accurate recent national prevalence data on adolescent and adult alcohol use in South Africa, the aim of this secondary analysis of the South African National HIV, Incidence, Behaviour and Communication 2008 survey was to provide current data to develop and implement effective alcohol-use policies and intervention programmes. However, future impact studies are needed to assess the impact of problem drinking.

HOW DO WE DRINK?

The drinking pattern in a country or within a group is an important determinant of types and levels of problems associated with consumption.

In much of the developing world, the predominant pattern is of infrequent heavy drinking, particularly by men. This includes binge drinking (five or more drinks on the same occasion for men and four or more for women), hazardous drinking (quantity or patterns of consumption that place the user at risk for adverse health events) and harmful drinking (intake that causes adverse events, for instance, physical or psychological harm).

HARD EVIDENCE

A multi-stage random population sample of 15 828 persons ages 15 or older (56.3% women) was included in the survey in South Africa in 2008.

Current (past-month) consumption was reported by 41.5% of men and 17.1% of women. White men (69.8%) were most likely and Indian or Asian women (15.2%) least likely to be current drinkers. Urban residents (33.4%) were more likely than rural dwellers (18.3%) to report current drinking.

Binge and hazardous or harmful drinking was highest in men among coloureds (31.9% and 31.6%, respectively) and in women also among coloureds (10.4% and 9.7%, respectively), followed by white men for binge drinking (19.9%) and black and white men for hazardous or harmful drinking (15.5% and 15.2%, respectively). Hazardous or harmful alcohol use was significantly higher in men (17%) than women (2.9%). For both men and women, higher rates of alcohol use (current use, binge drinking and hazardous or harmful drinking) were recorded in urban than rural areas. For both men and women, the highest current drinking, binge and hazardous or harmful drinking levels were reported in two provinces (Western Cape and Northern Cape). Current drinkers among men and women were higher in higher educational groups of Grade 12 and higher (more than 50%) than lower educational groups from no education to Grade 11 (below 33%). Likewise the proportion of current drinkers and binge drinkers increased with increasing income (from not employed 25.3% and 6.7%, respectively, to more than R48 001 a year income 55.2% and 14.4%, respectively).

Overall 9.6% said they had engaged in past-month binge drinking, which is a slight increase from the SABSSM II 2005 survey overall 7.4% (men, 14.3% and women, 3.2%). Risky or hazardous or harmful drinking was reported by 9%, significantly up from 6.2% reported in the 2005 survey.

The study's limitations included a 10.9% survey

non-response rate from the total sample of 15 828. Also, because the household survey on consumption is self-reported, it may under-report the true consumption rate.

DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT

For populations with high rates of hazardous alcohol use, both population-wide measures ('sin' tax, for instance) and individual-based interventions, such as brief healthcare-provider advice, have been shown to have a notable impact on reducing the global burden of alcohol misuse.

Most alcohol-related harm is attributable to hazardous/harmful drinkers, who also make disproportionate use of primary healthcare systems, even though brief, easily delivered interventions are effective in this group of people. And with our healthcare system currently providing tertiary care services to treat dependence – often with a poor outcome – this focus needs to shift towards providing brief interventions for early alcohol-use disorders. Effective evidence-based combinations of psychosocial and pharmacological treatments for alcohol-use disorders are available, but costly.

Summary of an article published in the African Journal of Psychiatry (2010), Alcohol use and problem drinking in South Africa: Findings from a 2008 national population-based survey.

Authors: Professor Karl Peltzer, research director, HIV/AIDS, STIs and TB (HAST) research programme; Dr Peter Njuho, senior research specialist, HAST; Alicia Davids, senior researcher, HAST.

Treating TB patients' mental health



Despite the fact that tuberculosis (TB) is a completely curable disease, it is one of the leading causes of death among the age group five years and older. Adherence to treatment regimens is critical to changing that.

TB-related deaths were estimated at 1.3 million in 2007 with an additional 456 000 deaths among HIV-positive TB patients. Many people with TB are co-infected with HIV. Consequently, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has placed an additional burden on health authorities' attempts to contain the cost of the treatment and prevention of TB.

People who have a lifelong or infectious disease and who have limited social, psychological and economic resources, find it extremely difficult to maintain a reasonable quality of life.

Based on a previous qualitative study at a public health clinic in the Cape Metropole, our study put forward the idea that assessing the prevalence and severity of the psychosocial factors of helplessness and depression, as well as the quality of social support among people with TB, may provide indicators of how to provide interventions.

The findings indicated that helplessness and depression had a negative influence on adherence to the directly observed treatment short-course (DOTS) strategy. We concluded that assessment and treatment should include screening for depression and provide the necessary interventions.

PSYCHOSOCIAL FACTORS

The social determinants of health, such as anxiety,

Treating depression and increasing the quality of social support should improve the overall management of TB infection and raise the cure rate, write PAMELA NAIDOO and KELVIN MWABA.

insecurity, low self-esteem, social isolation, lack of control over one's home and working life, are well established. People who have a lifelong or infectious disease and who have limited social, psychological and economic resources, find it extremely difficult to maintain a reasonable quality of life.

The pioneering research by MEP Seligman (1975) examined learned helplessness and described how, when individuals are unable to control the events in their lives, they learn that they cannot affect outcomes and, therefore, cease to try. Learned helplessness is the reaction to repeated exposure to uncontrollable events that do not allow the individual to effect change.

According to Seligman, individuals become helpless in three specific areas, namely, motivational (when efforts to change the outcome cease), cognitive (when no new responses that could help avoid aversive outcomes in the future are learned), and emotional (when depression sets in).

Depression is one of the emotional reactions to a physical disorder. Individuals may develop depression because of a continued sense of helplessness about their poor quality of life. Thus helplessness and depression are integrally linked and negatively affect individual's health outcomes. Limited social support or negative social support is also known to reduce an individual's wellbeing and is positively associated with depression.

In this sample, a high percentage of participants infected with TB were co-infected with HIV, which makes them more susceptible to developing a mood disorder, such as depression, because they are experiencing the double burden of disease.

It is clear, therefore, that the interrelationship between helplessness, depression, and poor social support should be understood in order to improve health outcomes.

In this study, participants – adults infected with TB attending a public health TB clinic in the Cape Metropole – completed a battery of questionnaires. They also completed a semi-structured questionnaire designed to assess helplessness.

RESULTS: DEPRESSION IS HIGH

Participants numbered 166 (82 men and 84 women) with a mean age of 30.5 years, which was consistent with national and international statistics on the vulnerable age ranges for becoming infected with TB. In sub-Saharan Africa, TB and HIV co-infection is particularly prevalent among young adults.

Significantly, 65% of the participants had a monthly household income of less than R500. Of the participants, 36.7% were HIV positive, of whom 31.1% were men. Bearing in mind that there was an almost equal number of male and female participants, it is important to note that the number of HIV-positive females was more than twice the number of HIV-positive males. The high HIV prevalence rate and the high TB co-infection rate of 36.7% found in this study is representative of sub-Saharan Africa.

There was a high incidence of clinical depression in the sample (64.3%), categorised as mild mood disturbance – 26.1%, borderline clinical disturbance – 10.3%, moderate depression – 15.8%, severe depression – 9.7%, and extreme depression – 3.6%.

The finding is consistent with the literature on mood disorders among chronically and terminally ill individuals. In this sample, a high percentage of participants infected with TB were co-infected with HIV, which makes them more susceptible to developing a mood disorder, such as depression, because they are experiencing the double burden of disease.

Participants in this study experienced the social support of close relatives in a positive way. This result is encouraging within the context of the way in which social support and health are currently conceptualised.

However, most participants did not report feelings of helplessness (89.1%). This finding, therefore, does not support the theoretical position that underpins this paper, in that Seligman described a sequence in which continual feelings of helplessness lead to learned

helplessness, which eventually leads to depression.

This is notable because of their under-resourced social and economic environments, disease status, and the prevalence of depression among the group.

The finding has implications for health interventions. One might assume that if the depression is treated then these people should have better health outcomes because their depression has not evolved from a sense of helplessness in the face of adversity.

SOCIAL SUPPORT A BOON

The groups of people within the social network of the participants who were considered to be supportive were spouses, parents, children, siblings, relatives, friends and neighbours.

There is ample evidence in the literature that social support serves as a buffer to the challenges associated with illness. Participants in this study experienced the social support of close relatives in a positive way. This result is encouraging within the context of the way in which social support and health are currently conceptualised.

Participants' low incidence of helplessness and high incidence of depression imply that effective management of the depression can improve the wellbeing of the TB patients. This finding can be used to advocate for a more holistic approach to healthcare programmes, particularly the inclusion of mental health services.

The DOTS approach to treating TB is demanding of the infected individual, so it stands to reason that in addition to the support of health practitioners, the support provided by members of the patient's social network will probably help to improve their health status. The high co-infection rate of TB and HIV meant that participants were having dual therapies and were involved in dual treatment programmes. An enabling and supportive environment becomes even more crucial in this situation.

Ultimately, the goal of healthcare providers is to increase the cure rates for TB. In the setting in which this study took place, we advocate that treating depression should be prioritised by healthcare practitioners. In addition, improving and engaging social support should be seen as central to their health management. Increasing the quality of social support should decrease the severity of depression, which should, in turn, facilitate the overall management of TB infection.

Summary of an article published in Social Behaviour and Personality (2010).

Authors: Prof. Pamela Naidoo, chief research specialist, HSRC, and extraordinary professor, University of the Western Cape; Kelvin Mwaba, head of the Department of Psychology, University of the Western Cape.

Abortion & contraceptive use

Sites of struggle for African men

In examining men's perspectives of contraceptive use and abortion, JEREMIAH CHIKOVORE identifies contradictions and multiplicities within gender relations and dynamics that are influenced by, among other factors, colonial-era labour mobilisation practices and socio-political dynamics.

DYNAMICS FEEDING MEN'S PERSPECTIVES

Men's ties to women and girls as sexual partners and guardians, and their connection to their families as providers seem to have a major influence on how they perceive and attempt to deal with contraceptive use, abortion, and sexuality in women related to them. How they regard these roles, in turn, depends on the effect of past and current processes and events in shaping expectations of men, their ability to meet the expectations, and how they deal with failure to measure up.

Sexuality became increasingly visible as a vehicle for pleasure and economic survival rather than simply for procreation. For both married and unmarried women, the dynamics and emerging forms of sexuality presented a motive to control and prevent childbirth.

The critical question, therefore, is: What affects the ways men experience their sense of self as well as their ability to execute role expectations on themselves? In turn, in what ways does this link to

the sexuality of both men and women today, and to insights on interventions seeking to promote sexual and reproductive health and contraceptive use?

THE DOMINO EFFECT

Colonial-era labour mobilisation strategies in southern Africa gave rise to, and in some instances made more pronounced, the male provider role. The resulting labour migration separated men from their families for long periods of time, in many cases with few economic benefits. The entire set of processes created conditions that favoured not only extramarital but also premarital sexual activity. Unmarried women lost economic security and were encouraged or forced to provide prostitution services on mines and farms, and in cities, partly for their survival but also, in principle, to stabilise male labour. At the same time many married women felt abandoned by their husbands both sexually and economically, leaving room for them to engage sexually outside of marriage. Sexuality became increasingly visible as a vehicle for pleasure and economic survival rather than simply for procreation. For both married and unmarried women, the dynamics and emerging forms of sexuality presented a motive to control and prevent childbirth.

Men weren't only driven to commercial sex

workers by desire necessarily, but possibly also to compensate for feelings of emasculation in their work settings, where they were frequently treated as 'boys' irrespective of whether they were married or had fathered children. Paradoxically men, who now related sexually with widowed and previously unmarried women, would perennially worry about their own wives' and daughters' sexuality in their absence. Men felt compelled to control – or at least imply they had such control over – their families despite their lack of proximity.

Their struggles in both home and work settings, and the emasculation they may experience seem to manifest in sometimes violent and destructive behaviour towards themselves and their families.

Today, most men in Africa have to deal with a sense of inadequacy, exacerbated by fewer employment opportunities and role switches as more women start to earn. Their struggles in both home and work settings, and the emasculation they may experience



seem to manifest in sometimes violent and destructive behaviour towards themselves and their families.

THE VOICES OF THE MEN

Data from rural Zimbabwe highlighted an additional factor that may influence men's perception of contraception and women's sexuality: the commercialised bride price. Bride price not only has become a source of income for many families; it is now a prestige symbol amid changing tastes and rising needs for luxury and accumulation.

'She has destroyed my chances of enjoying lobola [bride price] ...'

As one elderly man said in reaction to a daughter falling pregnant before marriage, thus threatening her chances of getting married and securing bride price: 'She has destroyed my chances of enjoying lobola [bride price] ... I supported her when she grew up. Whenever she got ill, I used to run around with her... And then she does the unthinkable!'

On contraception before wedlock, a young man was unambiguous: 'You get hold of her and beat

her up – so much so that she won't touch those pills before marriage. Why should she use them? Without a husband!'

Perhaps, therefore, and contrary to what is often expected, men's behaviour and perspectives may be a symptom of feeling, and dealing with, a sense of being powerless.

On wives using birth control, considered a strategy for preventing pregnancy from illicit sexual activity even when the husband is migrating for work, another man stated: 'A woman is a woman. Even when you are around she can engage in those bad activities. As a man, you may go to work even for a period of, say, two weeks, and your wife then decides she also should do as you do ...'

CONTRADICTIONS

Looking at these contradictions and the clearly disproportionate anger expressed over premarital pregnancy, sexuality and contraception through a gender/masculinity lens, against a broader socio-historical analytical

frame, the evidence points to men a) desiring to be recognised; b) struggling with a split existence between home and work; c) experiencing a deep sense of exclusion and attempting to reclaim lost space and prestige; and d) simply failing to meet the male grade and struggling to cope with such failure.

In ways that may have served to alienate men further, family planning programmes were until recently driven by bio-medical assumptions. The programmes focused only on women, who were considered as biologically the ones for whom fertility regulation was necessary, but also as subjects of abuse by men. Perhaps, therefore, and contrary to what is often expected, men's behaviour and perspectives may be a symptom of feeling, and dealing with, a sense of being powerless.

Summary of a presentation at the Men, Masculinities and Family Planning in Africa conference, Los Angeles, October 2010.

Author: Jeremiah Chikovore, senior research specialist, HSRC.

COST OF A HEALTHY DIET

Most South Africans cannot afford to eat well



The cost and inaccessibility of healthier food choices are forcing the greater majority of South Africans into an unhealthy lifestyle, find

NORMAN J TEMPLE and NELIA P STEYN.

For most South Africans, a healthy diet is unaffordable, costing on average 69% more than the unhealthy food choices they make presently. While there are several barriers between the general population and a healthier diet, cost is an important factor for South Africans in gaining access to healthier food.

Studies in the US and France have shown that refined cereals and foods with added sugar and fat are cheap sources of energy, but that they are typically low in nutrients, unlike healthy foods like meat, fish, vegetables and fruit. This means people with low incomes select a relatively less healthy diet with a low content of several micronutrients and a high energy density.

Moreover, foods with a high energy density appear to cause spontaneous overeating and may be an important factor in the high prevalence of obesity in people of low socioeconomic status.

NUTRITION IN SOUTH AFRICA

These findings are relevant to nutrition in South Africa. As a developing country, average incomes are much lower than in highly developed countries. South Africa has a high prevalence of under- and over-nutrition, including a fast-growing epidemic of obesity, especially among women.

These problems are most concentrated in the black population, where poverty is widespread and malnutrition common. In a study to determine the extra cost of a healthy diet, the prices of six commonly consumed foods were compared with that of healthier versions. A clear trend was seen for the healthier foods to be more expensive, typically 10% to 60% more on a weight basis, while the cost premium for healthier foods was considerably greater when prices were compared based on rands per mega-joule. The study found that healthier foods were 30% to 110% more expensive. On average, the healthier diet costs 69% more.

In real terms, the cost of a healthier diet was R36 more per meal (or about R1 090 per month) for a family of five. Based on a 2005–2006 survey, households whose income is exceeded by just more than half the population, the increased expenditure on food of R1 090 represents 57% of total household income. This percentage decreases to about 30% for those whose household income is exceeded by one-third of the population.

AVAILABILITY OF CHOICES

Studies in the US and other countries have reported that low-income areas often lack a supermarket with a wide selection of healthy food. Instead, people shop in small food stores where prices are higher and there are fewer healthier food choices. A similar scenario prevails in South Africa, where the small food stores in small towns offer limited healthy choices.

IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY

Recommendations need to be carefully crafted, especially when most people in the target population have a low income.

Asking people to switch from enjoyable foods to a combination of more expensive foods and cheap foods is likely to receive a lukewarm response. And because of the cost, a strategy of changing the national diet using health promotion is likely to achieve only limited success.

Overcoming this barrier will probably require a drop in food prices, in turn requiring government intervention in accessibility and with taxation and subsidies. Another strategy is to ensure healthy food choices are made in school meals or other sponsored nutrition programmes.

Summary of an article published in Nutrition (2011).

Commonly consumed food	Healthier food	Increased cost of healthier food (%) §	
		Cost per 100 g	Cost per mega-joules
hamburger (high-fat)	lean hamburger	11	44
full cream milk	fat-free milk	27	109
corn flakes	bran flakes	44	88
brick margarine	margarine (or a fat-reduced spread) rich in polyunsaturated fats	58	113
white rice	brown rice	39	50
white bread	wholewheat bread	17	29

§ Food prices were recorded at 8 supermarkets (3 in Cape Town and 5 in rural towns in the Western Cape). We then calculated the price ratios of pairs of food at the same supermarket.

Authors: Dr Norman J Temple is a researcher at the Centre for Science at Athabasca University, and Dr Nelia P Steyn is a chief research specialist in the Population Health, Health Systems and Innovation programme, HSRC.

RECYCLING IN URBAN HOUSEHOLDS

THE ROLE OF RACE, HISTORY AND SOCIAL STATUS



A study based on three annual general household surveys (2003, 2005, 2006), by BARBARA ANDERSON, JOHN ROMANI, MARIE WENTZEL and HESTON PHILLIPS, turned up some interesting anomalies.

If you're white or Asian, have had a good education and are a bit older than you'd like to be, it's a good bet that you will recycle household materials to bolster the nation's resources, improve the environment by reducing the destruction of trees, and lessening the likelihood of litter.

If you're African, on the other hand, education is only a factor when you reach the household heads with a BA or other university qualification (4%), older age will make you even less likely to recycle, and the best encouragement for you to do so is to have a child at school.

Recycling for altruistic reasons (not for money) is strongly related to education, and more common among older people.

The South African Constitution prescribes the protection of the environment, 'for the benefit of present and future generations', by legislating to prevent pollution and ecological degradation. It also advocates using natural resources while promoting economic and

social development.

For non-African households the results of research are similar to those of Europe and the United States, and recycling is more likely when it is easier for households to recycle. Local recycling programmes and the proximity of buy-back organisations or collection points are obvious factors.

Recycling for altruistic reasons (not for money) is strongly related to education, and more common among older people.

THE CHILD FACTOR

Among African households recycling is much less common, and increases little with education. But African households with a schoolchild are more likely to recycle, possibly to cooperate with school programmes and be a good role model.

An African scholar recounted growing up in an urban township where many recycled to gain a little money. Now she and her husband, both of whom have Master's degrees, 'do not think about recycling much'. The only time she recycles is when she sends paper with her son for a school paper drive.

She notes that her son is taught in school that behaviour such as wearing a seatbelt and recycling is good.

These reminiscences of an apartheid township may explain the apparent anomaly: older Africans, having lived longer under apartheid, remember recycling as a means of surviving, and apparently want to put that behind them.

Intriguingly, white people with a child at school are less likely to recycle, possibly because they are so busy with the daily rush of getting children to school and extramural activities.

A series of focus group will be conducted in order to gain insight into the sources of African perceptions and behaviours and to examine whether the explanations that have been developed based on statistical analysis of large data sets are borne out or modified through examination of qualitative data.

LITTERING

For every group, perceiving littering as a problem is likely to increase recycling, but the level is lowest among Africans, somewhat higher among coloureds and even higher in white or Asian households.

But South Africa does have a good record of recycling metal beverage cans, with an estimated level of 80 to 90% in 2004. Much of this is by individual entrepreneurs, rather than household recycling.

In developed countries, recycling is commensurate with social status, but there has been little research on recycling in the developing world.

It may take some time for African households to see recycling as worthwhile for the common welfare. So what could spur a higher level of recycling in African households, as 'wait a generation' is not an option? Better school education on recycling, more collection programmes and more and better located buy-back centres would likely increase recycling among all urban residents, especially Africans.

Based on a presentation at the HSRC Seminar Series, and is available on www.hsrc.ac.za.

Authors: Professors Barbara Anderson and John Romani, University of Michigan; Marie Wentzel, chief researcher, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery programme, HSRC; Heston Phillips, UNAIDS.



BUILDING A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY IN SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa is striving to become a knowledge-based economy but not all the essential building blocks are yet in place for a smooth transition in this regard, say WILLIAM BLANKLEY and IRMA BOOYENS.

New knowledge, innovation and technological change have become the drivers of progress, growth and wealth in the world's leading economies as they have evolved over the past two decades into knowledge-based economies, shedding their reliance on traditional resources such as labour and capital.

While innovation is identified as a driver for economic growth and productivity, the capacity to innovate remains low in most African countries.

Knowledge-based economies have the potential to stimulate economic growth, provide higher wages and greater employment opportunities, as well as enhance a country's competitiveness within the global environment.

While innovation is identified as a driver for economic growth and productivity, the capacity to innovate remains low in most African countries. The globalisation of technology, however, presents new opportunities for development in developing countries, but deliberate efforts, which include government action, are required to stimulate innovation. It requires investment in human capital and a highly skilled labour


force and the creation of infrastructure for high-technology industries.

KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY INDICATORS

Knowledge economy indicators (KEIs) play a crucial role in national policy debates, and in South Africa, the Centre for Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators (CeSTII) of the HSRC helps inform these debates through the provision of indicators based on the results of the surveys they undertake. Yet even though science and technology indicator initiatives exist in South Africa, there are gaps between the conceptual and empirical

aspects of measuring the knowledge economy. The KEI project, initiated by the department of science and technology (DST), aims to expand the list of traditional indicators, such as research and development (R&D) and innovation indicators, patent data and bibliometric data on patterns of scientific publications and citations, as well as to incorporate new indicators.

Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a percentage of GDP reflects the intensity of R&D performance. This indicator is used by politicians to set targets, such as expenditure on R&D reaching 3% of GDP in the EU by 2010 and 1% in South Africa by



2008. However, these targets have not been achieved. South Africa's GERD as a percentage of GDP amounted to 0.92% in the financial year 2008/2009.

Figure 1 shows that South Africa compares well with middle- to-low income countries, such as Hungary, though it ranks well below other developing countries such as China (1.47%), but higher than Argentina (0.51%). We have a fairly strong investment in R&D intensive industries, including pharmaceuticals, electronics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology and open source software, and R&D in these industries accounted for about 22.9% of GERD in 2008.

A specific framework of conditions is necessary to enable South Africa to make the transition towards a knowledge-based economy.

PATENTS AND PUBLICATIONS

Patents and publications are traditional science and technology indicators that are readily quantifiable and auditable and reflect the outputs of the national system of innovation. Publications generally represent the outputs of academic research while patents represent the technological outputs of industry.

South Africa applied for 265 patents at the US Patent Office in 2008 and was granted 91 patents in the same year while countries such as India and Brazil were granted 679 and 103 patents, respectively. In terms of triadic patent families (US, Europe and Japan), South Africa had 28 of these in 2008, compared with nine by Argentina and 63 by the Russian Federation.

In respect of publication outputs, South Africa ranked 38th out of all countries in all fields from 1999 to 2009, clearly lagging behind other developing countries such as China, India, Brazil and Argentina (Figure 2). However, country comparisons of the number of publications and citations should also take into account the population and the number of researchers.

Highly skilled human resources are the most critical component in building a knowledge-based economy. South Africa performs relatively poorly with only 1.4 fulltime equivalent researchers per 1 000 total employment, compared with 8.2 in the UK and more than 10 in Denmark and Japan (Figure 3).

Industry and global market indicators, such as foreign direct investment (FDI), measure competitiveness. FDI as a percentage of GDP fluctuated between 2005 and 2007 and remained quite low, although it increased to 4% of GDP in 2008. A large part of the FDI in South Africa comprises equity investments as opposed to fixed

productive investment.

The manufacturing trade balance and the high-tech manufacturing trade balance is negative and it is clear that payments for general imports and technology tend to be higher than receipts. This means that South Africa imports and buys more technology than it exports or sells. However, technology imports can have a positive effect if they are used productively or incorporated into new developments.

COMMITMENT AND TIGHTER POLICIES NEEDED

A specific framework of conditions is necessary to enable South Africa to make the transition towards a knowledge-based economy. It would include education and human capital development, an effective national system of innovation and a conducive business environment. Policies to enhance the knowledge economy should include economic development strategies built around innovation, education and learning, as well as policies to develop competitive structures and strong organisations able to deal with global competition and market forces.

The DST has set an R&D expenditure target of 2% of GDP by 2018. However, the business sector provides the greatest share of R&D expenditure. In 2007, South African R&D expenditure by business was nearly 58% of GERD. That means that either the government would have to invest in vast new R&D projects to achieve the new targets or alternatively would have to find new mechanisms to encourage business to increase its R&D expenditure. This would best be achieved as a partnership with government. To have reached the previous 1% target in 2008, South Africa would have required an extra R1.8bn in R&D expenditure. The target of 2% by 2018 therefore appears elusive.

South Africa's growth-orientated exposition of the knowledge economy, rooted in the notion of free competition and reliance on new technology and innovation, is insufficient in terms of promoting long-term human development. A knowledge-based economy will not necessarily ensure national economic prosperity, improved health and wellbeing, ecological sustainability and reduced inequalities. That means a balance between the expansion of the knowledge economy and sustainability, long-term growth and development are important policy considerations for South Africa. As they stand, the country's policies in support of a knowledge-based economy are too broad and attempt to simultaneously tackle growth and development when these essentially require distinct and specific policy emphases.

Summary of an article published in the South African Journal of Science (2010) 106(12):15–20.

Authors: William Blankley and Irma Booyens, Centre for Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators, HSRC.

Figure 2: Countries ranking on ISI citations in all fields, 1999–2009





Figure 3: Total researchers per thousand total employment, 2008 or latest available year*



WHERE ARE THE POOR IN INOVATION STUDIES?


The poor hardly feature in innovation studies, yet could really benefit from a new look at how their innovation systems work, write JO LORENTZEN and RAHMA MOHAMED.

Innovation is *en vogue*, and as a field of scientific enquiry, innovation studies are now being pursued by researchers all over the world. Indeed, 'innovation' has replaced 'competitiveness' as one of the more faddish terms on the planet. It's about achieving one happy planet through creating the global knowledge economy. But there's a conundrum in that the poor hardly feature in innovation studies. The large majority of innovation research focuses on how to make high-income economies keep their place in the sun. Very little work is dedicated to the catch-up, let alone take-off, of low income countries (LICs), those regions that need these insights most.

... but who out there studies how innovation, whether technological or otherwise, can lift the bottom billion out of misery? By and large, not the innovation research community.

POORER COUNTRIES NOT ON THE RADAR

Almost a billion people live in LICs. Four out of five inhabitants survive (or not) on less than \$1.25 (R8.99) a day and make up the world's poorest people (World Bank 2008). In fact, about half the world's population lives on less than \$2 (R14.40) a



day. So the poor are a sizeable constituency.

International organisations like NEPAD, UNCTAD and the World Bank exhort the transformational role that science, technology and innovation can and must play in changing their fate for the better by graduating into a global knowledge economy, but who out there studies how innovation, whether technological or otherwise, can lift the bottom billion out of misery? By and large, not the innovation research community.

WHY NOT?

Literature in the field marginalises LICs. One

possibility is that there is simply no innovation in LICs and hence nothing to research. It's been postulated, for example, that it makes no sense to conceive of innovation in developing countries as all they are doing is adopting existing foreign technologies in the interest of upgrading. Implicit in this view is that innovation is the icing on the cake that takes place exclusively in advanced economies.

A second possibility is that there is innovation in LICs but everybody is too busy studying innovation in 'sexier countries'. Researchers have incentives to devote themselves to Brazilian biofuel, Indian IT, Chinese genetic engineering or South African

telescopes, but the same is decidedly not the case for, say, irrigation systems in Eritrea or sheep husbandry in Tajikistan or healthcare service provision in Papua New Guinea.

It's been postulated, for example, that it makes no sense to conceive of innovation in developing countries as all they are doing is adopting existing foreign technologies in the interest of upgrading.

The third possibility is that there is innovation, but that researchers don't know how to approach it in LICs. New-to-world products from big firms are quite different to the more informal innovations of smaller firms, for instance, but the analytical tools to understand these are inappropriate. The fourth possibility is that there is innovation, but we don't recognise it in informal economies, as they may be happening in social contexts and not in tangible technologies or products.

The third possibility is that there is innovation, but that researchers don't know how to approach it in LICs.

THERE'S A NEED

Innovation in health systems is enormously important for development in Africa and South Asia, yet that is just one of the needs in poor countries that innovation studies have ignored or failed. At best, the research is piecemeal and messy. Innovation is of course also a collective endeavour by people to better their lot. What should happen is that these many small tales should combine into a compelling story that spells out how catch-up in LICs can work. More adequate models would then emerge, and research on how innovation affects the poor would certainly benefit. In the end, maybe even the poor would.

This is an extract from a paper prepared for the NickFest, Science and Technology Policy Research (SPRU), University of Sussex.

The late Dr Jo Lorentzen was a chief research specialist, Science and Innovation unit, in the research programme on Education and Skills Development, HSRC; Rahma Mohamed was a researcher in the same unit. She is currently pursuing PhD studies at Tilburg University in the Netherlands.

GHANA'S INNOVATION SYSTEM ON 'LIFE SUPPORT'

Science, technology and innovation (STI) are expected to play a key role in lifting Ghana to middle-income status by 2020. Yet after extensive fieldwork in Ghana, JO LORENTZEN found that the Ghanaian national innovation system – in particular the role of public research institutes and the three largest universities – is severely hampered by lack of funding, and is underperforming as a result.

LITTLE BANG FOR SMALL BUCK

The funding inputs to Ghana's research system leave much to be desired. Ghana's Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, for one, is a top-heavy organisation that employs its staff without giving them the means to do research. The annual reports of the 13 individual institutions constituting the CSIR highlight inadequate funding, especially to equip laboratories and workshops, inadequate and late release of government funds and unsatisfactory resources for infrastructure and farm machinery, to name just a few constraints.

Individual institutes suffer noticeably from lack of resources. For instance, the Centre for Scientific Research into Plant Medicine has no laboratory facilities to isolate active ingredients or marker compounds. Not surprisingly, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals exports based on Ghana's abundant biological diversity have not materialised.

MEAGRE OUTPUTS

In 2007, all Ghanaian universities graduated less than one percent of their students with a PhD in all science and engineering subjects. They contribute barely a handful of highly trained junior scientists or engineers to the country in a given year, including for the replenishment of their own faculty. Academics blame a huge teaching load for their low research output, reflected in the lack of published research.

In essence the whole system is on life support. For the most part things work badly, and without external and international partners they would not work at all. And despite the lip service it pays to science and technology, the government seems to regard the research system primarily as an expense, rather than a potential asset.

IS THERE A SOLUTION?

The government must increase its budgetary allocation to science and technology. Knowledge workers need to be well paid. They also need quality equipment and facilities. Such investments only make sense in the context of long-term commitments that necessarily

transcend electoral cycles. An increase in spending for a few years, followed by another funding drought, is futile.

Secondly, the government should consider bringing the entire science and technology system under one ministerial roof. It would be easier then to identify and address co-ordination and other failures, as opposed to several departments battling to overcome silo mentalities and bureaucratic obstacles.

The CSIR must take a hard look at its entire business model in each institute and in the organisation as a whole.

Thirdly, the research system must become more efficient. The CSIR must take a hard look at its entire business model in each institute and in the organisation as a whole. In particular, it cannot shy away from assessing the costs of employing people in non-productive positions.

Fourthly, external income needs to increase, via incentives to encourage academics to win international research tenders to commercialise technological innovation.

And finally, the entire system must increase its self-reflexivity. Annual reports must be taken more seriously, and reviews undertaken at regular intervals, including through external panels, in order to monitor whether the system is on track.

The alternative is tantamount to bidding the knowledge economy farewell.

Summary of an article published in the African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development (2010).

The late Dr Jo Lorentzen was a chief research specialist, Science and Innovation unit, HSRC.

THE SADC BLOC, TAKE TWO

Regional economic integration has not fared well. But will the next phase under Jacob Zuma and Rob Davies do any better, asks DARLENE MILLER.



Regional economic integration in post-apartheid southern Africa has not fared as well as the region's governments have hoped. As the minister of trade and industry, Dr Rob Davies, puts it, 'show me how to do regional integration and I will do it'.

Supra-national regions are an important instrument for global leverage in today's shifting global hierarchies.

Although the idea of regional cooperation remains an objective of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), it faces many challenges – mainly the institutional shortcomings of the SADC, bilateral trade arrangements by SADC members with the global North (EU and US) and the business cultures of foreign investors.

While combined regional action through the SADC remains the objective, the organisation's members have undertaken separate endeavours for economic security – and South Africa has not been immune to this.

Yet regional integration is not simply a nice idea. Supra-national regions are an important instrument for global leverage in today's shifting global hierarchies. US hegemony has faltered in various ways, including the failure of key financial institutions. Alongside the shifting global power blocs, middle regions such as

India, Brazil and Russia, and the newly termed Next-11 states, present new and potentially alternative power blocs through which South and southern Africa may find important political and economic alliances.

South Africa has a middle-income economy with a highly developed infrastructure, industry, managerial expertise and valuable mineral resources and is playing a regional global role.

South Africa's recent acceptance into the BRICbloc (Brazil, Russia, India and China) affirms some level of success in South Africa's global strategies.

BUTTERFLY STRATEGY

The formation of the IBSA grouping (India, Brazil and South Africa) and the support by the South African government is one example of the butterfly strategy of the department of trade and industry (dti), where it simultaneously implemented a number of key strategies for South Africa's regional and global expansion. South Africa's recent acceptance into the BRICbloc (Brazil, Russia, India and China) affirms some level of success in South Africa's global strategies.

Not only are the new regional powers affecting the architecture of global geopolitics, they have also become key new investors. In addition to its global political expansion, the South African government has

to ensure that it holds its own on the continent in the face of investment competition from China and India.

One strategy of the dti is the Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) developed under former president Thabo Mbeki. The SDI programme was conceived in 1995 to improve the functioning of government in areas where the greatest potential for growth existed.

For the first phase, eleven SDIs were planned for South Africa. They were the Maputo Development Corridor, the Phalaborwa SDI, the Platinum SDI, the West Coast Investment Initiative, the Fish River SDI, the Wild Coast SDI, the Richards Bay SDI, the Durban and Pietermaritzburg nodes, the Lubombo SDI and the Gauteng Special Economic Zones. Targeted interventions were meant to tap unrealised economic potential.

Although the SDI programme lost momentum in the latter days of the Mbeki administration, the initiative has been resuscitated as part of the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) envisaged for the next phase of South and southern African growth and development. Resources have been carried over from the previous phase through the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA).

While the premise of the SDIs is investment, the strategy emphasises the importance of economic governance and local development that is cognisant of its environmental and socioeconomic consequences. The need for checks and balances, and the need to support local economic development by assisting local



suppliers and small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) when industrial clusters are established, are recurrent themes.

While the premise of the SDIs is investment, the strategy emphasises the importance of economic governance and local development that is cognisant of its environmental and socioeconomic consequences.

FUNDING ANCHOR PROJECTS

Collaborative investment strategies through public-private partnerships are the principal source for funding anchor projects and development corridors. Central to the success of the SDIs is the implementation of measures that identify growth hubs, marshal the financial and industrial capacity of parastatals and target potential public-private investor combinations.

These measures are aimed at supporting infrastructure. Anchor projects, such as Mozal in the Maputo Development Corridor, are the principal source of revenue. Infrastructure development is a pivotal element in the first phase of SDI development. Infrastructure bottlenecks have been highlighted as among the top three impediments to investors.

A key dynamic in post-apartheid regional development has been South African investment in southern Africa, and ensuring that foreign and South

African investment embeds successfully remains an essential component. Extending the reach of South African capital in Africa is also an important goal for the Zuma regime.

That has been evidenced by the size and frequency of the combined state-business delegations led by President Zuma, but it is not clear how these delegations are informed by the SDI methodology, or to what extent the minister's vision is integrated with these forages into resource-rich countries of the region.

Infrastructure bottlenecks have been highlighted as among the top three impediments to investors.

Consultations have been held over the past two years with Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Namibia and Tanzania and a revised Regional Spatial Development Initiative Programme (RSDIP) has been planned. The RSDIP sees its primary role as reconfiguring infrastructure investments in transport, power, communications, ICT and water. The participants in the initial phase are Mozambique, Tanzania, the DRC, South Africa and

non-SADC members Rwanda and Burundi. The intention is that the programme will extend to Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Angola and Namibia.

TECHNICAL CAPACITY A PROBLEM

Shifting institutional dynamics in the post-apartheid skills environment have, however, created a new set of operational challenges. Technical capacity has been destabilised as experienced apartheid-era experts have exited without training a new generation of technicians, especially in the parastatals. Know-how deficiencies plague technical capacity and lead to institutional costs in government.

Alongside infrastructure bottlenecks, land has also emerged as an area of contestation.

Challenges facing SDI focal points also relate to how the community of beneficiaries is determined. In past SDI programmes, a desire to fast-track programmes often led to inadequate or patchy consultation and difficulty in identifying representative leadership.

If the objective is again to fast-track SDIs, the question is whether this will lead to similar challenges. There is evidence that working-class communities are likely to obstruct development if they feel they are not deriving sufficient benefit.

The RSDIP may well be more feasible with binational and tri-national intra-regional relationships between countries in southern Africa than with an over-arching regionalist objective. Cross-border industrial clusters have greater potential for success where there are strong political and economic relationships. But what kind of regionalism is invoked by these internal power clusters where the potential exists for blocs of countries to undermine and compete within the region? Regional ambitions towards greater global leverage could well be undermined by intra-regional arrangements.

Business cultures become one important variable in determining the potential for strategic alliances. The potential of an SDI can be negated or enhanced by the kinds of organisational structures and strategies of South African business in the region.

In early post-apartheid South Africa, capital flowed into other parts of Africa within the context of regional developmental objectives that placed equitable regional development as an important objective, but the subsidies that flowed to capital through the first SDI programme deepened regional inequality and failed to produce corresponding multipliers for local economic development.

It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the new phase of SDI development will depart from that trend and help to level uneven regional development in southern Africa.

Author: Dr Darlene Miller, senior research specialist, Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery programme, HSRC.

ON SEX, VIOLENCE & BEING MACHO IN THE ARMY

Male soldiers and sexual violence

NYAMEKA MANKAYI interviewed 14 male soldiers in the South African National Defence Force between the ages of 23 and 33, looking at how masculinity, sexuality and sexual violence is expressed in a military context. Articles flowing from these qualitative interviews appeared in two journals.

There is a dangerous contradiction in the adherence of male soldiers to the right of women to refuse sex on one hand, and their ambiguity around this right on the other.

Gender equity has been a high priority since the 1994 elections, yet despite numerous initiatives by concerned groups, gender-based violence remains endemic in South Africa. Rates of male violence towards women and children remain extraordinarily high, with between a quarter to two-thirds of women reporting either physical or sexual intimate-partner violence.

Aggressive behaviour, including physical violence and intense interest in sexual 'conquest', is important to the presentation of hegemonic masculinity.

This article looks at how the military, which is male-dominated and where aggression and conquest are valued as a professional ethos, might vicariously facilitate violence against women. It explores the association between the militarisation of male soldiers and violence, in particular sexual violence.

CONSTRUCTIONS OF MASCULINITY

To understand violence, it is necessary to focus on the socio-cultural context and the complex relations of meaning and power within which male masculinities are constituted. Across cultures and communities, some aspects of masculinity – such as heterosexuality, the importance of physical strength and control over

women – consistently emerge as key to hegemonic masculinities. Aggressive behaviour, including physical violence and intense interest in sexual 'conquest', is important to the presentation of hegemonic masculinity.

Reasons for failing to control sexual temptation were couched by the individual interview participants in the well-documented 'male sex drive' discourse,

The military structure is dominated by masculine characteristics such as aggression, bravery, heroism and heterosexuality, and the idea of the 'warrior hero'. War is the central function of the military, and the organisational context of it legitimises and idealises violence, which could rationalise male violence towards women. Indeed, feminists have long criticised the military as reflecting and representing patriarchy in its most extreme form, with war as a metaphor for rape.

Reasons for failing to control sexual temptation were couched by the individual interview participants in the well-documented 'male sex drive' discourse, this 'meaning' becoming exaggerated due to soldiers being deployed away from their sexual partners, in poor communities where transactional sex with women and girls – which is abusive and possibly coercive and violent – is easy due to their economic vulnerability.

WHAT IS 'RAPE'?

In reflecting on sexual violence, the dominant discourse of participants was that rape and rapists were abnor-

mal and pathological. Rape was seen as problematic, and differentiated from 'normal' male sexuality. Yet strong ambiguity emerged when presented with certain 'rape' scenarios, highlighting the popular notion that women are not always believable when they say they've been raped.

Women were positioned as being at times responsible for being sexually violated when they were not 'clear' and 'strong' enough in their protests. Even a little force ('pushing') by men seemed justified as something relatively trivial. It appears that only extreme forms of men's violence (being 'gun-handled') qualified as contributing to sexual violence.

Also, in reflecting on coercive sexuality, some participants continued to invoke the popular notion that women 'cry rape'. More disturbing was the claim by participants that even if a woman was raped, she'd be more upset about being 'used' by a man.

ARMED AND DANGEROUS

The combination of exaggerated masculinity and certain material conditions of military life create a situation in which coercive and even violent sexual practices may be normalised and legitimised, and in many cases rendered invisible. Socially, it is a critical intersection that requires examination, given the highly mobile nature of military populations, their subjectiveness in being so integrally locked into weapon-carrying and violence, and their potential to enact violence in many situations.

Summary of an article published in the Journal of Psychology in Africa (2010).



HOW MACHO IS MACHO IN THE MILITARY?

Race groups in the SA National Defence Force sometimes differ on what they see as manly, but despite their different departure points, masculine identity is always strengthened by military culture.

During the apartheid era, service to the nation was portrayed as necessary to transform young white conscripts into responsible men who could support a family and function in organised civil society.

The SA Defence Force, which became the SA National Defence Force on the eve of the first democratic election in 1994, was a crucial source of ideas about appropriate behaviour for white men. The media presented military successes in such a way that the warrior hero was revered.

The long history of masculinity and militarism has not been unique to South Africa. The link between militarisation and 'masculinisation' is universal – men have since time immemorial been expected to be protectors and fighters. But a shift from conscription to volunteers has provided the opportunity to combine armed masculinity with the masculinity of the breadwinner.

This article briefly interprets 14 interviews held with male soldiers from different racial groups. All 14 were at a tertiary institution while pursuing a career as junior commissioned officers. They were aged from 23 to 33.

JOB SECURITY

In South Africa many join the military for job security or educational opportunities – the masculinity of improving yourself or providing for your family. Close to 80% of soldiers joined for job security and fringe benefits, and because they sought discipline, orderliness, uni-

formity and cohesiveness. About 60% cited an interest in weapons.

Close to 80% of soldiers joined for job security and fringe benefits, and because they sought discipline, orderliness, uniformity and cohesiveness. About 60% cited an interest in weapons.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Soldiers from different racial groups with different historical and social backgrounds join the army for different reasons, and assess masculinity differently. All the white participants believed soldiering was a 'calling' and not just a job, while their African counterparts joined primarily for socioeconomic reasons.

'I tried to go to varsity, and was accepted in two institutions, but I had no money to study' (Thando).

Sam, a coloured man from a low socioeconomic background, saw the masculine imperative of being responsible and providing for his family: 'It breaks my heart to see how some families suffer because the man is irresponsible ... I can't stand it. That's why I come here.'

The military has its own traditions, seldom written down but taken seriously nevertheless. Toughness and leadership are seen as manly. Uniforms denote strength and valour, creating a sense of pride. They are used to benchmark masculinities against one another – for instance, the white uniforms and activities of the navy are ridiculed by other service divisions.

A comment on them being a 'bunch of gay guys' shows that gay men are particularly 'othered' in the military, where homosexuality means subordinate masculinity. Remarked one participant: 'Me, I'm a para-trooper; I'm a man [boasting]. I enjoy being a man. I don't want to be a feminine man.'

SUBSTANCE ABUSE, MASCULINITY AND PROMISCUITY


Participants also cited 'unhealthy' traditions – drinking and casual sex are rife. 'Guys start to drink very heavily, smoke heavily and start to experiment with drugs,' said one.

Drinking practice is perceived as a site in which power and legitimacy of masculinity and sexuality are cemented: '... you must impress the ladies, the whole time and that you must be at heart of every party and you must be able to drink until you drop, and try not to drop while you're drinking'.

Masculine culture is deeply embedded in South Africa, and participants' conceptions of masculinity and sexuality call for investigation as they have implications for the lives of young women and men (black and white) in the SANDF and in broader society.

Summary of an article published in Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 38(2):22–43.

Author: Dr Nyameka Mankayi, senior research specialist, HIV/AIDS, STIs and TB programme, HSRC.



AFRICA IN FOCUS: GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Kwandiwe Kondlo and Chinenyengozi Ejiogu (eds)

The Africa in Focus series is an initiative of the Human and Social Sciences Research Council (HSRC) that creates a forum for African scholars to frame research questions and examine critical issues affecting the African continent in the 21st century. The series should inspire robust debate to help inform the orientation of public policy in Africa.

Will Africa's recuperative powers have dispelled the shadows of historically imposed predicaments by the end of the century? This question is at the core of this first volume in the series, in which contributors wrestle with 'lived realities' related to the unfolding process of democratic transformation across the African continent. The volume interrogates a range of issues: knowledge and its transformation; the need to manage natural resources; the economy viewed through the lens of actual livelihoods; other thorny challenges affecting social wellbeing in Africa and Africa's relationship with the rest of the world.

In the early part of this 21st century, colonial legacies continue to circumscribe many of the hopes and aspirations pinned on democracy by people of the African continent. The challenges of the African state cannot always be explained through reference to the past, and the contributors put forward strong arguments for self-reliance among African people, ethical leadership, economic democracy, the indigenisation of knowledge and institutional reform.

This seminal collection will be of interest to political scholars, students and professionals in the field of African Studies, as well as to policy-makers and public officials across the continent.

Soft cover, 400pp, ISBN 978-07969-2344-8, research monograph, R295.00



SECTORS AND SKILLS: THE NEED FOR POLICY ALIGNMENT

Andre Kraak

This study examines the skill demands of five economic clusters in South Africa:

- The high-tech sector – automotive, aerospace and 'big science' technology such as space science, nuclear energy and biotechnology;
- The resource-based sector – metals, chemicals, wood, paper and pulp;

- The labour-intensive sector – clothing and textiles, agro-processing and the creative industries;
- The services sector – financial services, ICT and tourism; and
- Public infrastructure – energy and transport.


Drawing on the skills of scholars and expert consultants throughout South Africa, the findings point to highly differentiated socioeconomic conditions and divergent prospects for future growth in each sector. The analysis shows that each sector requires customised skills development strategies to meet specific sectoral conditions. This places widely diverging demands on the education and training system that, in turn, necessitate far greater levels of alignment between skills development and industrial policies.

Economic policy-makers, small business development and funding agencies,

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academics, development planners and human resource strategists will find this a vital resource in conceptualising and formulating new skills development strategies.

Soft cover, 380pp, ISBN 978-07969-2265-6, research monograph, R 210.00




CLEANER ENERGY COOLER CLIMATE

Harald Winkler

Energy and climate change are issues of critical importance for shaping a sustainable future, both in South Africa and globally. For South Africa, finding a policy approach which balances the increasing demand for energy with the need for sustainability, equity and climate change mitigation is a particular challenge.

This book provides an innovative and strategic approach to climate policy, with local development objectives as its starting point. Through energy modelling, indicators of sustainable development and policy analysis, Harald Winkler builds a rich and detailed case study illustrating how a development-focused approach to energy and climate policy might work in South Africa. An energy researcher, IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) author and a member of the South African delegation to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Winkler offers a nuanced examination of where the synergies and trade-offs lie, and makes clear the imperative of considering long-term implications when meeting short-term needs.

Soft cover, 320pp, ISBN 978-07969-2230-4, peer-reviewed book, R190.00



ELECTRIC CAPITALISM: RECOLONISING AFRICA ON THE POWER GRID

David A McDonald (ed.)

Although Africa is the most under-supplied region of the world for electricity, its economies are utterly dependent on it. There are enormous inequalities in electricity access, with industry receiving abundant supplies of cheap power while more than 80% of the continent's population remain off the power grid. Africa is not unique in this respect, but levels of inequality are particularly pronounced here due to the inherent unevenness of 'electric capitalism' on the continent.

This book provides an innovative theoretical framework for understanding electricity and capitalism in Africa, followed by a series of case studies that examine different aspects of electricity supply and consumption. The chapters focus primarily on South Africa due to its dominance in the electricity market, but there are important lessons to be learned for the continent as a whole, not least because of the aggressive expansion of South African capital into other parts of Africa to develop and control electricity. Africa is experiencing a renewed scramble for its electricity resources, conjuring up images of a recolonisation of the continent along the power grid.

Written by leading academics and activists, Electric Capitalism offers a cutting-edge, yet accessible, overview of one of the most important developments in Africa today – with direct implications for health, gender equity, environmental sustainability and socio-economic justice. From nuclear power through prepaid electricity meters to the massive dams projects taking place in central Africa, an understanding of electricity reforms on the continent helps shape our insights into development debates in Africa in particular, and the expansion of neoliberal capitalism more generally.

Soft cover, 512pp, ISBN 978-07969-2237-3, peer-reviewed book, R230.00

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